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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a critique of the reception of the Knowledge-Based Economy concept within 
both mainstream economics and contemporary Marxist debates. The first chapter analyses 
how this concept and attendant discussions have recently prompted mainstream economists 
to provide it with foundations within economic theory and advocate the development of an 
economics of knowledge. Given the fallacious understanding, within mainstream economics, 
of knowledge, the economy, and their interaction, the chapter demonstrates the flawed 
nature of the mainstream version of the Knowledge-Based Economy and the economics of 
knowledge as judged from the standpoint of any contribution holding different views on 
knowledge, the economy, and their interaction. The second chapter addresses the 
reinterpretation of the Knowledge-Based Economy as cognitive capitalism elaborated within 
Italian post-workerist autonomist Marxism. The latter theorises the preponderance of 
immaterial labour within contemporary capitalism, and has been recently recast in terms of 
Marxist economic analysis. Following the persistence of capitalism and the continuing 
relevance of Marxian analytical categories, the chapter demonstrates how the 
conceptualisation of contemporary capitalism as cognitive capitalism hinges on a misreading of 
Marxian value theory and its relation to the economy, and weakened links of the analysis with 
the politics of Marxism itself. The third chapter investigates issues related to the social ubiquity 
of networked computers, which is increasingly understood as driving new processes of class 
formation within capitalism and as instantiating new forms of exploitation considered, under 
the label of “prosumption”, as simultaneously more pervasive and less alienating. The chapter 
investigates these issues through the prism of recent work of Italian post-workerist Marxists 
critical of the cognitive capitalism debate. The chapter demonstrates the theoretical flaws 
inherent in both understanding technology as a vector of class formation and the concept of 
prosumption, while also deepening the critical understanding of Italian post-workerism 
elaborated in the second chapter. 
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Introduction 
 
The idea that we are now living in a Knowledge-Based Economy has recently shot to 
prominence within and across the social sciences, political rhetoric and public debates. Indeed, 
the Knowledge-Based Economy is the latest conceptual embodiment of the belief that 
information and knowledge are the new and true determinants of value in a changed context 
of economic activity. This belief has periodically resurfaced across the social sciences since at 
least the 1960s, in a rapid (and chaotic) sequence and proliferation of concepts, whilst sharing 
obvious affinities with one another (and the concept of Knowledge-Based Economy itself): at 
first with the portrayal of society as post-industrial, then with that of the economy as 
informational, learning, weightless, or simply “new” (often together with, or as alternative to, 
similar portrayals of society) (Huws, 2003; Kenway et al., 2006; Carlaw et al., 2006). At a 
material level, the elaboration of these concepts has received a great impulse from the 
reorganisation and restructuring undergone by productive processes and economic activity in 
capitalist economies since the 1970s, which have left observers both fascinated and baffled (if 
not in awe), and which have become themselves an object of conceptualisation and 
scholarship under, for example, the heading of post-Fordism (see Amin, 1994 for an 
introduction to the debate). Further, the rise of the concept of Knowledge-Based Economy 
within and across the social sciences at large is indicative of broader dynamics and trends 
affecting the latter, albeit in ambiguous ways. Indeed, at a general level, interest in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy is inscribed in a movement of retreat from the excesses of both 
neoliberalism and postmodernism which has marked recent developments within and across 
the social sciences. This has been matched and paralleled by a renewal of analytical curiosity 
for the imbrication and dynamic interaction of the economic, the material, the social, the 
political, the ideal and the cultural. The concept of Knowledge-Based Economy is but one 
expression of such tendencies and revived analytical aims and prospects, and other examples 
are readily available in the scholarship and debates on social capital (Fine, 2001, 2010b), 
globalisation and, more recently, financialisation. At a less general level, though, the 
conceptualisation of the Knowledge-Based Economy exemplifies how such retreat has been 
uneven across disciplines and topics or, put otherwise, it exemplifies how persisting, though 
changing and redefined, the influence of both neoliberalism and postmodernism can still be. 
The specific case of the Knowledge-Based Economy is a key illustration of this. Indeed (as the 
first chapter of this thesis will also demonstrate), the limited engagement of mainstream 
economics with the Knowledge-Based Economy has been deeply marked by the rise of 
neoliberal elements within and without the discipline, as well as the support that this has 
offered to specific developments internal to the discipline itself. As a matter of fact, the most 
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prestigious understanding and treatment of the relation between knowledge and the economy 
provided from within economics was integral to Hayek’s rhetoric in service of the neoliberal 
programme (Hayek, 1945). Although this was not the only available conceptualisation of the 
relations between knowledge and the economy within economics (see, for an equally 
prestigious alternative conceptualisation, Boulding, 1966), it is Hayek’s account that prevailed 
and proved the most influential in the long run (Mirowski, 2011). Similarly (as the second 
chapter will also demonstrate), interest in the Knowledge-Based Economy within radicalism 
and critical scholarship is part and parcel of postmodernist re-elaborations (if not rejection) of 
Marxism. This is unsurprising for, in many ways, the rise of postmodernism and its prominence 
within and across the social sciences are tightly and deeply connected with the concept of 
Knowledge-Based Economy itself: on the one hand, postmodernism has been largely inspired 
by many of the same ideas and phenomena prompting the development of the concept in the 
first place (see, for a telling example, the founding text of postmodernism, Lyotard, 1979b), 
while, on the other hand, postmodernism has also provided the latter with a legitimising force 
and rhetoric (Huws, 2003), as well as a vast scholarship and a philosophical framework to draw 
on, engage with, and contribute to. Moving from the domain of scholarship to that of policy, 
the Knowledge-Based Economy concept has quickly become part of the rhetoric (though not 
necessarily the policy in practice) of several international institutions (OECD, 1996, 2000; 
UNESCO, 2003, 2005; World Bank, 1999; Kaul et al., 1999), and was even cast as a stated policy 
objective (if not new foundational narrative) for the Eurozone (CEU, 2000). Although this has 
been somewhat disrupted by the outbreak of the current financial and economic crisis, it is 
significant that the rhetoric of international institutions (albeit with different qualifications 
according to institutional purposes, functions and politics) found an important point of 
convergence with the grievances of those attempting to defend the open and public character 
of knowledge from privatisation. Indeed, both rhetoric(s) and grievances (although to different 
extents, for different reasons and with different motives) accept and borrow the 
characterisation of knowledge as a public good from economic theory. Such characterisation 
originates in the understanding of scientific activity, research and development as non-rival 
and non-excludable goods put forward by Arrow (1962a) and Nelson (1959). However, 
potentially because of its political and moral attraction and its ability to be easily understood, 
this characterisation of knowledge has become prominent across scholarship, advocacy and 
even radicalism, as manifest in the rise of the related concept of global public goods (Kaul et 
al., 1999) and its echoes in, and affinities with, the scholarly (Hess, Ostrom, 2007a) and radical 
(Hardt, Negri, 2009; Mattei, 2011) debates on the commons. Given this context, it is 
unsurprising that a critical (radical) scholarship would eventually come to develop, under the 
heading of cognitive capitalism, with the precise aim of tracing the contours of change and 
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continuity in contemporary capitalism, and of demystifying the idyllic scenarios often 
associated with the Knowledge-Based Economy (Vercellone, 2003, 2006a, 2007a). 
However, all of this raises the issue of the empirical foundations for the concept of Knowledge-
Based Economy and of their appropriate conceptualisation. Indeed, to claim that we are now 
living in a new epoch in the material organisation of economic activity, if not of (or beyond) 
capitalism altogether, immediately raises the necessity to identify with precision extant 
changes in the economy and their extent, their origins and sources, and their dynamic 
interaction with the socio-economic structures and processes shaping the economy and its 
functioning as a whole. Commentary on the Knowledge-Based Economy, both mainstream and 
critical, has converged on the identification of a set of stylised facts. These range from the 
increased importance of intangibles and immaterial goods within conventional Gross Domestic 
Product figures, through the growth of knowledge-related investment, knowledge work and 
knowledge-intensive activities, to the ongoing revolution in information communication 
technologies and the current quantitative and qualitative extension and expansion of patents 
and intellectual property rights (David, Foray, 2002, 2003; Gorz, 2003; Vercellone, 2003, 
2006a; Rullani, 2004; Foray, 2006; Fumagalli, 2007; Pagano, Rossi, 2009). Nonetheless, any 
understanding of the Knowledge-Based Economy will inevitably hinge on prior understandings 
and conceptualisations of knowledge, the economy, and the relation between these. 
Therefore, there can be (at least potentially) as many understandings of the Knowledge-Based 
Economy as there are understandings of these elements and their combinations. Significantly, 
for mainstream economics the nature and role of knowledge has occupied a shadowy 
existence, and this reflects an inability to address the issues and content involved at all let 
alone satisfactorily. This is not to deny that mainstream economists have engaged over specific 
topics which may be understood as falling within the broad category of phenomena 
encompassed by the concept of Knowledge-Based Economy (i.e. topics related to one or 
another stylised fact). Nor is it meant to deny that (casual, mindless and superficial) reference 
to the relation between knowledge and the economy and to the Knowledge-Based Economy 
itself is increasingly being made, more or less gingerly, from within mainstream economics 
(although this is done in contradictory ways, as also demonstrated in the first chapter) 
(Mirowski, 2011). Rather, what needs to be emphasised is how there has been very little 
engagement of economics with the concept of Knowledge-Based Economy, its foundations and 
the scholarship attached to it. Potentially  (as suggested in Foley, 2013), this can be explained 
by an ingrained and firm belief, within mainstream economics, in the logic of “Engel curves”, 
whereby the shift from the satisfaction of (strictly and narrowly conceived) material needs to 
that of immaterial needs, and the consequent shift in the preponderance of economic activity 
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addressing and catering for the latter as opposed to the former (together with the 
phenomenon of deindustrialisation), is a normal, understandable and predictable consequence 
of raising standards of living. Yet, while in other areas the assumptions and weaknesses of 
mainstream economics have not prevented it from addressing the issues involved (as in the 
cases of social capital and globalisation, for example), in the case of the Knowledge-Based 
Economy mainstream economics is left behind, and it is only a handful of economists that have 
attempted to provide the concept with foundations within economics. This lack of engagement 
follows directly from the flawed understanding of knowledge, the economy, and the relation 
between the two characterising mainstream economics. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated 
in the first chapter, even the limited engagement that there has been with the Knowledge-
Based Economy concept and its implications is marked by the weaknesses of the discipline and 
the idiosyncrasies of those who engage by deploying, or even departing from, the standard 
categories of mainstream economics. 
The relative absence of mainstream economics on the topic of the Knowledge-Based Economy 
has left a vacuum to be filled, and this offers both an opportunity and a challenge for 
heterodoxy. Indeed, given the undeniable (though not uncontested) monopoly currently held 
by orthodox economics over teaching, scholarship, policy advice and policy-making, one of the 
main thrusts of heterodox economics has been to take the mainstream as point of departure. 
While, as mentioned above, there has been, at least in part, convergence between orthodox 
and heterodox accounts of the Knowledge-Based Economy over the identification of a set of 
stylised facts, this convergence has been (mis)interpreted (from outside of economics) as a 
slow, partial and timid coming to their senses of mainstream economists (Rullani, 2004), or 
(from the point of view of heterodox economists contributing to the cognitive capitalism 
literature) as confirmation, however partial and uncritical, of the empirical salience of the 
trends and dynamics identified by the adherents to the cognitive capitalism approach 
(Fumagalli, 2007). However, if at a theoretical level, the relative lack of scholarship on the 
Knowledge-Based Economy from within economics opens a world of possibilities for heterodox 
economics and, more generally, anyone having anything purposeful to say about knowledge, 
the economy, and the relation between them, all of this has also left enormous scope for ideas 
to float free in all sorts of directions. Indeed, and precisely because of the popularity of the 
concept of Knowledge-Based Economy and the corresponding and growing feeling that it 
needs to be demystified, takes on the latter have multiplied more or less chaotically within and 
across the social sciences. Further, this has interacted with, and has been exacerbated by, the 
dynamics and processes leading conceptual innovation within the social sciences to turn, more 
often than not, into the coining of buzzwords, the bastardisation (naive, opportunistic or 
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otherwise) of the notion of interdisciplinarity, and the powerful support offered to these by 
the dynamics and processes summarised under the “publish or perish” dictum. As a result, 
these tendencies have created a problem of focus for this thesis. Thus, priority has been 
accorded to the literatures and scholarship attempting to provide an understanding of the 
Knowledge-Based Economy and its dynamics from a theoretical point of view. Therefore, and 
to begin with, it has seemed appropriate to analyse, in the first chapter, whatever little 
attention the Knowledge-Based Economy has garnered from within mainstream economics. 
Indeed, however limited the engagement of mainstream economists as a whole with the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, specific ideas, concepts and theories from mainstream economics 
(such as the conceptualisation of knowledge as a public good or endogenous growth theory) 
have played an important part in nourishing the universe of, and the rhetoric associated with, 
the Knowledge-Based Economy, especially as received within the discourses of international 
institutions and of those attempting to defend the immanently public and open character of 
knowledge from privatisation. Further, following (if not partially inspired by) this appropriation 
of economic ideas from outside the discipline, a small group of economists have attempted to 
provide the concept of Knowledge-Based Economy itself with a foundation within 
(mainstream) economic theory, and to call for, if not already proclaim the existence of, the 
parallel development of an economics of knowledge. Amongst these, the work of Paul David 
and, especially, Dominique Foray (David, Foray, 2002, 2003; Foray, 2006) stands out, not least 
because of their prominence in earlier debates on the economics of science and the economics 
of innovation, and because of their pivotal role in influencing the research and policy agenda 
(and the rhetoric) of the OECD (1996, 2000). The chapter will demonstrate that, given the 
flawed understanding, within mainstream economics, of knowledge, the economy, and the 
relation between the two, there exist devastating criticisms of the mainstream version of the 
Knowledge-Based Economy and of the economics of knowledge attached to it, even to the 
extent of declaring their impossibility (Mirowski, 2009b, 2011), as gauged from the point of 
view of any contribution taking a different, even slightly more refined, view of the nature of 
knowledge, the economy, and their interaction. 
Following my dissatisfaction with the mainstream version of the Knowledge-Based Economy, 
my engagement with the latter led me to attempt to come to grips with it and the issues 
involved through the lens of current debates on the labour process in relation to both 
contemporary capitalism and abstract thinking. In order to do so, I have studied what has 
come to constitute, and establish itself as, the most structured critical theoretical body of 
scholarship investigating the Knowledge-Based Economy and its dynamics. This, which is the 
object of analysis of the second chapter, originates in Italian post-workerist autonomist 
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Marxism, especially as popularised and reframed as a theory of contemporary capitalism in the 
work of social and political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2009). 
This body of work focuses on the concept of immaterial labour, understood as the labour 
involved in the production of immaterial goods and, more generally, the immaterial, 
informational and cultural content of commodities. From this basis, and the putative 
contemporary preponderance (or, in Hardt and Negri’s terminology, “hegemony”) of 
immaterial labour, systemic implications are drawn in service of a particular reading and 
understanding of what constitute, putatively, new mechanisms of capital accumulation and a 
new condition of labour (in relation to capital) within contemporary capitalism. This analytical 
endeavour has recently been completed and complemented by the literature on cognitive 
capitalism. The latter has developed as an explicit attempt to recast Hardt and Negri’s reading 
of contemporary capitalism in terms of Marxist economic theory and Marxian categories 
(Vercellone, 2003, 2006a, 2007a). This approach is of more recent vintage than Negri’s own 
theories (although, as will be demonstrated, it is on these that the cognitive capitalism 
approach is largely based). However, there are signs that it is increasingly attracting the 
interest, within and across the social sciences, of those wanting to address the Knowledge-
Based Economy, its dynamics and processes from a critical perspective (see, for a collection of 
examples, Peters, Bulut, 2011). Further, and in tight connection with Hardt and Negri’s (2009) 
recent turn to the debate on the commons, the cognitive capitalism approach is garnering 
attention as a paradigm of reference within contemporary forms and manifestations of 
political radicalism (if not acquiring the character and status of counterpart to the Knowledge-
Based Economy concept and, therefore, becoming a buzzword in its own right, even if radical, 
alternative, oppositional or whatever). Yet, upon closer inspection, both Hardt and Negri’s 
conceptualisation of contemporary capitalism and its recasting as cognitive capitalism appear 
strikingly paradoxical. Indeed, and despite the latter’s appeals to Marx, Marxism, Marxist 
economic theory and Marxian categories, in practice, they undermine the basis for, and logic 
of, a commitment to the purposeful use of Marxian economic categories to understand 
contemporary socio-economic dynamics, processes and structures. By contrast, the chapter 
will demonstrate that, given the persistence of capitalism and the enduring relevance of 
Marxian analytical categories, Hardt and Negri’s conceptualisation of contemporary capitalism 
and its recasting as cognitive capitalism are highly dependent on a misreading of Marxian value 
theory, a misreading of the current socio-economic dynamics, processes and structures 
shaping and structuring the economy, as well as a tenuous rooting of the analysis in Marxist 
politics and the lives, behaviour and practices of really existing workers. 
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At this point, following up on the interest in the labour process which led me to study Italian 
post-workerism, and pushed by my disagreements and dissatisfaction with the latter, I have 
deemed it necessary to study some of the theoretical issues raised by the role of computers, 
software, the internet and their attendant processes of informatisation in reshaping and 
restructuring work, exploitation, and the labour process itself. Indeed, as is widely recognised, 
these constitute the (socio-)technical basis and infrastructure of the Knowledge-Based 
Economy. Following from this, broader societal implications are usually drawn. Within 
conventional accounts of the Knowledge-Based Economy, computers, software and 
informatisation are understood as encompassed by, and enablers of, the rise of knowledge-
related investment, knowledge work and knowledge-intensive activities. Thus, their social 
ubiquity is itself interpreted as a confirmation of, and a major thrust behind, the shift to a 
Knowledge-Based Economy (Foray, 2006). Similarly, within the standard post-workerist 
account, the social ubiquity of computers and software is seen as entailing processes of 
informatisation and computerisation of work, which are then (mis)understood as making 
labour both “abstract” (for it is through computers and software that workers operate on 
symbols, procedures and algorithms, i.e. “abstractions”) and “autonomous” from capital (for 
this type of work is seen as implying the direct mobilisation of the linguistic and cognitive 
abilities of workers, with the former understood as inherently leading to cooperation and the 
latter as making the fruits of labour inherently inexpropriable) (Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt, Negri, 
2000). In this intellectual climate and context, two questions have emerged spontaneously. 
Since we (putatively) live in a Knowledge-Based economy, i.e. an economy in which knowledge 
and information are (posited as) the ultimate determinants of value and economic activity, can 
knowledge workers be understood as a class within contemporary society, if not the new 
productive class itself? Further, given the social ubiquity of software and computers within and 
without the labour process of knowledge workers themselves, to what extent and degree do 
these, together with the socio-economic processes of which they are dynamically part, lead to 
exploitative dynamics, relations and processes? With respect to the first question, there have 
been as many answers as there are conceptions of class and knowledge work and, although 
the general tendency is to respond positively to both questions, exactly how knowledge 
workers are identified and whether they are seen as exploited or not varies (for different 
summaries, see: Huws, 2003, ch.10; Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b). With respect to the second 
question, often in relation to the first but also independently of it, a (relatively) new concept 
has (re)appeared in current debates within and across business studies (Tapscott, Williams, 
2008), the sociology of consumption (Ritzer, Jurgenson, 2010; Ritzer et al., 2012), and critical 
media studies (Fuchs, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). This goes by the (clumsy) name of “prosumption”, 
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and refers to the whole range of activities, undertaken by consumers themselves, leading to 
the production of goods and services for consumption. 
The third chapter of this thesis addresses these issues, questions and debates by looking at 
them through the prism of a close reading of the recent work of Sergio Bologna (Bologna, 
2007; Bologna, Banfi, 2011) and Carlo Formenti (2011), two post-workerist authors critical of 
Hardt and Negri’s theories. Indeed, Bologna provides a reading of the changes affecting the 
contemporary workplace, not least those due to the informatisation of production and the 
consequent displacement of the workplace from its “traditional” locus. In this context, he 
elaborates a new social figure (the “second generation autonomous worker”), commonly 
understood as a valid (and empirically-grounded) alternative to Hardt and Negri’s immaterial 
labourer (Cuninghame, 2000). Formenti, on the other hand, reassesses the faults and merits of 
post-workerism and Hardt and Negri’s theories in light of, and relation to, the current debates 
over the politics of the internet, where the notion of prosumption is mobilised by both 
enthusiasts (see, for example, Tapscott, Williams, 2008) and critics (see, for example, Fuchs, 
2009, 2010a, 2010b, and Formenti himself) to give material grounding to the socio-economic 
dynamics surrounding the internet. Viewing these debates, which are interesting in 
themselves, through the prism of Bologna and Formenti’s post-workerist dissent, has a twofold 
value. Indeed, and first, this endeavour allows assessing and discussing the questions 
mentioned above in their own right, although through the specific case study of post-workerist 
dissenters. Second, it also allows assessing critically the recent work (and theories) of these 
post-workerist dissenters, which has not yet been translated into English. Thus, the chapter 
will demonstrate the problematic aspects of understanding knowledge workers as a new class 
and of the concept of prosumption itself, while at the same time gauging the limits of post-
workerist dissent. In the process, this will allow reaching a better and deeper understanding of 
post-workerist Marxism, and to test the mettle of the interpretative hypothesis on the latter 
developed in the second chapter. 
However, at this juncture it is in order to clarify the reasons which have led to choosing the 
present form for this thesis, together with the methodological stance espoused in each of the 
chapters composing it. Indeed, and to begin with, the choice to structure the thesis around a 
set of related yet distinct self-contained contributions (as opposed to structuring it as a 
monograph) could be questioned on the grounds of its appropriateness for the tasks at hand, 
as well as on altogether logical grounds. Indeed, consider the following: this thesis author’s 
institutional location and intellectual background is in economics; this thesis has a primary 
focus on (more or less) heterodox topics and literatures, and it is critical in intent; and, in close 
connection with the previous point and with respect to the appropriate understanding of the 
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contemporary relation between (mainstream) economics and the other social sciences, this 
thesis addresses various aspects of what has been termed economics imperialism – i.e. the 
extension of economic theory to subject matter previously understood as beyond the 
disciplinary purview of economics, resulting in the progressive (although restricted, restrictive 
and debased) (re)incorporation of the social within economic theory (Milonakis, Fine, 2009). 
But, given these considerations, is it not contradictory to insist on criticising economics 
imperialism while simultaneously structuring this thesis’ own discourse as a set of related yet 
distinct self-contained contributions? Would it not have been more appropriate, given the 
tasks at hand and the clear aim to criticise economics imperialism, to structure the thesis as a 
monograph, systematically endowing it with a narrative running through it from beginning to 
end? These are not idle questions, for an important feature of economics imperialism could be 
seen as exactly the expulsion of narrative from the discourse of economics and, albeit 
unevenly, of the disciplines it “invades” and “colonises”. This is done in deference to 
mathematical modelling and it entails the sidelining of established methodologies and 
continuing traditions across both the study of particular topics and the social sciences in 
general, with this move being (mis)interpreted and (mis)construed as the ultimate hallmark of 
scientificity and analytical rigour. Thus, the structuring of this thesis around a set of related yet 
self-contained contributions could be seen as reproducing the form (if not the meme) of the 
traditional doctoral thesis in economics – generally structured around a collection of papers, as 
opposed to being infused with a narrative – and, therefore, as a blunted analytical weapon 
against economics imperialism. Further, and as consequence of the above, the structure 
chosen for this thesis could even be seen as leading the latter to be logically incoherent and 
internally contradictory, exposing this piece of work to the critique of having fallen prey, albeit 
unwittingly (though perhaps more irritatingly), to the very logic it seeks to demystify. Put 
otherwise: tu quoque, “heterodox” economist? 
Yet, and in response to the potential contradiction raised above, two sets of reasons leading to 
privilege the present form for this thesis can be offered. First, it must be stressed how a critical 
historical narrative demystifying the Knowledge-Based Economy concept already exists. This is 
readily found in the work recently carried out by Philip Mirowski, on the one hand, and 
Benjamin Coriat, on the other hand, together with their respective associates (Mirowski, Van 
Horn, 2005; Mirowski, Sent, 2008; Mirowski, 2008, 2011; Coriat, 2002a, 2002b; Coriat, Orsi, 
2002; Coriat et al., 2003; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012; Orsi, 2002; Orsi, Moatti, 2001; Orsi, Coriat, 
2005, 2006). As discussed in greater length and detail in the conclusion of this thesis, this body 
of work stands out for its ability to highlight the shallowness of the foundations for the 
concept of Knowledge-Based Economy, not least by emphasising the historical (co)evolution of 
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the socio-economic institutions, structures, dynamics and processes underpinning the use, 
production, reproduction and accumulation of knowledge (together with science and 
technology) in advanced capitalist economies. 
Nonetheless, and however much I agree with Mirowski’s and Coriat’s recent work and 
historical understanding of the incorporation of knowledge within capitalist dynamics, to use 
their account as a base for an alternative narrative could have been itself contradictory (at 
least for the purposes of the present thesis, but see the conclusion for considerations on the 
possibility of integrating and extending their more recent work). Indeed, Mirowski (1989) 
rejects Marx’s value theory (but see Caffentzis, 2007 for an attempt to refute Mirowski’s 
reading), and Coriat originally hails from workerist labour process theory (1976) only to shift 
soon thereafter to regulation theory (1979, 1990) – of which he is one of the forefathers – and, 
ultimately, to accept and praise post-fordist Japanese methods of production (1991) (although 
his more recent contributions, commended above, can be seen as marking a phase of re-
radicalisation in his work). In light of all of this, to base a rebuttal of Italian post-workerism as 
the one proposed in this thesis on a narrative borrowing from Mirowski and Coriat could have 
been seen as deeply contradictory, and probably more so than the potential contradiction 
suggested in the previous paragraph. Thus, while this thesis does not intend to replicate (or, at 
least for the time being, extend) Mirowski’s and Coriat’s recent work, it seeks to complement 
it in two ways: by providing an understanding of the mainstream version of the Knowledge-
Based Economy together with its points of contact with the broader rhetoric attached to the 
latter concept outside of the discipline of economics, not least in light of economics 
imperialism and the contemporary state of economics; and by paying close attention on how 
radicalism and left-leaning scholarship have reacted to the concept of Knowledge-Based 
Economy and its scholarship. The first theme is explored in the first chapter, not least by 
offering a close reading of those contributions more directly seeking to derive a 
characterisation of contemporary capitalism from the classical characterisation of knowledge 
offered within mainstream economic theory. The second theme is explored in the second and 
third chapters in relation to, respectively, Italian post-workerism and its internal dissent 
(together with the issues of whether knowledge workers constitute a new class, and whether 
prosumption is an appropriate category for the study of contemporary capitalism). Albeit 
related, these are self-enclosed issues that commanded separate treatment. 
A second set of reasons inducing to structure the thesis in its present form derives from what I 
have found to be problematic aspects of narrative itself with respect to the Knowledge-Based 
Economy concept and its relation to the economy. This is not to appeal to the cynical rejection 
of, and suspicious scepticism towards, narrative as bestowed upon academia by the 
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postmodern proclamation of the “end of master narratives” (Lyotard, 1979b). If anything, and 
quite to the contrary, it is to denounce how such postmodern hubris (if not a narrative in 
itself?) has instead resulted in (and masked?) what can be likened to a veritable explosion of 
narratives. Indeed, the original intentions and motivation in preparing this thesis were exactly 
those of providing an alternative critical account of the Knowledge-Based Economy, not least 
by studying the socio-economic dynamics attached to software and computers as a specific 
case study of the former conceptualisation of contemporary capitalism. Yet, in reviewing and 
making sense of the existing literature, both mainstream and critical, it soon became clear to 
me that, as already stated at the beginning of this Introduction, the Knowledge-Based 
Economy is but one amongst many competing portrayals of society and/or the economy, 
where the latter are (mis)construed as post-industrial, post-Fordist, informational, learning, 
weightless, or simply “new” (Huws, 2003; Kenway et al., 2006; Carlaw et al., 2006). In addition 
to this, and more to the point, the literature on the Knowledge-Based Economy has 
characteristically focused on asserting what is its nature, how it is distinctive, and how and why 
this is significant. But, given that there can be as many conceptions of the Knowledge-Based 
Economy as there are conceptions of knowledge, the economy, and of their interaction, this 
has resulted in a proliferation of narratives, where particular and select aspects of reality 
(sometimes having relative purchase, sometimes merely contextual or altogether imaginary) 
are generalised and magnified into descriptions of contemporary capitalism as a whole. 
Further, not only has this happened at the expense of sound theoretical conceptualisation and 
pushing the analysis in the wrong directions and beyond what is justifiable, but it has often had 
the effect of distracting from (if not outrightly masking, although in complex ways) the real 
nature and dynamics of contemporary capitalism, undeniably rooted in finance (as painfully 
evident in light of the current crisis). But, having reached these conclusions, to propose yet 
another version of the Knowledge-Based Economy, even if critical, inevitably appears as a 
complicit participation in the proliferation, if not cacophony, of competing and 
incommensurable narratives discussed above. It then seemed more fruitful to take part in a 
more fine-grained exercise of debunking, such as the one offered in the chapters of this thesis. 
However, all of the above raises the issue of the methodological stance adopted in each 
chapter. Having chosen to structure the thesis as a set of related yet self-contained 
contributions, it has seemed appropriate to let the issues addressed in each chapter dictate 
the methodological stance best suited to address them. In the first chapter, my main 
motivation is to caution those positioned outside the mainstream of economics (be they 
economists or not) against welcoming the elaboration of a mainstream version of (and vision 
for) the Knowledge-Based Economy as a move of the mainstream towards greater pluralism 
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and increased realism (along the lines proposed by Foray, 2006 and David, Foray, 2002, 2003, 
for example). An equally powerful motivation is easily found in the intent to caution the same 
constituency against the use of concepts and conceptualisations drawn from economics and 
which have come to permeate the broader rhetoric conventionally attached to the Knowledge-
Based Economy outside of the discipline (e.g. the conceptualisation of knowledge as a public 
good), since these are inappropriate to understand the social character of knowledge and to 
defend the latter from commercialisation. Given these motivations, it has seemed adequate to 
adopt a broad pluralistic heterodox approach, in the intent of convincing those otherwise 
attracted by the Knowledge-Based Economy concept of its lack of foundations and of the 
necessity to build broad alliances against the mainstream. Otherwise, the second and third 
chapters address issues directly related to the Marxian research programme (such as 
exploitation and class, for example), as well as scholarship and interpretations of particular 
phenomena which, in various ways, are increasingly coming to be seen as improving on, if not 
ultimately sanctioning the obsolescence of Marxian and Marxist political economy. Thus, these 
two chapters adopt a methodological stance distinctly and firmly located within Marxist 
political economy and which takes Marx and his own work seriously, for the main motivation 
behind these chapters is to sound a warning against abandoning Marx’s value theory when 
interpreting the workings of capitalism. 
In summary, this thesis does not have the pretension (nor the presumptuousness) of 
addressing all of what has been said (or that could possibly be said) about the Knowledge-
Based Economy. Rather, it provides a reading of the latter that is relevant to some of the 
concerns that the Knowledge-Based Economy concept raises, together with the socio-
economic dynamics and processes usually associated to it, as judged from the perspective of 
economic analysis and theory. This is done from a general point of view in the first chapter, 
and with a specific focus on Marxian economic theory in the second and third chapters. 
Nonetheless, the thesis also addresses broader themes and concerns than those strictly 
related to the Knowledge-Based Economy, for which the latter provides an interesting example 
and a useful case study. Indeed, and first, this thesis is animated by the aim of investigating the 
conditions and methods for the appropriate conceptualisation of the dynamic interaction and 
(co)evolution of the economic, the material, the social, the political, the ideal, and the cultural. 
In tight connection to this, a second major thrust of this thesis lies in the aim to investigate the 
appropriate conditions and method for the rigorous dialogue between and across disciplines. 
This is extremely important, for, while concepts from mainstream economics (such as 
knowledge as a public good or externalities) are increasingly borrowed from outside of the 
discipline (and even by radical critics, as demonstrated in the first and second chapters of this 
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thesis), this happens in a context in which economics itself has not been shy in expanding 
beyond its traditional boundaries and “colonising” the subject matter of other disciplines (Fine, 
Milonakis, 2009). Further, this has recently been complemented and paralleled by the 
ambitions of sociologist who, hailing from the sociology of scientific knowledge, have moved to 
provide their own reading of economic phenomena, dynamics and processes (see, for an 
introduction, Barry, Slater, 2002a, 2002b). Yet, as will be shown in the following chapters, the 
picture that emerges from the discussions on the Knowledge-Based Economy (and cognitive 
capitalism) is one of both opportunistic and naive borrowing of concepts, rather than one of 
rigorous interdisciplinary dialogue. Thirdly, the material and subject matter covered in the 
thesis offer insights about the issues of change and continuity between and within different 
socio-economic systems, as well as the role played in these dynamic processes by technology 
and (its embedding in) historically-given social relations. While the intellectual route followed 
in this thesis is not the only one that could have been taken, the path of my research led me to 
assess these literatures, scholarship and authors in their own right, not least because they are 
influential (or increasingly so) irrespective of whether or not they shed light on the Knowledge-
Based Economy. In essence, this thesis remains agnostic about what the Knowledge-Based 
Economy is (if not altogether sceptical about the existence of such a thing). To reiterate, it 
would be natural to expect anyone embarking on research on the latter, even from a critical 
perspective, to assert what is its nature, how it is distinctive, and how and why this is 
significant. Indeed, this is characteristic of the research addressed in this thesis. However, 
while this thesis refrains from such endeavour, what it demonstrates is that the answers 
provided to research questions along these lines have been unsatisfactory. This raises the issue 
of whether we need better answers or better questions. On the ground of what this thesis 
demonstrates and the doubts that it raises, however tentatively, speculatively and to be 
confirmed by future research, it seems appropriate to suggest that we are in strong need of 
better questions. 
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Chapter 1 – Debunking the Knowledge-Based Economy and the 
Economics of Knowledge 
 
1.1) Introduction 
 
The notion that we are “now” living in a Knowledge-Based Economy has been circulating in 
various guises, with the portrayal of the economy as post-industrial at first, then informational, 
or simply “new”, since at least the 1960s. Furthermore, this has been accepted in the 
mainstream of many social sciences, to the point of having become a cliché. However, such 
conceptualisation of the economy has come to the fore only recently within economics itself. 
Indeed, while economists have investigated issues relating to knowledge and its relation to the 
economy in the past, it is only of late that mainstream economists, albeit tentatively and 
episodically, have started to refer to contemporary capitalism as a Knowledge-Based Economy 
(henceforth KBE) and invoke, if not already proclaim the existence of, an economics of 
knowledge (henceforth EK) as a legitimate sub-field within the discipline. This has been 
received enthusiastically outside of economics, where the latter’s characterisation of 
knowledge as a public good has become prominent in the rhetoric of international 
organisations, while at the same time fuelling the outrage of those arguing against the 
privatisation of knowledge through expanded intellectual property rights (and, more generally, 
in defence of the commons).1 Yet, more attentive analysis reveals that, in adhering to the 
conceptualisation of the economy as KBE and attempting to develop an EK, economists have 
merely opportunistically appropriated ideas that were “in the air”, rehashing their own 
conceptual and methodological apparatus rather than genuinely engaging with the problems 
posed by the production, reproduction and distribution of knowledge at all let alone in the 
                                                 
1
 The hitherto unprecedented development of intellectual property rights witnessed since the 1980s has 
been widely acknowledged as one of the major transformations within contemporary capitalism, and as 
a major factor leading to the elaboration of the Knowledge-Based Economy concept itself (for examples 
of discussions of these trends germane to the concerns of this chapter and thesis, albeit differing in 
interpretation, see: Foray, 2006; Hardt, Negri, 2004, 2009; Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). It is 
important to emphasise that this evolution has a quantitative dimension (manifest in the exponential 
increase in the numbers of both applications for patents and patents granted in the U.S. and in Europe), 
but also a qualitative dimension (Foray, 2006; Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). However, this is 
not merely a Hegelian quip, where sheer quantity morphs into quality. Indeed, the scope and breadth of 
patents (and intellectual property in general) have expanded to encompass new objects previously 
explicitly excluded from patentability (software, mathematical algorithms and computer programmes; 
genes and living matter; business models), and new players (with the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act, or 
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, in 1980 in the U.S.; this authorises the granting of patents 
and the negotiation of exclusive licenses on the results of publicly-funded research conducted by 
universities, small companies, and non-governmental organisations) (Coriat, Orsi, 2002). Further, this 
has led to the explosion of markets for licenses and the pressure to harmonise legal frameworks and 
standards worldwide, not least as consequence of international treaties, commercial activity, the 
material (re)organisation of production, and the concerted efforts to emulate the (pioneering) U.S. 
experience (Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). 
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contemporary period. Indeed, and regardless of whether one attributes to knowledge a central 
place into the economy or not, there are devastating weaknesses in the way in which the 
mainstream treats the economy, knowledge, and the relation between the two, and any 
genuine engagement with the relation between knowledge and the economy is incompatible 
with mainstream economics. Thus, it is hardly surprising that there are devastating criticisms 
of the mainstream version of the KBE and of the EK, even to the extent of declaring their 
impossibility, from any contribution taking a different view of the nature of knowledge, the 
economy, and their interaction. In this light, this chapter will review the criticisms, add to 
them, and pose a coherent overview of the flawed nature of the KBE and the EK. 
1.2) The Knowledge-Based Economy and the Economics of Knowledge 
 
The idea that contemporary advanced economies have reached a stage of development 
dominated and driven by knowledge and information has become common currency across 
political and public debates, scholarship, and policy discussions. Thus, the concept of KBE has 
gained such prominence that it has become almost a vernacular description of contemporary 
capitalism. According to the OECD’s glossary of statistical terms,2 the expression has been 
‘coined to describe trends in advanced economies towards greater dependence on knowledge, 
information and high skill levels, and the increasing need for ready access to all of these by the 
business and public sectors’. As the OECD document goes on to state, the notion has emerged 
out of a context in which ‘knowledge and technology have become increasingly complex, 
raising the importance of links between firms and other organisations as a way to acquire 
specialised knowledge’, paralleled by ‘the growth of innovation in services in advanced 
economies’. In other words, the recent expansion in knowledge-related investment and 
activity, coupled with the technological revolution in information communication technologies 
(henceforth ICTs), are thought to be at the heart of a change in the conditions of production, 
transmission and accumulation of knowledge and information resulting in ‘a break in growth 
processes and modes of organization of the economy’ (Foray, 2006, p.21).3 In turn, this is 
perceived as having brought about an economic context in which the speed of creation, 
accumulation and depreciation of knowledge has increased dramatically, while the costs of its 
                                                 
2
 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/index.htm (last accessed on the 9
th
 of August 2013). 
3
 Dominique Foray is ‘a prominent French science policy expert’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.42) or, as the 
biographical note on his website states, ‘one of the leading academic experts in the economics of 
innovation and knowledge and economic policy implications of the new knowledge-based economy’ 
(see http://people.epfl.ch/dominique.foray/bio?lang=en&cvlang=en, last accessed on the 9
th
 of August 
2013). His work is followed closely in this chapter, for Foray (2006) (often in association with Paul David, 
see David, Foray, 1995, 2002, 2003) is one of the main proponents of the KBE concept and of the EK as a 
sub-discipline within economics (see below). Further, together once again with David, Foray has played 
a pivotal role in shifting the policy and research agenda of the OECD from an approach focused on the 
study of national systems of innovation to one focusing on the KBE and EK (see footnote 43). 
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codification and transmission have substantially decreased (Foray, 2006; Benkler, 2006; 
Powell, Snellman, 2004). Despite acknowledgement that ‘there have always been 
organisations and institutions capable of creating and disseminating knowledge’, from ‘the 
medieval guilds through to the large business corporations of the early twentieth century, 
from the Cistercian abbeys to the royal academies of science that began to emerge in the 
seventeenth century’, and so on, and indication that the KBE concept ‘is meant to signify’ a 
‘“sea change”’ from the material organisation of economic activity of earlier periods rather 
‘than a sharp discontinuity’ (David, Foray, 2003, p.20; similarly, Foray, 2006, p.21, and David, 
Foray, 2002, p.9), these developments, nonetheless, commanded enthusiastic reception and 
attention across the social sciences and cultural theory and commentary, where the 
temptation ‘to reify’ them ‘into some grand synthesis of a New Information Mode of 
production’ has proven ‘irresistible’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.10). However, while the latter is 
certainly true for the social sciences at large, whether, and how deeply, this attitude is 
embedded within economics beyond the speculations of a handful of key figures (for example: 
Foray, 2006; David, Foray, 2002, 2003; Stiglitz, 1999a, 1999b), remains dubious. On the 
contrary, this chapter will argue that the forays (nomen omen?) of economists into the topic of 
the KBE have been consistent with the logic of economics imperialism and, even when 
attempting to depart from the latter, are exemplary of the present state of “suspension” of 
economics (as opposed to purposeful engagement with the issues at hand). 
Alongside these putative material developments in economic and social reality, economic 
theory is posited as witnessing the rise of two distinct yet related ‘new developments’ of its 
own. First is ‘a scientific development corresponding to the emergence of a new economic 
subdiscipline’, the EK, whose ‘research object – knowledge – poses new theoretical and 
empirical problems’ (Foray, 2006, p.xi). Indeed, as noted by Leppälä (2012, p.2), even though 
the expression “economics of knowledge” has been around at least since Kenneth Boulding’s 
(1966) use, after that it has ‘appeared rather irregularly in the economic literature’, to 
resurface consistently only ‘in the early 21st century’ (Leppälä, 2012, p.2).4 Thus, the 
                                                 
4
 However, Leppälä entirely glosses over that Boulding’s ‘The Economics of Knowledge and the 
Knowledge of Economics’ (1966) criticises the discipline for its neglect of ‘[w]hat might be called, 
perhaps somewhat grandiloquently, the Epistemological Question’ (i.e. ‘the role of knowledge in social 
systems, both as a product of the past and as a determinant of the future’) (Boulding, 1966, p.1). For 
Boulding, consideration of the role of knowledge in social systems was essential to move beyond 
general equilibrium theorising, and implied the restoration of methodological holism, systemic thinking 
and the recognition of the dynamic and evolutionary nature of economies, organisations and 
development (together with purposeful dialogue with other disciplines) at the heart of economics 
(Boulding, 1966). These implications for the discipline of the serious consideration of the importance of 
knowledge in socio-economic development, rather than the primacy (or not) of knowledge within 
economic activity and the material organisation of the economy in any specific era, provide better cues 
as to why issues related to knowledge within mainstream neoclassical economics have been neglected 
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expression has reappeared recently in the titles of books (Foray, 2006; Andersson, Beckmann, 
2009) and in academic journals (Ancori et al., 2000; Lundvall, 2004), summoning interest from 
points of view as disparate as, for example, (rational choice) political philosophy (Hardin, 2009) 
and popular journalistic accounts (Warsh, 2006). Secondly, the discipline of economics itself is 
presented as having taken into account the ‘historical development heralding the advent of a 
particular period in the growth and organization of economic activities’ (Foray, 2006, p.xi; 
similarly, David, Foray, 2003), sufficing to re-label the current organization of economic activity 
as KBE. These theoretical developments are perceived as consequence of the material and 
social evolutions outlined above (Foray, 2006; David, Foray, 2003). Indeed, although the EK is 
understood as having its own precursors and “tutelary deities”,5 Foray (2006, p.ix) submits 
that, ‘[j]ust as industrial economics as a discipline was founded with the advent of 
industrialization in around 1820, so the economics of knowledge developed as knowledge-
based economies gradually came into being’.6 Thus, following Foray’s understanding of the 
‘dual nature of the economics of knowledge – as a discipline and as a historical period’ (Foray, 
                                                                                                                                               
and the calls for an EK have been sporadic and generally unheeded, at least until recently to some 
degree. 
5
 Foray (2006) and Leppälä (2012) provide the following lists and (diverging) accounts. On top of 
historical figures such as ‘Smith, Marx, and Schumpeter’, understood as having ‘all dealt with 
knowledge, its creation and division’, and ‘its use and appropriation’, Foray signals ‘Simon, Hayek, 
Arrow, and Machlup’ as the unquestionable ‘latter-day pioneers in the general economics of knowledge 
(i.e. not confined to science and technology)’ (Foray, 2006, p.1). However, Leppälä provides a broader 
account, which includes areas deliberately excluded by Foray from the EK (see Foray, 2006, p.1), such as 
the economics of invention, innovation and technical change, on the one hand, and decision-making, 
uncertainty and market coordination, on the other. Rather than casual, this disagreement reflects the 
imprecise boundaries and foundations of the EK (see also footnote 9). 
6
 This statement, which opens the introduction of Foray’s (2006, p.ix) book, is problematic on several 
levels. Leaving aside (for the moment) the simplistic and deterministic way in which developments in 
thought are attached to developments in the material organisation of the economy (for which, see 
footnote 8 and below), Foray’s statement is unintelligible also because he remains silent about what he 
means by “industrial economics” and who he identifies as its representative theorists. Further, one 
cannot help but notice that, prior to the marginalist revolution (whose origins are commonly located at 
the beginning of the 1870s, see, for example, Roncaglia, 2005, p.278), economics, together with its 
internal division into sub-disciplines and separation from other disciplines and fields of study, simply did 
not exist. What was there was classical political economy, which, ‘drawing upon whatever historical and 
social factors were considered to be relevant’, treated the economy ‘as part of its wider social and 
historical milieu, with political economy as a sort of a unified social science to cover this wide terrain’ 
(Fine, Milonakis, 2009, p.2). By contrast with Foray’s statement, Arena, Festré, and Lazaric (2012b, p.1) 
provide a more sobering account of the relations between material reality and economic theory. For 
them, ‘economic reality questions ... economic theory’, and the ‘concept of the knowledge-based 
economy has generated a “new economics of knowledge” or “new economics of science”’. Nonetheless, 
while this ‘has prompted greater reflection on the notion of knowledge in analytical areas such as game 
theory, innovation theory, organization theory, firm theory, spatial economics and growth theory ... it is 
not certain whether the numerous contributions on these issues have contributed to a better 
understanding of the key questions related to the notion of knowledge in economics’. However, as will 
be argued below, the paucity of the contributions of economics to understanding issues related to 
knowledge lies in that, while it is certainly true that the (reception of the) concept of KBE has prompted 
interest if not the necessity, within economics, to offer some attention to new/unfamiliar areas, this has 
taken place idiosyncratically and firmly within the parameters, dynamics and logic of economics 
imperialism (for which, see Fine, Milonakis, 2009 and below). 
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2006, p.xi), the development of the EK and KBE concepts could even be interpreted as a long 
overdue move towards increased realism within the discipline of economics. Thus, Rullani (for 
whom, though, the economy and production are fuelled by knowledge since at least the 
industrial revolution) retraces in the EK a possible paradigm shift in the making, potentially 
attenuating the ‘deterministic vocation of the economic science’ (Rullani, 2004, p.285) and 
reconciling it with the true determinant of value and ‘“engine” of the modern economy’ 
(p.321). Similarly, Fumagalli (2007) draws on the work of David and Foray (David, Foray, 2003; 
Foray, 2006) to show that even the mainstream has finally come to accept, albeit uncritically, 
trends and phenomena which have prompted the post-workerist reading of contemporary 
capitalism (which will be discussed in the next chapter).7 
Lastly, these material and theoretical developments and public debates have been 
complemented by the fascination commanded by the KBE and the EK within policy discussions 
and (the rhetoric of) international organisations. Indeed, on the one hand, the KBE concept, as 
description of a particular historical period in the organisation of economic activity, seems to 
offer a “structural” approach to the study of economic phenomena derived from an 
understanding of a set of trends characterising the development of western economies over 
the last forty years.8 On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, the EK is understood 
as providing a general framework with enough flexibility to attach several strands of economic 
research (such as human capital theory, social capital, endogenous growth theory – see OECD, 
2000 for an example) to a set of corresponding policy prescriptions.9 Thus, for Foray, the KBE 
as ‘possible scenario of structural transformation’ is already ‘the conception of major 
                                                 
7
 Such enthusiastic reception of the putative rise of an EK and consideration of the KBE within 
economics echoes closely the enthusiasm of those identifying an ongoing revolution within economics, 
bringing un-orthodox contributions thus far relegated to the margins at the frontier of research and core 
of the discipline and, consequently, pushing the latter’s orthodoxy to dissolve into pluralism (see, for 
example, Colander, 2005 and Davis, 2006; but see also Fine, Milonakis, 2009 for a critique of this view). 
8
 Here, the term “structural” deserves to be in inverted commas for the following reasons. The rhetoric 
of the KBE, together with the explanation of the rise of the EK, recall naïve and mechanistic 
understandings of the material organisation of economic activity and technology within it as base, of 
(economic) theory as superstructure, and of the evolution of the latter as due to that of the former. 
However, in the case under examination none of this is underpinned by an understanding of capitalism 
itself as a historically-determined mode of production (or any other theory of socio-economic 
structures), nor any explanation of how to move from an understanding of concrete phenomena to the 
elaboration of (abstract) theory and/or vice versa. 
9
 For instance, Leppälä (2012, pp.4-5) holds that the differentia specifica of the EK is that ‘it does not 
solely study any particular market’. Indeed, for him, quite apart from concrete studies of “knowledge 
industries”, ‘information and knowledge are an integral part of the whole economic analysis itself’. Thus, 
the EK ‘offers a perspective that can, and has been, applied to labor economics, finance and many other 
fields’. Nevertheless, it ‘is neither a tool nor a method’, and ‘the best way to describe’ it is as ‘an 
“approach” ... that analyses any given economic phenomenon from the point of view of knowledge’, 
providing ‘insights and approaches [sic] that can be applied to many different economic phenomena’. 
However, this view is exemplary of the reduction of knowledge to information (and of the relabeling of 
information economics as EK), something against which Foray (2006), by contrast, argues explicitly. 
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international organizations as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’ (Foray, 2006, p. ix). Whatever one’s opinion about whether this is true and 
of the policy prescriptions of international institutions themselves, the latter’s fascination with 
the KBE concept was undeniably reflected, at the turn of the century, in a variety of policy 
documents (see, for example: OECD, 1996, 2000; UNESCO, 2003, 2005; World Bank, 1999).10 
This appeal of the KBE concept for policy (if not in practice, at least rhetorically) is best 
exemplified by the launch in 2000 of the Lisbon Strategy as a governance strategy for the 
European Union (renewed, revamped, amended and re-launched in 2007 with the signing of 
the Lisbon Treaty, and in 2010 with the launch of Europe 2020). Aiming to transform Europe by 
2010 into ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (CEU, 
2000), the strategy had two of its three pillars, the economic and the social, respectively 
concerned with: 
a) ‘laying the groundwork for the transition to a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based 
economy’, with ‘strong emphasis on adapting quickly to changes in the information 
society and to investing in research and development’; 
 
b) modernising ‘the European social model by investing in human resources and 
combating social exclusion … making it easier to move to a knowledge economy’.11 
This has led some commentators to identify the ‘(Renewed) Lisbon strategy’ as built ‘upon and 
strongly influenced by Neo-Schumpeterian and Evolutionary Economics’ (Harttmann, 2007, 
                                                 
10
 That the policy documents explicitly dealing with the KBE are limited in time to the turn of the 
century, together with the shift of international institutions towards more pressing concerns in light of 
the crisis a decade later, can be taken as indicative of the real driving forces and dynamics of 
contemporary capitalism, where the dysfunctions of finance have knocked the functions of knowledge 
from their perch. Further, one could also suspect that the interest in knowledge within international 
institutions has also been sustained by, and seen as instrumental for, the purposes, advocacy and 
politics of the specific international institution proffering its view of the KBE. For example, the fleeting 
interest in the KBE within the World Bank (1999) can be connected (as does Stiglitz, 1999b, 1999c) to 
the notion of the World Bank as Knowledge Bank (since ‘[s]uccessful development ... entails not only 
closing the gap in physical or even human capital, but also closing the gap in knowledge ... the World 
Bank is increasingly thinking of itself as a knowledge bank, not just a bank for facilitating the transfer of 
capital to developing countries’, Stiglitz, 1999c, p.11; but see also Van Waeyenberge, Fine, 2011 for 
critical assessment of the World Bank as Knowledge Bank). Similarly, for UNESCO, interest in the KBE has 
focused around the promotion of accessible and equal access to education as independent from strictly 
economic concerns (UNESCO, 2003, 2005). This could even be interpreted as an attempt to beat the 
World Bank at its own game, subsequent to the latter’s hijacking of education policy in developing 
countries in light of the rise of human capital theory within economics and the World Bank itself (Fine, 
Rose, 2001; Rose, 2006). For the European Union and the OECD, see, respectively, footnotes 12 and 43. 
11
 See the entry for the Lisbon Strategy in the glossary of the European Commission, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Lisbon_Strategy (last 
accessed on the 9
th
 of August 2013). 
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p.17), and as reflecting ‘a policy concern with developing human capital (or “intangible assets”) 
as the basis of European competitiveness’ and growth (Rosamond, 2002, p.171). Thus, the KBE 
‘as it emerged in the 1990s and was then promoted by the Commission’ has been perceived as 
having ‘a much more European-character to it than the earlier concept of the “knowledge 
economy” (e.g. Machlup, 1962) or the “new economy” in the USA’, providing a ‘more “socially 
embedded” vision’ of the relations between knowledge, the economy and society at large in 
the Lisbon Agenda. Further, ‘the European perspective’ emphasised the insufficiency of simply 
creating ‘new knowledge, production processes or commodities’, and the vitality of expanding 
‘the skills base (e.g. to stimulate knowledge-based employment) as well as promote training 
and learning (e.g. to stimulate high-tech employment)’ (Birch, Mykhnenko, forthcoming), thus 
mobilising the role of knowledge within a politically and socially inclusive rhetoric at the heart 
of the polity of the Eurozone.12 
1.3) Knowledge as a public good and the rationale for patents 
 
However, not all is presented as rosy in the KBE. According to Foray’s (2006, p.xi) conception of 
the ‘dual nature’ of the EK, if knowledge is increasingly central to the material organisation of 
economic activity, then its economic properties are propelled at the centre-stage of economic 
and social life. Thus, on the one hand, these properties, sustained and enhanced by the 
revolution in ICTs, are posited as having the potential to set in motion a ‘“combinatorial 
explosion”’ (Foray, 2006, p. 104) in society and the economy. This would lead to the radical 
decrease of the costs of acquisition, reproduction and transmission of knowledge, the 
mitigation of geographical constraints (or, as per the title of Cairncross, 1997, the “death” of 
distance), and a progressive movement away from attitudes obstructing knowledge disclosure 
and obscurantism (Foray, 2006) and even propelling social cooperation at the centre stage of 
contemporary capitalism (Benkler, 2006). However, on the other hand, the economic 
characteristics of knowledge are also seen as posing the ‘main dilemma of the economics of 
knowledge’ (Foray, 2006, p.113), that of reconciling the interest of society at large with that of 
the private producers of knowledge. Following the typical economic characterisation of 
knowledge as a public good, Foray deems knowledge ‘a strange good’ whose properties are 
                                                 
12
 Given the current crisis in the Eurozone and the threats it poses to social and political cohesion, the 
Euro, and the European Common Market itself, it seems appropriate to comment that the Lisbon 
Agenda has scarcely lived up to expectations. Firstly, and notwithstanding how rhetorical emphasis on 
knowledge allowed stress to be placed on social inclusion, the real economic dynamics at play were de 
facto dynamics of exclusion, producing and reproducing a core/periphery structure within the European 
Union (with Germany at the core and Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain at the periphery) which 
ultimately has led to the current Eurozone crisis (Brancaccio, Passarella, 2012). Secondly, as discussed by 
Birch and Mykhnenko, in practice, the Lisbon agenda has been tightly focused on, and connected to, the 
financialisation of Europe (with the financial sector in all its ramifications as main beneficiary) rather 
than the promotion of employment (in sectors other than finance) (Birch, Mykhnenko, forthcoming). 
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‘ambiguous[ly]’ different ‘from those characterizing conventional tangible goods’, since, while 
‘activities concerning knowledge production generally have a very high “social return” and are 
… a powerful mechanism in economic growth, they also pose daunting problems of resource 
allocation and economic coordination’ (Foray, 2006, p.91). In the midst of this dilemma, 
patents are understood as a “necessary evil” or, more precisely, a necessary (albeit imperfect) 
compromise between static and dynamic efficiency. 
1.3.1) A social dilemma … 
 
The economic properties of knowledge, as traditionally identified within economic scholarship, 
are easily stated. Knowledge is characterised as a good that is non-excludable and non-rival 
(Arrow, 1962a) and, therefore, following Samuelson (1954), as a public good (see, for example, 
Foray, 2006, and Stiglitz, 1999a, 2008) – pure or impure (and, therefore, quasi- or semi-public), 
depending on the extent of, and limits to, non-excludability.13 Indeed, with ‘[i]nformation and 
knowledge’ seen as ‘continuously’ escaping ‘from the entities producing them’ and, thus, 
appropriable and usable by rivals (Foray, 2006, p.92), the non-excludable character of 
knowledge implies the difficulty of subjecting knowledge to private control and appropriation, 
and confers to the creation of new knowledge the character of a positive externality. However, 
it is the non-rival character of knowledge which differentiates its production from that of other 
positive externalities (Romer, 1993a): unlike other situations which have become classic 
examples of positive externalities,14 where the latter are limited by the exhaustibility of the 
resource leading to congestion in use, in the case of knowledge the positive externalities are 
seen as unlimited, since, ‘[a]s a resource, knowledge can be characterized by its 
inexhaustibility’ (Foray, 2006, p.93).15 Further, knowledge is recognised as a good that is 
cumulative and progressive (Foray, 2006). Since new knowledge is the output of a process 
whose input is previously existing knowledge, any production of new knowledge relies on the 
possibility to “stand on the shoulders of giants” (Scotchmer, 1991; Foray, 2006; Stiglitz, 2008). 
Thus, the externalities generated by the production of knowledge are seen as not only 
enhancing ‘consumers’ enjoyment but also, and above all, the accumulation of knowledge and 
                                                 
13
 While the expression “public goods” has become widely used in the literature, in his paper Samuelson 
referred to these as ‘collective consumption goods’ (Samuelson, 1954). 
14
 The two classical examples are that of the proximity of beekeeper and orchard (Meade, 1952), or that 
of the lighthouse providing light to several boats offshore (which has been discussed by John Stuart Mill, 
Sidgwick, Pigou and Samuelson, whose arguments – but especially Samuelson’s – are ridiculed in Coase, 
1974a; but see below for more). 
15
 This has a twofold dimension: individual (since, once acquired by any individual, an element of 
knowledge can be used indefinitely to produce actions and effects) and collective (since the same 
element of knowledge can be used by an infinite number of individuals without anyone being deprived 
of it) (Foray, 2006). 
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collective progress’ (Foray, 2006, p.94).16 This allows Foray to posit the combination of these 
characteristics as a ‘threesome … at the origin of the huge size of potential externalities 
associated with the production of knowledge’, and endowing the latter with ‘the potential to 
create a combinatorial explosion’ (Foray, 2006, p.96). 
However, these characteristics do not come without qualification.17 Indeed, and firstly, the 
uncontrollability of knowledge is seen as limited by the fact that, however codified, knowledge 
has also a tacit dimension which ‘affords those who have it a degree of control, since only 
voluntary demonstration and learning on site allow its acquisition’, and confers to knowledge a 
natural degree of excludability (Foray, 2006, p.97; similarly, Chang, 2001).18 Moreover, if the 
                                                 
16
 For Foray, though, not all elements of knowledge are equally cumulative: while data bases, research 
tools and generic knowledge (in short, “science”) are ‘strongly cumulative’, other elements of 
knowledge mostly used within consumption (such as songs or poems) are characterised by Foray as 
‘noncumulative’. Furthermore, different types of knowledge have different temporal horizons for 
cumulativeness – think of mathematical theory as opposed to software programming (Foray, 2006, 
p.95). However, Landes and Posner (2003, p.422, footnote 4) highlight that, while cumulativeness of 
knowledge has ‘long been familiar to students of patents, since it was obvious that technological 
advance is a cumulative process’, works of art have been ‘less frequently understood in those terms, the 
tendency being to think (mistakenly) of the creators of works of the imagination as solitary geniuses 
rather than as improvers of previous work’. This view has changed (or is beginning to change), not least 
because of various forms of postmodern art and manifestations of postmodern culture, based on the 
recombination of previously existing works of art and cultural elements. See Landes, Posner, 2003 for a 
discussion of copyright in this context, and Benkler, 2006 and Lessig, 2004 for views (argued from within 
political liberalism) on the conditions for, and limits to, cumulativeness in the cultural domain. 
17
 Attentive readers will note how the qualifications presented in this paragraph, provided by Foray 
himself, are indebted to dialogue with the sociology of scientific knowledge (on which, see Hands, 
2001), especially as summarised in Callon, 1994 (which, however, claims that science is not a public 
good as defined in economic theory, p.401). See also Callon, Foray, 1997 for a joint assessment of the 
economics of science and the sociology of scientific knowledge ending with two sections voicing the 
diverging opinions of the two co-authors, where each one defends the “insights” provided by his own 
field of provenance: for Callon, the way forward lies in developing a socio-economics of scientific activity 
and research, not aimed at understanding either science or “the market” per se, but their hybridisation 
(pp.26-27); for Foray, on the other hand, it lies in integrating the advances made within industrial 
organisation (as a sub-discipline of economics) into the economic analysis of science (p.28). 
18
 The distinction between codified and tacit knowledge is important to distinguish knowledge from 
information, and was originally put forward by the chemist and philosopher of science Michael Polanyi 
(1966), brother of economic historian Karl Polanyi (2002 [1944]). Polanyi’s original argument was part of 
a polemic against Bernal (1939) – a Marxist physicist and precursor of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (Hands, 2001) – in the context of a public debate over the central planning of science 
(Mirowski, 2011; Nightingale, 2012; Hands, 2001): ‘[m]uch like Hayek’s emphasis on the tacit nature of 
norms and rules, tacit knowledge was developed as part of a political project against central planning 
that argued that, since part of science could not be articulated and entered into planning calculations, 
knowledge production could not, and therefore should not, be managed’ (Nightingale, 2012, p.384). 
Polanyi’s argument lost traction within the science policy community in light of the (planning) success of 
the Manhattan Project (Nightingale, 2012) and the popularity of the linear model of innovation in policy 
circles (Godin, 2006b) (see also footnotes 29 and 31). However, discussions about tacit knowledge have 
come back into fashion, not least because of the rise of neoliberalism and current commercialisation of 
science (Mirowski, 2011). While the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge has resurfaced 
within contemporary debates, the latter have been marked by controversy over definitions, their 
validity and applicability, and the politics of the definition itself. For a sample of contributions, see: 
Ancori et al., 2000; Balconi et al., 2007; Cowan et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2002; Metcalfe, 2010; 
Mirowski, 2009a, 2011; Nightingale, 2003, 2012. Perceptively, and of direct relevance to the issue of 
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exploitation of knowledge relies on complementary assets, be these intellectual or 
technological, the uncontrollability is limited further and the externality ‘artificial’ (Foray, 
2006, p.98; similarly, Callon, 1994). Secondly, non-rivalry is mitigated by the magnitude of the 
acquisition costs, i.e. ‘the costs of intellectual investment needed for people to be capable of 
understanding and exploiting knowledge’ and gain ‘absorptive capacity’. Once these 
acquisition costs are considered, non-rivalry can be represented as a continuum ranging from 
‘fairly specific or specialized nonrival’ goods to ‘more general or universal nonrival’ goods 
(Foray, 2006, p.98; similarly, Callon, 1994, who describes science as a “local” public good at 
best, Romer, 1993b, who classifies non-rival goods along a continuum between private and 
public according to the degree of controllability, and Metcalfe, 2001, p.569). Lastly, the 
cumulativeness of knowledge is highly dependent on the level of ‘trust in the validity of 
existing knowledge’, together with ‘the adoption of systematic codes and forms of expression’ 
and commonly shared ‘procedures of verification and evaluation’ (Foray, 2006, p.99; similarly, 
Callon, 1994, and Metcalfe, 2001, p.569). Thus, the cumulativeness of knowledge can be 
hindered by the obsolescence of knowledge itself, contingently on the dynamics of the specific 
field of knowledge and historical period under consideration (which leads to the ‘depreciation’ 
of knowledge), and its weak persistence (i.e. the fact that people forget) (Foray, 2006, p. 100). 
Thus, if ‘[k]nowledge externalities are’ posited as ‘a constant in history’ because of the 
‘intrinsic’ properties of knowledge, their magnitude and extent are seen as structured and 
shaped by the ‘costs of accessing, formatting, and transmitting knowledge’ (Foray, 2006, 
p.103; similarly, Benkler, 2006) and, therefore, historically-given. The ‘marginal cost structures’ 
(Foray, 2006, pp.104-107) of acquisition, transmission and reproduction of knowledge are 
highly influenced by the dynamics of ICTs. Therefore, the recent ‘move to a communications 
environment built on cheap processors with high computation capabilities, interconnected in a 
pervasive network’ (Benkler, 2006, p.3), is seen as leading to a world in which positive 
externalities are very strong, if not ‘massive’ (Foray, 2006, p.103), and which is even posited as 
a world where ‘social production and exchange’ tend ‘to play a much larger role, alongside 
property- and market-based production’ (Benkler, 2006, p.3), in the guise of “commons-based 
peer production” (Benkler, 2006).19 
                                                                                                                                               
planning (both economic and of scientific activity), Nightingale (2003), by drawing upon Searle and 
exploring the links between ‘neurological causal processes, subjective mental states and speech acts’ 
(Nightingale, 2003, p.149), provides an account of the flawed nature of the distinction between tacit and 
codified knowledge, pointing out that ‘the antonym of “tacit” is “conscious”, not “codified”’ (Mirowski, 
2009a, p.214). 
19
 For Benkler (2006), this kind of social production can sometimes substitute for, and sometimes 
complement, public and private (market) provision. For more on the commons, see below. 
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Thus, for Foray (2006), while all of the above sets up the stage for a KBE in which externalities 
are extremely powerful, it also highlights the extreme fragility of the dynamics at its heart. On 
the one hand, the recent innovations in ICTs and the move towards attitudes and behaviours 
favouring knowledge openness allow harnessing in the most effective way the potentially 
explosive externalities corresponding to the economic characteristics of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, while these factors provide the KBE with ‘a coherent physical and social base’, 
they ‘also compound’ the ‘problems of protection and compensation for the producers of new 
knowledge’ (Foray, 2006, p.112). Thus, for Foray, the ‘main dilemma’ of the EK comes to the 
fore: reconciling ‘the social goal of efficient use of knowledge once it has been produced and 
the goal of providing ideal motivation’ to private producers (Foray, 2006, p.113). By contrast, 
for Benkler (2006) there is no dilemma, but different regulatory structures which, by 
interacting with technological arrangements, can favour or impede social cooperation. In this 
scenario, commons-based peer production is made possible by a reduction of costs brought 
about by changes in ICTs such that, in modular projects which are sufficiently “granular” (e.g. 
Wikipedia), the cost of individual “investment” in the production of new knowledge (e.g. the 
writing of an entry in Wikipedia) is sufficiently low not to require extrinsic (monetary) 
incentives. Thus, for Benkler (2006, p.104), ‘[c]ooperation in peer-production processes is 
usually maintained by some combination of technical architecture, social norms, legal rules, 
and a technically backed hierarchy that is validated by social norms’. The difference between 
Benkler and Foray’s assessments (with the former giving prevalence to technology and the 
latter to the intrinsic economic properties of knowledge) may depend, amongst other things, 
on that Foray is an economist and, therefore, beholden to the characterisation of knowledge 
highlighted within economic scholarship, whereas Benkler is a legal scholar and, therefore, 
oriented towards positive analysis and, potentially, more directly influenced by Coase (through 
the latter’s influence on law and economics) as opposed to Arrow. However, Foray’s dilemma 
is exemplary of how a (and what kind of) vision of the KBE can be elaborated from mainstream 
economic principles, a vision which explicates (and exemplifies the limits) of the “spontaneous 
philosophy” of economists when discussing the KBE. For the essence of the dilemma is that, 
because of the non-excludable character of knowledge and the positive externalities this 
entails, producers of new knowledge cannot expect to appropriate the full social returns of 
their output; but, since this entails the lack of appropriate incentives, private investment in the 
production of new knowledge will be insufficient from the standpoint of society (Foray, 2006; 
similarly, Stiglitz, 2008). While this is a typical “public good problem” (described in general by 
Pigou, 1932, and originally adapted to the case of research, invention and innovation by 
Arrow, 1962a and Nelson, 1959), Foray (2006) highlights how the non-rival and cumulative 
character of knowledge exacerbates the problem by deepening the rift between private and 
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(potential) social returns. Thus, any new element of knowledge produced ‘should, from the 
welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting 
information)’ (Arrow, 1962a, pp.616-617). But, while this would allow ‘optimal utilization’ 
(Arrow, 1962a, p.616), or ‘maximum efficiency’ in the use of knowledge (Foray, 2006, p.116; 
Stiglitz, 2008), it would also undermine (what mainstream economic scholarship posits as) the 
necessary conditions for the production of new knowledge (Arrow, 1962a). The latter is a 
highly costly process and, therefore, it is only ‘a positive price on use’ which ‘will guarantee the 
allocation of resources for creation’ (Foray, 2006, p.116). Furthermore, the contradiction 
between private and social value of knowledge is aggravated by the non-rival and cumulative 
character of knowledge so that, the more cumulative the use of knowledge, the greater the 
social losses generated by the social mechanisms devised to keep in check its free flow (Foray, 
2006). 
1.3.2) … and its imperfect solution 
 
In this context, patents are conventionally presented as an ‘obvious’ (albeit imperfect) 
‘solution to the public good problem’ (Foray, 2006, p.136) since, by increasing expected private 
returns to investment in the production of new knowledge, they bridge the gap highlighted 
above between private and social returns and raise the incentives for undertaking innovative 
activity.20 The patent system is part and parcel of the regime of Intellectual Property Rights 
(henceforth IPRs), whose functions are to provide precise definition of the rights and objects 
deserving exclusive protection, and to ensure enforcement of these rights by guaranteeing 
effective exclusion of ‘all unauthorized agents from use of the relevant resources’ (Foray, 
2006, p.134). Traditionally, to be patentable an innovation must satisfy the following criteria: 
absolute novelty (i.e. the invention in question must not be part of the currently existing state 
of knowledge and technique), non-obviousness (for a person of ordinary expertise given the 
current state of knowledge in the field), and utility (meaning that the innovation must be apt 
to be integrated into any part of a specific industrial process, as part or output of the 
productive process). In addition to these, a further requirement is that a description of the 
innovation must be provided, such that anybody with average expertise in the field could 
                                                 
20
 However, Arrow’s (1962a) and Nelson’s (1959) characterisation of knowledge (together with scientific 
research and innovation) as a public good was originally intended to advocate for the subsidisation and 
central planning of research and development in the United States in the context of the Cold War (see 
below). Thus, Arrow dismissed patents, which he saw as an impediment to the free flow of information 
and running against the incentives to innovate: ‘In the interests of the possibility of enforcement, actual 
patent laws sharply restrict the range of appropriable information and thereby reduce the incentives to 
engage in inventive and research activities’ (Arrow, 1959, p.13) (see also: Arrow, 1955, 1959, 1962a; Van 
Horn, Klaes, 2011a). 
36 
 
replicate the patented innovation.21 In exchange for complying with these requirements, 
holders of patents are entitled to temporary exclusive rights over the commercial exploitation 
of patented inventions (lasting twenty years in the legislation of most countries) (Foray, 2006; 
Coriat, et al., 2003; Stiglitz, 2008). The condition of non-obviousness is meant to distinguish 
products of human creativity from the realm of nature, while that of utility was originally 
aimed at excluding generic scientific knowledge from patentability. However, these criteria are 
seen as ‘sufficiently flexible and even ambiguous to allow … excesses in contexts of innovation 
races and striving for competitiveness through intellectual investment’ (Foray, 2006, p.133).22 
Thus, patents are perceived as providing a host of private benefits. These include the provision 
of appropriate incentives for the disclosure of information, the creation of transferable rights 
in support of technology transfer and acquisition, and the signalling of the ‘future value of the 
technological effort’ of companies (Foray, 2006, p.136). However, it is their perceived social 
benefits which allow touting them as a key institution in the KBE. Indeed, since the granting of 
patents is accompanied by public disclosure of methods, processes and techniques, patents 
are seen as conducive to the dissemination of knowledge and information and, therefore, 
‘heightened research effort and hastened transfer of results to those best situated to turn 
them into better technologies, and sharpened evaluation of the quality of their ideas’ 
(Mirowski, 2011, p.190). In turn, patents are also praised for their putative coordination 
function, which should reduce the risk of duplication of research and innovative efforts 
through the facilitation of trade in information and, ultimately, allow a better allocation of 
resources.23 Furthermore, patents (as opposed to other potential mechanisms to reward 
                                                 
21
 However, this does not necessarily stop firms from disclosing as little as possible (Stiglitz, 2008), not 
least through purposeful provision of unclear or obscure descriptions. 
22
 For a more accurate historically-grounded account of the renegotiation and reinterpretation of the 
conditions for patentability throughout time, together with the drivers of these changes, see Mirowski, 
2011 and Coriat, Weinstein, 2012 (see also footnote 23 below for more). In particular, it must be noted 
here how the renegotiation – in both legislative and jurisprudential terms – of the condition of non-
obviousness has been one of the key factors allowing for the traditional distinctions between products 
of human creativity and the realm of nature, together with the previous exclusion of generic scientific 
knowledge from the domain of patentability, to be transcended (Orsi, 2002; Orsi, Moatti, 2001; 
Mirowski, 2011). These processes are part and parcel of the recent quantitative and qualitative 
extension of the domain of IPRs (discussed in footnote 1) and, ultimately, of the contemporary 
commercialisation of scientific activity in the U.S. and beyond (Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). 
Thus, they cannot be simply and casually dismissed, as does Foray (2006, p.133), as excesses following 
from the mere flexibility and ambiguity of IPRs regimes. 
23
 Foray (2006, pp.142-144) also recognises two issues which are widely acknowledged as negative 
aspects of patents: in the case of interdependent and cumulative innovation, patents with a broad scope 
give high rewards to the first inventor, blocking possible subsequent research in the field by providing 
the incentive for “races to patent”, reducing the diversity of innovators and the probability of 
cumulative developments; further, if a single innovation is covered by too many patents, this will result 
in a ‘proliferation of blockages’ (Foray, 2006, p.144) which will ultimately lead to underutilisation of 
resources as in a typical anti-commons problem, as originally conceptualised by Heller (1998) and 
Eisenberg (Heller, Eisenberg, 1998). Both situations deter innovation and stifle dynamic efficiency. 
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innovation) are seen as beneficial for society because they function as an ex post valuation 
mechanism and, therefore, avoid the necessity of complex ex ante evaluations by charging the 
costs of the patent system on consumers (i.e. those who benefit directly from the innovative 
activity) as opposed to taxpayers (Foray, 2006).24 However, by granting exclusive rights of 
exploitation, albeit limited in time, patents entail the creation of monopolies. While the latter’s 
intensity and onus for society can be mitigated (at least conceptually) by tinkering with patent 
duration, breadth and scope (Nordhaus, 1969; Scherer, 1972; Gilbert, Shapiro, 1990; Merges, 
Nelson, 1990; Klemperer, 1990), judged from the standpoint of welfare economics, patents 
will nonetheless generate a deadweight monopoly loss (Foray, 2006). Further, as solution to 
the ‘main dilemma’ of the KBE (Foray, 2006, p.113), patents are also presented as an imperfect 
mechanism bridging the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency (see, for example, 
Stiglitz, Walsh, 2006, pp.457-458 for the canonical textbook treatment of patents in this light): 
if, on the one hand, patents confer monopoly power to firms (thus creating distortions in the 
economy) and restrict from using and exploiting knowledge those who could have done so in 
their absence, on the other hand, they are seen as a key component in providing appropriate 
incentives for innovation, which (from the standpoint of mainstream economics) would be 
underprovided in their absence. 
It is worthwhile to note here that this conception of dynamic efficiency as the appropriate 
balance of ‘short-run concerns (static efficiency) with long-run concerns (focusing on 
                                                                                                                                               
However, although he admits the quantitative and qualitative evolution in patenting trends (Foray, 
2006, pp.149-154), for Foray (2006), the problems above are simply exemplary of ‘abuse[s] of how 
patents are used’ (p.145), leading to high transaction costs (pp.154-156) in the economy. A different 
view, which highlights the structural and historically-given character of these phenomena, their 
interaction with the changing interpretations of the conditions for patentability, and their role in the 
contemporary material organisation of the economy can be found in: Mirowski, Van Horn, 2005; 
Mirowski, Sent, 2008; Mirowski, 2008, 2011; Coriat, 2002a, 2002b; Coriat, Orsi, 2002; Coriat, et al., 
2003; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012; Orsi, 2002; Orsi, Moatti, 2001; Orsi, Coriat, 2005, 2006. The structural 
nature of these phenomena can be gauged from the coming into existence of so-called “non-practising 
entities” (or “patent trolls”, Mirowski, 2011, p.148), i.e. ‘players whose activity consists of the mass 
purchase of patents, not to use them, but, based on carefully organized monitoring, to take out lawsuits 
against alleged infringers with the sole aim of obtaining financial compensation. Faced with these new 
players … other organizations have developed a business model based on the preventive purchase and 
pooling of licences. The access to and benefits from this preventive action are supplied (in return for the 
payment of an annuity) to companies and organizations wishing to protect themselves against attack 
from’ non-practising entities. ‘The result is a booming market in the race to litigate and/or to avoid 
litigation, a market driven by specialized firms, none of which have any intention of using the licences 
they trade for practical inventions’ (i.e. “working” the patent) or actual production of goods and services 
(Coriat, Weinstein, 2012, p.286). 
24
 But see Stiglitz, 2008 for discussion of the distortionary and ethical shortcomings of this way of 
financing innovation (which amounts to a “benefit tax”) in the case of the pharmaceutical industry: 
‘within the context of any utilitarian or Rawlsian social welfare function, (or any of the other generally 
accepted views of social justice), a benefit tax for medicine cannot be justified. There are other public 
services in which a benefit tax might be justified, but not in the areas of lifesaving medicines’ (Stiglitz, 
2008, p.1714). 
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encouraging R&D)’ (Stiglitz, Walsh, 2006, Glossary, A-3) implies the reduction of the processes 
and practices characterising innovation, learning, technological dynamism and the like, 
together with their embedding into wider socio-economic structures, to the sole dimension of 
intertemporal allocation of resources. Such simplistic conception of dynamic efficiency is a 
prelude to the superficial incorporation of Schumpeter’s ideas (not least that of creative 
destruction) within endogenous growth theory (see below). Further, it must be emphasised 
how the depiction of innovative activities and processes provided above is far from being 
complete or realistic in the context of a capitalist economy. For, leaving aside the issue of what 
motivates individual researchers and inventors beyond (mechanically understood notions of) 
incentives (pecuniary or not), and which can variously draw from, and across, the political, the 
ethical and the aesthetical, various systemic issues, forces and processes are neglected and 
overlooked in the public good problem presented above. 
Firstly, historical evidence shows that actual socio-economic development has happened often 
in the absence, if not direct violation, of (more or less well-specified) IPRs, through ‘shameless 
copying and stealing of technologies, knowledge, and experts as a way of evading the 
attempted lock on trade and development by the advanced nations’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.185; 
similarly: Chang, 2001, 2003a; Beaud, 2010). Secondly, following the work of Schumpeter 
(1911, for example), it is well known that innovations come in gales of creative destruction, 
and techno-economic revolutions and paradigms sustained by the complex dynamic 
interactions of various agents of change (suppliers, producers, consumers, the state, financial 
capital, etc.) and backward and forward linkages (Freeman, Louçã, 2001; Perez, 2003, 2010). 
Thirdly, innovation and technology are at the heart of the dynamic and interrelated processes 
of commodification and accumulation, whereby creation of new products and techniques of 
production is shaped by, and in turn shapes, capitalist dynamics of value extraction, constantly 
renegotiating the boundaries between socialised and unsocialised labour (Huws, 2003). Last 
but not least, science and technology play a key role in the labour process itself, allowing for 
the shift from absolute to relative surplus value extraction, as well as more or less direct forms 
of capitalist control (Marx, 1976; Braverman, 1998 [1974]; Noble, 1986). However, perhaps the 
most striking illustration of the shortcomings of this depiction and conception of the relation 
of knowledge to the economy is provided by Foray (2006, p.144) himself, who admits that the 
‘economics profession’, caught between the two ends of this trade-off (underprovision of 
knowledge and monopolistic distortion), has found ‘the subject of intellectual property 
policies’ particularly ‘vexatious’. Indeed, the conceptual difficulties faced by economists in 
assessing the virtues and demerits of patents were neatly (and famously) summarised by Edith 
Penrose (1951), for whom, ‘[i]f national patent laws did not exist, it would be difficult to make 
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a conclusive case for introducing them, but the fact that they do exist shifts the burden of the 
proof and it is equally difficult to make a really conclusive case for’ their abolition (cited in 
Foray, 2006, p.144). A similar confession was made years later by Fritz Machlup (1958, p.80), 
who, in concluding a study on the U.S. patent system conducted on behalf of Congress, 
claimed that ‘If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we 
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it’. 
1.4) A contradictory scenario 
 
The two sections above have presented the conventional narrative, as told within economics, 
about the relation between knowledge and the economy. Nonetheless, any serious attempt to 
delve beneath, and move beyond, the idyllic linear scenario described in section 1.2 and the 
tension between combinatorial explosion and underprovision highlighted in section 1.3 will be 
presented immediately with the perplexing, even paradoxical, nature of both the KBE and EK. 
This is evident in the conflictual rhetoric of the KBE and its obvious divergence from policy in 
practice, the contradictory historicity of the KBE (both as a description of the material 
organisation of contemporary capitalism and as a concept within mainstream economics) and 
EK, the internal contradictions of the definition of the EK (as provided by its main proponent, 
Foray, 2006), and the aporetic character of knowledge for mainstream/neoclassical economics, 
especially as exemplified by endogenous growth theory. All these elements testify to the 
idiosyncratic way in which issues relating to the relationship between knowledge and the 
economy have been incorporated within mainstream economics: conforming with economics 
imperialism, at the expense of substantive content and appropriate conceptualisation, and 
irrespective of the logical consequences for the discipline of taking to its fullest implications 
the study of the relationship itself even on its own let alone broader terms. 
1.4.1) The divergence of rhetoric and policy in practice 
 
With its simultaneous emphasis on the socially inclusive dimension of the posited transition to 
the KBE – rooted in the intrinsically social nature and character of knowledge, and the ensuing 
positive externalities – and the importance of knowledge as field of valorisation and even 
source of value, the rhetoric of the KBE immediately appears as internally conflictual. Indeed, 
as discussed above, much of this rhetoric is built around the notion that knowledge is a public 
good (see, for example, European Commission, 2002, UNESCO, 2005) and, therefore, non-
excludable and non-rival in use. Such conceptualisation of knowledge, although originating in 
economics (Arrow, 1962a; Nelson, 1959), has enticed fascination well beyond the confines of 
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the discipline, coming to be widely accepted even amongst radical critics, be they (heterodox) 
economists (see, for example: Perelman, 1998, 2003, 2005; Teixeira, Rotta, 2012; Pagano, 
Rossi, 2009; Pagano, 2012) or not (Söderberg, 2008). Furthermore, in this rhetoric, not only is 
knowledge (together with science) posited as a public good, it is also depicted as a ‘global’ 
(Stiglitz, 1999a) or ‘meta-public good’, of which, ‘the more you use’, ‘the more there’ is ‘for 
everybody’ (Perelman, 2005), thus becoming ‘more valuable with use’ (Perelman, 2003, 
p.305). This aspect is best captured in the numerous references in this literature to ‘Thomas 
Jefferson, the third president of the United States’, who ‘described knowledge in the following 
way: “he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; 
as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me”’ (Stiglitz, 1999a, 
p.308). Indeed, while Stiglitz, 1999a is taken here as exemplary of this tendency to portray 
Jefferson as having ‘anticipated the modern concept of a public good’ (p.308), see also David, 
1993, who quotes Jefferson to illustrate the non-rivalrous and cumulative character of 
knowledge. More generally, similar quotes from, and references to, Thomas Jefferson have 
become a trope in this literature. Usually (though not necessarily exclusively), when the quote 
is used by non-economists, it is meant to highlight the inequity of private appropriation 
through patents; on the other hand, when the quote is used by economists, often the aim is to 
show that the conceptualisation of knowledge as a public good goes back a long way before 
the speculation of a handful of economists and, potentially, to legitimise the latter by 
attributing to them a noble lineage (see, for example, Stephan, 1996). However, it must be 
emphasised how ‘Jefferson was making an argument against Lockean natural rights accounts 
of property, in service of the thesis that one should not treat knowledge as a thing’ (Mirowski, 
2011, p.358, footnote 21; similarly, Boyle, 2003).25 Interestingly, the figure of Jefferson has 
exerted considerable appeal also on radical critics such as Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) 
and their reflection on, and conceptualisation of, the “common” as radical democratic 
alternative to both the state and the market (see below). However, and irrespective of the 
content and reliability of their interpretation and enlistment of Jefferson to their cause, Hardt 
and Negri deserve credit for an engagement with Jefferson much deeper than that, deplored 
here, typical of the (economic) literature on knowledge (see, for example: Hardt, Negri, 2000, 
2004, 2009; and Hardt, 2007a, 2007b). 
Following the above illustration of the “inexhaustible” character of knowledge, and inspired by 
the prospect of describing this property by way of a positive term, David (1993) and Keely and 
                                                 
25
 The original letter in which Thomas Jefferson addressed this issue can be consulted in its entirety at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html (the relevant section of the 
online version of Kurland, Lerner, 1987, last accessed on the 9
th
 of August 2013). 
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Quah (2000) proposed using the expression “infinite expansibility” instead of “non-rivalry”. 
Similarly, Pagano and Rossi (2009, p.679) see knowledge not only as a non-rival good, but even 
as ‘anti-rival’. However, with the recent extension of patentability to “basic knowledge” (as 
opposed to its exclusive applicability to commercial exploitations of the latter) (Coriat, Orsi, 
2002; see also footnote 1) and the enshrining of these newly redefined IPRs into an 
international regime under the aegis of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (henceforth TRIPS) agreement (Chang, 2001; Drahos, Braithwaite, 2002; Orsi, Coriat, 
2006), in practice, the ‘intensification of the economic function of knowledge has come’ clearly 
‘at the expense of’ its ‘social function’ (Kenway et al., 2006, p.25). Therefore, as noted by 
radical critics (Perelman, 1998, 2003, 2005; Teixeira, Rotta, 2012; Azam, 2007), once intrinsic 
(as opposed to exclusively economic) value is attached to knowledge, the narrow economic 
and the broader social aspects of the KBE evidently diverge and even come into strident 
conflict. Thus, the quantitative and qualitatative extension and expansion of IPRs has been 
read by many as a second movement of “enclosure of the commons” (Shiva, 2001; Boyle, 
2003; Azam, 2007; Stiglitz, 2008), where knowledge becomes a (Polanyian) “fictitious 
commodity” (Azam, 2007; Jessop, 2007), part and parcel of current processes of “accumulation 
by dispossession” and ongoing (global) primitive accumulation (Harvey, 2003; Tyfield, 2008).26 
This has even been interpreted as leading to the emergence of an “intellectual monopoly 
capitalism” (Pagano, 2012) and, together with the identification of intellectual monopolies as 
one of the causes of the onset of the current crisis (Pagano, Rossi, 2009; Pagano, 2012), it has 
been posited ‘that the crisis of intellectual monopoly capitalism requires a radical move from a 
world mainly organized around closed science and closed markets to a world centered on open 
markets and open science’, with the move towards the latter depicted as ‘certainly consistent 
with some sort of communism of human knowledge’ (Pagano, 2012, p.18). Yet, while this 
assessment of the crisis and its causes, together with the proposed solutions and their 
consequences, remains dubious, these can be taken as exemplary and indicative of the 
excessive faith placed in the centrality of knowledge in contemporary capitalism even for those 
who see themselves as critics of the KBE, and the consequent neglect, in the rhetoric and 
scholarship of the KBE, of the latter’s true engine firmly located in (a hypertrophic) finance. 
                                                 
26
 More generally, the TRIPS agreement and the extension of IPRs in general have been one of the 
factors leading to the revival of debates around the commons within and across scholarship (Hess, 
Ostrom, 2007a, Foray, 2006) and radicalism (Hardt, Negri, 2009; Harvey, 2011; Mattei, 2011). However, 
for the former – following the pioneering work of Elinor Ostrom (see Ostrom, 1990, and Fine, 2010a and 
Harribey, 2011 for critical assessment) – this means that knowledge, ‘a nonrivalrous, nonexclusionary 
public good’, is converted by different technological arrangements ‘into a common-pool resource’ 
needing management, monitoring and protection ‘to ensure’ its ‘sustainability and preservation’ (Hess, 
Ostrom, 2007b, p.10). On the other hand, radicals have interpreted the commons as a model for 
overcoming the public/private and state/market dichotomies in the socio-political organisation of 
society (Hardt, Negri, 2009; Mattei, 2011). 
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However, while outsiders to the economics profession and even heterodox (or otherwise 
progressive) economists remain attached to the characterisation of knowledge as a public 
good (be that for a commitment to Pigovian welfarism, romanticism, rhetorical wit, or political 
strategy), their faith in this line of argument as a defence of the social nature of knowledge 
may be misplaced. Indeed, the history of the characterisation of knowledge as a public good 
and its role within economic theory highlights how this characterisation is ‘much more an 
artefact of the twists and turns of postwar neoclassical economic theory’ than a philosophical 
enquiry about truth where the ‘slippery notions of nonexclusivity and nonrivalry’ constitute 
‘some deep insight into the eternal nature of knowledge’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.56).27 First 
formalised by Samuelson (1954), the notion of public good was conceived to provide 
justification and ‘economic legitimacy’ to ‘government intervention in the economy while still 
pledging allegiance to’ the ‘neoclassical model of the free market’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.57), in an 
intellectual climate within the economics discipline marked by a conventional wisdom centred 
on a mix of Keynesianism and Pigovian welfarism (Fine, Milonakis, 2009; Milonakis, Fine, 
2009). Progressively, the notion came to incorporate many (if not most) functions of 
government (Samuelson, 1955), becoming ‘confused and conflated with the existence of 
“externalities”’ in the process. These, in turn, were redefined within welfare economics ‘as a 
problem of nonexclusion, such that all the relevant aspects of the commodity were not 
correctly priced by the market’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.57) and, ultimately, shifted within the realm 
of general equilibrium by Arrow (1969), as a special case of market failure (Mirowski, 2011, 
p.57). While Nelson, 1959 and Arrow, 1962a have been internalised within and without 
economics as seminal papers setting the bases for the characterisation of knowledge, research 
and innovation as public goods, it is important to highlight the inception of, and role played by, 
these papers and their argument in a specific controversy taking place at the RAND 
Corporation during the 1950s (recounted in: Mirowski, 2011; Hounshell, 1997, 2000; Van Horn, 
Klaes, 2011a).28 Indeed, in light of their victory in the Second World War, U.S. military elites 
were firmly convinced of the strategic role played by ‘closely integrated military-style planning 
across the military, industrial, and academic sectors’ (Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a, p.305) in 
securing scientific and engineering advances. In this intellectual and political context, a 
                                                 
27
 This and the following paragraph draw on Mirowski’s (2011, pp.56-66) account of the rise and fall of 
the characterisation of science as a public good, and Van Horn and Klaes’s (2011a) account and 
comparison of the views of Arrow and Coase (as representatives of, respectively, the Cowles Planning 
Commission and Chicago Neoliberalism) on public goods and patents. 
28
 The RAND Corporation is a policy think tank, originally instituted to offer research and analysis to the 
United States armed forces, with RAND standing for Research and Development (see 
http://www.rand.org, last accessed on the 9
th
 of August 2013). For accounts of its role in shaping and 
advancing the post-war neoclassical economics research programme in the context of the Cold War 
(both in general and with specific reference to innovation, research and development), see: Amadae, 
2003; Mirowski, 2002; Hounshell, 1997, 2000; Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a. 
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controversy raged at RAND between its systems analysts, who argued in favour of a top-down 
procedure (controlled by the military) in the design and development of the intercontinental 
ballistic missile, and a ‘cadre of neoliberal economists at RAND, including Armen Alchian, 
Reuben Kessel, and Jack Hirshleifer’, who favoured the simultaneous contracting out to private 
corporations of several research and development programmes, ‘with the military entering in 
at a relatively late stage to procure the most likely candidate weapons system’ (Mirowski, 
2011, p.60).29 Nelson and Arrow sided with the system analysts, and supported the latter’s line 
by providing it with ‘appealing economic theories as to why the nation would systematically 
underinvest in basic research’ (Hounshell, 1997, p.258) in the absence of government 
intervention.30 Thus, Arrow and Nelson’s characterisation of research activity as information, 
and of the latter as an anomalous good (if compared to tangible goods) whose provision 
required government subsidy and intervention, was instrumental in furthering the interests of 
RAND, both within (against the neoliberals) and without (at the time, RAND was facing a crisis 
of legitimacy and the potential withdrawal of government funding) (Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a). 
Given the Cold War climate and the subsequent fear that the USSR could outdo the US 
technologically and militarily, Arrow and Nelson’s view found favourable reception within 
RAND, which ended up pursuing the top-down approach devised by its system analysts 
(Mirowski, 2011, p.60). 
Yet, while the characterisation of knowledge as a public good rose to prominence in science 
policy discussions in the West in the 1960s – not least because it lent active support to the 
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 This controversy echoes closely the debate between Bernal and Polanyi over the planning of scientific 
activity, mentioned in footnote 18, and, more generally, the debate over the virtues and superiority of 
decentralised (market) vs. centralised (state) planning (see Hayek, 1945). A more recent, similar 
controversy over the efficiency of privately- vs. publicly-funded research has taken place around the 
Human Genome Project, launched in 1988 as a publicly-funded project tasked of mapping the human 
genome, but subsequently privatised in the process of its activities. It is worthwhile to notice that 
(unsurprisingly) Gary Becker (2000) has been a staunch supporter of the beneficial effects of 
privatisation of the project. More sobering and complex historical accounts of the entire affair are 
provided by Orsi, Moatti, 2001 and Mirowski, 2011. 
30
 Arrow intervened in this controversy through a RAND document and paper (respectively, Arrow, 1955 
and 1959); these were reworked for publication as Arrow, 1962a, but purged of direct references to the 
dispute over weapons systems (Mirowski, 2011, p.60). While Arrow, 1959 was partly ground in the 
analysis provided in Arrow, 1955, the latter did not point to the danger of underinvestment in research 
and development, a theme that became present and prominent in Arrow, 1959 and Arrow, 1962a. The 
launch of the Sputnik satellite by the USSR in 1957 proved a key factor in making Arrow’s argument 
more persuasive (Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a). More broadly, accurate analysis of Arrow’s role within RAND, 
the Cold War, and the development of neoclassical economics in that period can be found in Amadae, 
2003 and Mirowski, 2002. Nelson’s famous 1959 paper was also written in the heat of this controversy 
(Mirowski, 2011; Hounshell, 1997, 2000). Nelson (2006) himself has recognised the origins of Nelson, 
1959 and Arrow, 1962a in his and Arrow’s work at, and involvement with, RAND, although without 
mentioning the controversy narrated above. See also Alchian, Kessel, 1954 for the point of view of 
neoliberal economists within RAND. 
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(then popular) idea of the linear model of innovation (Mirowski, 2011; Hands, 2001, p.364)31 – 
the notion of public good itself was to come under heavy attack within economics subsequent 
to, and as consequence of, the rise of neoliberalism both within and without the discipline 
(Mirowski, 2011; Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a). Arrow (1962a) and Nelson’s (1959) papers had 
proved instrumental in initiating the ‘now-pervasive habit of treating the genesis of scientific 
knowledge as if it were production of a “thing”, on a par with any other commodity, except for 
the fact that basic science was said to exhibit the characteristics of a public good’, thus paving 
the way for the reification of ‘science as a conflation of object and process as a prelude’ to its 
being encompassed ‘as a subject of economic analysis’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.58). However, this 
argument would face its come-uppance, at the hands of Ronald Coase, through a redefinition 
of what constitutes a commodity. Drawing on, and generalising from, his analysis of 
broadcasting frequencies (Coase, 1959), Coase’s (1960) ‘The problem of social cost’ aimed to 
challenge the conventional wisdom of the day, which implied that solving problems of market 
failure and externalities required government intervention through taxation or subsidy.32 For 
Coase, market failure and externalities did not result from a failure of competitive processes 
but, rather, they were to be understood as the manifestation of the failure of the legal 
framework to provide clear, well-defined property rights. Thus, ‘[u]nderlying Coase’s analysis 
was the question of how to interpret the most basic unit of exchange’. If ‘[e]conomists at that 
time explained the workings of a competitive market with reference to tangible goods’,33 
‘Coase insisted … that the basic unit of exchange should not be understood as goods 
themselves, but rather bundles of property rights for goods’ (Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a, p.315; 
similarly, Mirowski, 2011, p.61). With the commodity thus redefined in “intangible” terms, 
Coase held that, once property rights were “unbundled” and given clear definition, the 
untrammeled market mechanism would ensure the most efficient allocation of resources in 
                                                 
31
 The linear model of innovation can be represented as follows: PUBLIC FUNDING  BASIC RESEARCH 
 APPLIED RESEARCH  DEVELOPMENT  TECHNOLOGY  COMMERCIAL APPLICATION  SOCIAL 
BENEFITS. See Mirowski, 2011 (especially pp.47-56) and Godin, 2006b for accounts of its rise, 
(mis)fortunes, and decline. 
32
 Samuelson was acutely aware of the attack that the controversy over broadcasting frequencies 
constituted for the edifice of his own public good theory. Indeed, he noted that the debate over 
unscrambling the frequencies was really centred on how ‘to convert a public good into a private good’ 
and, therefore, ‘sidestep the vexing problem of collective expenditure, instead relying on the free 
pricing mechanism’. However, he disagreed, since ‘[b]eing able to limit a public good’s consumption 
does not make it a true-blood private good. For what, after all, are the true marginal costs of having one 
extra family tune in on the program? They are literally zero’ (Samuelson, 1958, p.335). But see also 
Medema, 2009, especially ch.5, for discussion of the significance of the controversy over broadcasting 
frequencies (and Coase’s intervention in it) for the redefinition of the traditional views within (welfare) 
economics with respect to externalities, market failure and government intervention. 
33
 Arrow, 1962a and Nelson, 1959 are extreme cases of this tendency, since they analyse innovation and 
information as if they were goods defined, in negative terms, by … what distinguishes them from 
tangible goods! 
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the absence of transaction costs (though these were considered negligible in practice).34 
However, the full implication of this argument was that, since the non-excludable nature of 
public goods resulted from ill-specified property rights (rather than some intrinsic 
characteristic of the good in question), in reality, there was ‘no such thing as a “public good” 
but only a series of problems handled by different governance structures, themselves 
determined by relative transaction costs’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.30). Thus, Coase’s argument and 
reconceptualisation of the commodity resulted in a full-on attack to the non-excludability 
component of the definition of public goods (Mirowski, 2011, p.62), which not only implied 
that public goods do not exist,35 but also that there are no fundamental differences between 
markets for goods and markets for ideas (Coase, 1974b).36 
With the concept of public good thus hollowed out from within the economics profession, it 
cannot constitute but a blunt weapon in defence of the free character of knowledge in an age 
of commercialised science (Mirowski, 2011, pp.56-57) and redefined and expanded IPRs.37 This 
is implicitly admitted (although not deplored) by Foray, for example, for whom ‘[s]aying that 
knowledge is a public good, when we are living in a historical period of accelerated 
privatization of knowledge bases … can be a source of misunderstanding’ (Foray, 2006, p.118). 
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 This argument constitutes, in a nutshell, what was to be dubbed by Stigler (1966) as the “Coase 
Theorem”. See Medema, 2002 on Stigler as promoter of the Coase Theorem, and Fine, Milonakis, 2009 
and Medema, 2009 for discussion of the history, significance and nature of the Coase Theorem itself. It 
must be stressed that, in this case, “theorem” is a misnomer, since the Coase Theorem does not result 
from the derivation of ‘formal consequences from deductive reasoning’ (Fine, Milonakis, 2009, p.100). 
35
 This argument was carried further in Coase, 1974a, which ridiculed the lighthouse as example of 
positive externality as classically discussed within economics by contending that, in historical reality, the 
English lighthouse system was financed privately. However, see Bertrand, 2006 for critical discussion 
and a more complex historical account showing mixed public and private sources of funding. 
36
 ‘I do not believe that this distinction between the market for goods and the market for ideas is valid. 
There is no fundamental difference between these two markets and, in deciding on public policy with 
regard to them, we need to take into account the same considerations’ (Coase, 1974b, p.389). 
Incidentally, it must be noted that Coase’s reflection played an important role in shifting the conception 
of Chicago neoliberalism from one of hostility towards patents, rooted in the anti-monopolistic tradition 
of Chicago classical Liberal economists, towards one of appreciation of patents’ role in the construction 
of a competitive order (Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a, 2011b). Further, that Coase’s attack on the concept of 
public good has been a key moment, sanctioning the ascent of neoliberal attitudes within the economics 
discipline, can be gauged from Samuelson’s own lament in light of the controversy over broadcasting 
frequencies: ‘The final question is, Why all this? Is it because, despite all denials, Chicago is not so much 
a place as a state of mind? Is it because of the fear that finding an element of the public-good problem 
in an area is prone to deliver it over to the totalitarian state and take it away from the free market? The 
line between conviction and paranoia is a fine line’ (Samuelson, 1964, p.83). As will be argued later, the 
demise of the characterisation of knowledge as a public good ultimately finds completion and 
celebration with the rise of endogenous growth theory. 
37
 By the same token, as shown in footnote 23, the “anti-commons” literature which, spawning from 
Heller, 1998 and Heller, Eisenberg, 1998, has attempted to defend open science and knowledge 
production from commercialisation and the extension and expansion of IPRs (for a sample, see many of 
the contributions in Hess, Ostrom, 2007a) is rendered futile by its own recourse to concepts (the 
commons, public goods) from, and the logic of, orthodox economics (similarly, Mirowski, 2011, p.372, 
footnote 29). 
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Ultimately, as noted by Mirowski (2011), the death knell of this justification for the defence of 
publicly funded science has been sounded from within the sociology of scientific knowledge by 
Michel Callon (1994), one of its most notable exponents. Indeed, as much as the latter 
deplores the economists’ reification of science as a good, their collapsing of knowledge into 
information, and the commercialisation of science itself, he draws, nonetheless, form his 
Actor-Network Theory the lesson that ‘[s]cientific knowledge does not constitute a public good 
as defined in economic theory’ (p.407), since ‘[r]ecent results in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge make it easy to show that there is nothing in science to prevent it from being 
transformed into merchandise’ (pp.401-402).38 Thus, different international institutions have 
given more weight in their rhetoric to the social (Stiglitz, 1999a, UNESCO, 2003, 2005, 
European Commission, 2002, CEU, 2000)39 or the economic (OECD, 1996, 2000) according to 
their own ethos, purposes and functions – with, on the one hand, those emphasising the social 
character of the KBE, joined by radical critics, enthused by the conceptualisation of knowledge 
as a public good, and, on the other hand, those emphasising the role of knowledge within 
economic growth more attentive to the subsequent redefinitions of the characteristics of 
knowledge within economic theory and the sociology of scientific knowledge. Of course, in the 
rhetoric of the KBE, existence and extension of IPRs have found justification in the classic 
rationale for patents (i.e. provision of appropriate incentives for innovation and information 
dissemination and the need to find a compromise between static and dynamic efficiency) 
(Foray, 2006; Stiglitz, 1999a), the distinction between basic and applied science/technology 
(OECD, 1996, following science and technology studies scholars Gibbons et al., 1994), and the 
progressive re-conceptualisation of knowledge, through revision of its economic attributes and 
characteristics, as a semi-public or entirely private good (OECD, 2000; Callon, 1994). However, 
the most ‘remarkable’ aspect of the recent changes and extension of IPRs is that they have 
‘occurred without the slightest sign of any corresponding change in the domain of ... theory 
and analysis’ (Orsi, Coriat, 2005, p.1210; similarly, Foray, 2006, p.146, for whom ‘[e]conomists’ 
uncertainty’ on the issue of patents remains ‘greater than ever’), while also side-tracking by far 
the musings of mainstream economists about the intrinsic characteristics of knowledge (i.e. 
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 For Callon (1994), the public character of science must be defended from (the homogenising 
tendencies inherent in) commercialisation on the grounds of science being ‘a source of variety and 
flexibility’ (p.410). For Callon, this should ‘open the way for a renewal of the economic definition of a 
public good’ (p.411). This attitude can be seen as part of a broader research programme focused on the 
study of the economic through deployment of insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge and 
Actor-Network Theory, not least the idea of “performativity” (see Barry, Slater, 2002a, 2002b and the 
collection of chapters in MacKenzie et al., 2007 for an introduction, but also Hands, 2001, Fine, 2003a, 
and Mirowski, Nik-Khah, 2007, 2008 for critical assessments). 
39
 Stiglitz, 1999a is part of a collection on global public goods (Kaul et al., 1999) published for the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
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the characterisation of knowledge as a public good).40 Thus, as opposed to other proposed 
scenarios of structural transformation of the economy which have come forth as a result of the 
complex dynamic interaction of changes within and across rhetoric, scholarship and policy in 
practice,41 the rhetoric and policy in practice of the KBE are clearly divergent even if assessed 
on their own grounds, and display feeble, if non-existent, underpinnings in scholarship. 
However, rather than casual, this results from the chaotic, confused and simplistic way in 
which concepts from economics are appropriated within the rhetoric of the KBE without 
careful consideration of their substantive content, analytical origins, and changing status and 
role within economic theory itself. 
1.4.2) The challenges of historicity 
 
On top of the rift between rhetoric and policy in practice, the novelty attached to both the KBE 
and the EK is contradictory with respect to the issue of historicity, at both the material and 
intellectual levels. Indeed, knowledge ‘has been important to production across all historical 
epochs’ since, ‘in the most basic sense’, labour ‘is human creativity, mediated by knowledge, 
and applied to the material world’ (Curry, 1997). Such a point is so obvious that one can find 
similar statements across both mainstream and heterodox economics. For the former, Mokyr, 
2002 offers an account of the role of the co-evolution of useful knowledge and technological 
change in initiating and sustaining the Industrial Revolution, and an assertion that ‘the 
relationship between economic performance and knowledge seems at first glance obvious if 
not trite’ (p.2). For heterodox economics, see Perez, 2003 and 2010 for a Schumpeterian 
schematisation of technological revolutions and the evolution of techno-economic 
paradigms,42 and Freeman, Louçã, 2001 for a Kondratiev-inspired account of the role of 
technology in the history of capitalism and the assertion that every ‘human economy has been 
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 That very little advance has been made with respect to the theory and analysis of intellectual property 
can be easily understood by comparing contemporary debates on patents with the patent controversy 
raging in the nineteenth century (Machlup, Penrose, 1950). If anything, various mainstream economists 
have expressed concern openly over the extension of IPRs protection, not least through the TRIPS 
agreement. See, for example: Bhagwati, 2004 (for whom TRIPS should not be part of WTO negotiations, 
length of protection accorded is excessive, and access to cheap generic drugs should be allowed for 
developing countries); Henry, Stiglitz, 2010 (who deplore how poorly designed IPRs regimes hinder 
dissemination of information and stifle innovation); and Boldrin, Levine, 2008 (for whom IPRs stifle 
competition unnecessarily in a market economy, thus constituting a form of legally sanctioned 
intellectual monopoly). Most of these concerns evoke those of many nineteenth century economists, 
who often closely associated patents with protectionism and, moved by anti-monopolist sentiments, 
understood them as an impediment to free-trade (Machlup, Penrose, 1950). Yet, Stiglitz deserves 
special mention (and, potentially, praise where it’s due) for his active engagement in opposition to the 
TRIPs agreement as member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and, later, as Chief 
Economist of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 2008), as well as for his defence of prizes against patents as 
reward mechanisms for invention (Stiglitz, 2007, 2008). 
41
 The Washington and post-Washington Consensuses are key examples of this, see Saad-Filho, 2005. 
42
 These draw on the notion of “technical paradigm”, developed by Dosi (1982) by way of a parallel with 
the Kuhnian notion of paradigm within epistemology (Kuhn, 1962). 
48 
 
a “knowledge economy” and not only the contemporary one, which we, in our arrogance, 
proclaim today’ (p.132).43 Thus, with respect to the processes identified as constitutive of the 
KBE, it must be said that all types of economies across time and space have a knowledge, 
science and technology base, however (under)developed. Therefore, with knowledge, science 
and technology being transhistorical determinants of socio-economic development, what 
matters is their specific historical character, i.e. the way in which different concrete and 
historically-determined institutional arrangements (and their determinants) favour or impair 
the use, production, accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, science and technology 
themselves. However, while the main proponents of the EK and of the KBE as structural 
scenario of transformation recognise that ‘knowledge has always been at the heart of 
economic development’ (Foray, 2006, p.21; similarly, David, Foray, 2003, p.20; OECD, 1996, 
p.9), mainstream economics, given its ahistorical and disembodied analysis rooted in the 
conceptualisation of knowledge as public (semi-public, or entirely private) good, provides little 
guidance in accounting for historical and contextual specificity. 
Furthermore, and with specific respect to the rise of the concept of KBE and putative 
emergence of an EK, the peculiarities of economic scholarship need stressing. Indeed, the 
central role of knowledge within contemporary capitalism has been a prominent topic of 
debate across the social sciences since at least the 1960s, and the KBE is the last in line of an 
array of similar concepts attempting to describe and redefine advanced capitalist societies 
since then, drawing momentum and impetus from the structural transformations of the 
1970s.44 While these concepts have had their own fortunes across the social sciences, not least 
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 Significantly, both Perez and Freeman are representatives of the National Systems of Innovation 
(henceforth NSI) approach. The latter was central to the reflections on science and technology 
elaborated at the OECD in the late 1990s, only to be displaced by the “new economy” and KBE concepts 
within the OECD itself. See Fine, 1992 for a critical, yet sympathetic, assessment of the NSI approach, 
and Godin, 2004, 2006a and 2009 for the fortunes of the NSI within the OECD and its fall from grace in 
deference to the “new economy” and KBE concepts within the OECD itself. See also David, Foray, 1995 
for a critique of the NSI approach arguing for a shift in analytical emphasis away from national 
institutions and economic growth and in favour of the distribution of knowledge itself, because ‘an 
efficient system of distribution and access to knowledge is a sine qua non condition for increasing the 
amount of innovative opportunities. Knowledge distribution is the crucial issue’ (David, Foray, 1995, 
p.40). However, see Foray, 2006, pp.13-14 for an endorsement of NSI against endogenous growth 
theory. 
44
 The following easily spring to mind: post-industrial economy/society, information economy/society, 
new economy, learning economy/society; but see Carlaw et al., 2006, especially appendices 1 and 2, for 
more and a review, and Kenway et al., 2006, for an attempt at a conceptual genealogy. These concepts 
have all suffered from imprecise definition and use (potentially and partly explaining the emergence of 
competing expressions), and significant overlap, with each representing a different ‘inflection of a 
fundamental idea’ (Kenway et al., 2006, p.20), albeit with differing emphases on the social or the 
economic across them. The KBE functions as an overarching concept and narrative, drawing on and 
incorporating many of these previous conceptual reincarnations (thus, for instance, Kenway et al., 2006, 
p.21, on how OECD, 1996 incorporates within the KBE ‘variant and related notions of the information 
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under the impulse of postmodernism,45 that it is only now that mainstream economics turns to 
proclaiming the centrality of knowledge as a productive force in the economy requires 
explanation in itself (similarly, see: Mirowski, 2011, p.25; Mirowski, 2009b, p.102; Tyfield, 
2012, p.13). Foray’s candid “materialism”, positing that ‘the economics of knowledge 
developed as knowledge-based economies gradually came into being’ (Foray, 2006, p.ix) (and, 
therefore, implying a simplistic and historically flawed isomorphism of developments in 
thought and in the material organisation of the economy), will not suffice, not least because 
the need for historical contextualisation of this putative intellectual development is 
exacerbated by three mutually related contradictions. Firstly, if, on the one hand, the 
acceptance of the concept of KBE within mainstream economics is puzzling, given the latter’s 
proverbial squeamishness about the identification of socio-economic structures and 
recognition of their importance, on the other hand, proclamations of the existence of an EK 
within mainstream economics might strike those outside of the discipline as paradoxical, given 
the proverbial imperviousness of mainstream economics to epistemology.46 Secondly, and 
consistently with their transhistorical nature, the fundamental role of knowledge and 
information for growth and socio-economic development has been amply emphasised by pre-
Smithian and classical economics (see, respectively, Prendergast, 2010 and 2007), and 
knowledge and information have received attention over time and in different ways from 
economists of varied theoretical allegiances (see Part I of Arena, et al., 2012a).47 Yet, in 
addressing ‘the question of what economic theory has to do with knowledge, in general, and 
more specifically with the interpretation of the contemporary so-called “knowledge-based” 
                                                                                                                                               
society, network society and learning economy’. Similarly, Godin, 2006a sees the KBE as an “umbrella 
concept” – or buzzword – gathering previously existing ideas and concepts into a single framework). 
45
 See Lyotard, 1979b for a classic reference. This landmark contribution famously came out of a report 
to the Conseil des Universités du Québec (Lyotard, 1979a), meant to ‘examine the status of knowledge 
(of its formal and informal institutions, of research and teaching) in the most developed industrial 
societies’ (Lyotard, 1979a, p.1), since knowledge was already thought of as having ‘become the principal 
force of production over the last decades’ (p.7). That the task was assigned in the first place to a 
philosopher rather than an economist is telling, and potentially indicative of the paradox pointed out in 
footnote 46. For an assessment of the role of postmodernism in sustaining the rhetoric of the KBE, see 
Huws, 2003, ch.9. 
46
 In other words, why should (mainstream) economists (who are often portrayed as the idiots savants 
of social science) be trusted to provide guidance on the ‘production and reproduction’ of knowledge, ‘as 
well as the historical and institutional conditions ... determining its treatment and processing in a 
decentralized economy’ (Foray, 2006, p.1) when, to begin with, they are so acutely insensitive to, and 
unaware of, how knowledge is produced, reproduced and constructed within their own discipline, the 
historical and institutional conditions of such processes, and their relation to the market itself? A primer 
on the historical and institutional conditions and constraints governing the use, production and 
reproduction of disciplinary knowledge within economics can be found in Lee, 2009. 
47
 For example, Marshall was already writing, in 1890, that capital ‘consists in great part of knowledge 
and organization: and of this some part is private property and other part is not. Knowledge is our most 
powerful engine of production’, and ‘[o]rganization aids knowledge’ (Marshall, 1920 [1890], p.138). 
Similarly, it is well known that Marx devoted significant attention to knowledge, science and technology 
in the Grundrisse (1993) and Capital (1976, 1978, 1981). 
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economy’, one may ‘reasonably come up with two different’ – and opposite! – ‘answers’: ‘in 
an essential sense, asking how a decentralized economy works is equivalent to asking how 
socially distributed knowledge is collectively put to work in ways that are not socially 
detrimental and, possibly, increase the welfare of everyone’, and yet, ‘most strands of current 
theory have very little to say by way of an analysis of the nature of the particular form of 
economy that one observes nowadays and its relations with the transformation in its 
knowledge bases’ (Dosi, 2012, p.167; similarly, Boulding, 1966). 
Thirdly, and in tight connection with the previous points, if one were to accept the restrictive 
emphasis of neoclassical economics on efficient allocation of scarce resources as defining the 
purview of the discipline,48 then the production of knowledge and information, characterised 
as cumulative, non-divisible, (partially) non-excludable and non-rival (Foray, 2006; Rullani, 
2004), should be shunned from the subject matter and province of application of economics 
itself. Or, put otherwise, if one were to accept genuinely the proclamations of the centrality of 
knowledge within contemporary capitalism and the characterisation of the latter as KBE, this 
should command the abandonment of the neoclassical framework. Members of the discipline 
have reacted to this paradox in different ways, without expressing a shared consensus or 
synthesis (Mirowski, 2006, 2009b, 2011). Thus, for some, ‘durable economic principles’ still 
offer guidance ‘in today’s frenetic business environment’, as ‘[t]echnology changes’ but 
‘[e]conomic laws do not’ (Shapiro, Varian, 1998, pp.1-2). For others, ‘the assumption about the 
nature of goods and services and the process of exchange’ implicitly underlying ‘Adam Smith’s 
argument for the efficiency of the market system’ are ‘likely to fit the “new economy” of the 
future even less well then they fit the economy of today’ (De Long, Froomkin, 2000, p.8); yet, 
while this will inevitably result in the increased relevance and pervasiveness of market failure, 
technological innovation will nonetheless find some way to compensate (De Long, Froomkin, 
2000). However, others have been more drastic in emphasising the devastating consequences 
for the discipline of the primacy of knowledge and information in economic processes. Thus, 
for Stiglitz (1999b), ‘standard economic theory has little to say about the efficiency of the 
knowledge-based economy’ as we ‘are slowly shedding the limitations of Matter to unleash 
the expansiveness of non-rivalrous Ideas’ (Stiglitz, 1999b, cited in Mirowski, 2011, p.11). 
Indeed, if, as microeconomic principles have it, price has to equal marginal cost of production 
under perfect competition, then the price of knowledge and information should be equal to 
(or tend towards) zero. Although one might object that it is the ‘marginal cost of production’ 
which is ‘very high’, while ‘the marginal cost of reproduction is zero (nonrival good)’ (Foray, 
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 See Robbins’s (1932, p.15) landmark definition of economics as ‘the science which studies human 
behavior as a relationship between given ends and scarce means which have alternative uses’. 
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2006, p.105), this (rather than Foray’s dilemma, discussed in section 1.3) remains the central 
paradox of the KBE: ‘even though economic theory is severely biased towards markets, 
according to the criteria of economics, the laws of economics tell us that the laws of 
economics themselves are invalid, since’ knowledge and ‘information should not be priced as 
... scarce’ resources (Perelman, 1998, p.89). However, at a deeper level, the putative rise of the 
KBE and EK within economics could be seen as yet another example of the rise of neoliberalism 
within the discipline, signalling the implicit shift of the definition of “the economic problem” 
from Robbins’s (1932) focus on the allocation of scarce resources to Hayek’s (1945) conception 
of markets as processors of information and coordinators of cognition (whereby markets are 
seen as reconciling ‘participants’ mental states through the computation of prices, rather than 
simply shift around physical goods between people who’ desire ‘them with greater or lesser 
urgency’, Mirowski, 2011, p.26). 
1.4.3) A new bottle for old wine 
 
As if the paradoxes and contradictions presented in the sections above were not enough, and 
to add insult to injury, a stable body of scholarship that could be safely gathered under the 
heading of the EK (as defined by the main proponent of the expression, Foray, 2006, who 
claims for it the status of ‘new economic subdiscipline’, p.xi) is nowhere to be found within 
mainstream economics. Indeed, Foray’s definition of the ‘field of analysis’ of the EK can be 
decomposed as follows: 
- PROPOSITION 1: the EK ‘covers the’ economic ‘properties of’ knowledge ‘governing its 
production and reproduction’; 
 
- PROPOSITION 2: the EK covers ‘the historical and institutional conditions (such as 
information technology or patent rights) determining’ the ‘treatment and processing’ 
of knowledge ‘in a decentralized economy’ (Foray, 2006, p.1). 
Foray is motivated by the ‘conception’ that ‘knowledge has something more than information’ 
because it ‘empowers its possessors with the capacity for intellectual or physical action’, being 
‘fundamentally a matter of cognitive capability’ (p.4). This is important because ‘the 
reproduction of knowledge and the reproduction of information are clearly different 
phenomena’ since, while ‘one takes place through learning’ and always requires ‘[m]obilization 
of a cognitive resource’, ‘the other takes place simply through duplication’ (p.4) (the full 
implications of this conception of knowledge as cognitive capability, though, will be addressed 
in sub-section 1.4.4). However, although Foray points out that the EK ‘should not be confused 
with the economics of research’, ‘the economics of innovation’, or ‘the economics of 
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information’ (p.1),49 he is also quick to recognise the existence of two different views of the EK: 
one where there ‘is no real difference between knowledge and information, which means that 
the scope of the economics of knowledge is defined very broadly’,50 and a more ‘restrictive 
conception’ of the EK, which ‘excludes problems of economic choice in situations of 
incomplete and uncertain information and focuses more specifically on ... “expertise” – 
namely, knowledge’ (Foray, 2006, p.2). For Foray, navigating ‘between these two conceptions 
is difficult’, and the ‘definition of the scope of the discipline ... depends on one’s conception of 
knowledge and information’ (Foray, 2006, p.3).51 Indeed, the difficulty of disentangling 
knowledge from information is evident in PROPOSITION 1, which posits the centrality of the 
nature and properties of knowledge (i.e. its character of public, semi-public, or private good) 
within the scope of the EK. As discussed above, and implicitly recognised by Foray, for whom 
‘the main dilemma of the economics of knowledge’ remains ‘the conflict between the social 
goal of efficient use of knowledge once it has been produced and the goal of providing ideal 
motivation to the private producer’ (2006, p.113), this can be said to be the “core” scholarly 
contribution of economics to the rhetoric and concept of the KBE. 
However, if one directs attention to the ways in which mainstream economics has been 
deployed to understand scientific activity itself – i.e. the principal (though not exclusive) 
consciously pursued process of production and reproduction of knowledge – two separate 
bodies of work are distinguishable.52 Nonetheless, both are equally disappointing and 
unhelpful in identifying and tackling the ‘historical and institutional conditions’ determining 
the production, ‘treatment and processing’ of knowledge ‘in a decentralized economy’, as per 
PROPOSITION 2 of Foray’s (2006, p.1) definition. Indeed, on the one hand, it is possible to 
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 This attempt to differentiate the EK from previously existing economic sub-disciplines echoes earlier 
‘appeals to an “economics of science” … as contrasted with an economics of technological change’ 
(Sent, 1999, p.96) and, potentially, David and Foray’s (1995) earlier critique of the NSI approach arguing 
for a shift in analytical emphasis away from national institutions and economic growth and in favour of 
the distribution of knowledge itself. 
50
 It is under this heading that Foray rubrics the work of Hayek (1945), Arrow (1962a, 1962b), Simon 
(1982) and Machlup (1984), who he sees as the precursors of the EK (Foray, 2006, pp.1-2). 
51
 Foray’s distinction between knowledge and information hinges on the difference existing in French 
between the meaning of connaissance  and savoir whereby, while both allow action, the latter form of 
knowledge is distinguished from the former in light of having been certified and having received 
‘institutional testing’ (Foray, 2006, p.6). The same distinction, albeit in a different theoretical context, is 
referred to by Gorz (2003, pp.13-15; 38-40; 41-48; 105-112). 
52
 Focus here is on mainstream economics. However, other constituencies (such as the historians of 
science and technology, the sociologists of science, the science policy experts and, last but not least, the 
real working scientists) have been active participants in the debates around the funding of science and, 
more broadly, its economic aspects. These debates have taken place in a heated context, marked by a 
shift in sources of funding (from the state to the market) and the so-called Science Wars (i.e. the fierce 
intellectual controversy between scientific realists and postmodernist critics about the nature and 
legitimacy of science and scientific enquiry) in the United States in the 1990s. For critical assessment of 
these issues, these constituencies and their views, see Sent, 1999, Mirowski, Van Horn, 2005, and 
Mirowski, 2011. 
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identify the work of mainstream economists who, partly motivated by the extension of the 
application of economic theory to issues and subject matter traditionally thought to be beyond 
the purview of economics (Sent, 1999; Hands, 2001),53 have focused on the behaviour of 
economically rational individual scientists (Diamond, 1988, 1996; Shi, 2001; Wible, 1998a, 
1998b) posited as “scientific entrepreneurs” and “scientific consumers” engaging in scientific 
communities depicted as “exchange organisations” (Shi, 2001), selecting theory and research 
projects on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, and liable to misconduct or fraud depending on 
the outcome of constrained optimisation problems (Wible, 1998b). Otherwise, focus has been 
on investigating the institutional arrangements and mechanisms allowing for the optimal 
allocation of scientific research efforts, often with providing justification for ‘state or non-
market funding of “science”, the difference between “pure” and “applied” science, or the 
economic incentives’ and (non-pecuniary) reward structures faced by individual scientists 
(Sent, 1999, pp.97) as sole concerns (see, for example: Dasgupta, David, 1987, 1994; David, 
1998. See also Stephan, 1996 for a review of this literature, and Foray, 2006, ch. 8 on the 
economic incentives for knowledge openness; Dasgupta, David, 1994 can be read as a 
“manifesto” for this approach, which they call the “new economics of science”). However, this 
body of work has been criticised for remaining ‘largely silent about the influence of’ its 
‘analyses on the content of science’ itself, for its analysis ‘carried out at such a generic level 
that “science” becomes conflated with “knowledge” in general’ (irrespective of disciplinary 
boundaries, as well as intellectual and material determinants and constraints of research 
within and across different disciplines and scientific fields), and for their scant attempts ‘to 
connect with any historically specific science or concrete institutional structures’ (Sent 1999, 
p.97). 
On the other hand, science theory has recently taken an ‘economic turn’ of its own whereby, 
‘[m]uch like cognitive psychology … evolutionary biology … and sociological theory’, 
‘economics is no longer’ understood as ‘just a subject for science theory’, but has ‘become an 
important resource to be used in science theory’ itself (Hands, 2001, p.354). This movement 
originates from the work of philosophers of science operating within the normative tradition 
who are motivated to use mainstream economics to resolve the tensions between the 
“truthful” character of knowledge and its irredeemably social origins (Tyfield, 2012). 
Presenting itself as the ‘economics of scientific knowledge’ (henceforth ESK), ‘one of the 
youngest members in the heterogeneous field of “Science Studies”’, this body of work pursues 
‘the application of concepts and methods of economic analysis to the study of the epistemic 
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 For example, this motivation is explicitly acknowledged by Shi (2001) and Wible (1998b). For broader 
discussion of economics imperialism, i.e. the extension of (micro)economic theory to subject matter 
previously thought to be beyond the disciplinary purview of economics, see Fine, Milonakis, 2009. 
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nature and value of scientific knowledge’ (Zamora Bonilla, 2012, p.823). Thus, it comprises 
work attempting ‘to understand scientific research as a process of rational cost-benefit 
decision making … or of optimisation of an epistemic utility function’, or through ‘the idea that 
science is basically an institution for the exchange of items of knowledge, a “marketplace of 
ideas”’ (Zamora Bonilla, 2012, p.827). In doing so, the aim of the ESK is ‘to “naturalise” 
philosophical debate by grounding it in (social) scientific methods that provide scientific 
justification for philosophical conclusions’ (Tyfield, 2012, p.13; similarly, see Hands, 2001). 
Indeed, this interest of philosophers in economics and their attempt to use it as a resource for 
epistemology stems from the need to navigate between the Scylla of positivism and the 
Charybdis of relativism and propose ‘a philosophical approach that is sensitive to the critique 
of the Received View’ in Science Studies – i.e. the relativism introduced by Thomas Kuhn 
(1962) which informs the sociology of scientific knowledge – while ‘retaining an element of 
normative bite’ (Hands, 1997, S110; similarly, Hands, 2001, Tyfield, 2012).54 
The two bodies of work described above differ significantly in terms of their motivations and 
driving forces, while also sharing intellectual origins in positivism, as well as significantly 
converging and overlapping in scope and subject matter and in the idea of a “marketplace of 
ideas” (see Zamora Bonilla, 2012 for an assessment of differences and similarities, but see also 
Mirowski, 2011 for discussion of the role of the “marketplace of ideas” in the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism). However, and despite their differences, both bodies of work can claim for 
themselves the moniker of economics for their recourse to mainstream economics as 
analytical framework, rather than for any consideration of the material conditions and 
determinants of scientific activity or of the connections between scientific activity and broader 
socio-economic structures, dynamics and processes. With respect to the contributions of 
economists, this prompted Sent (1999) to distinguish between economic theory of science and 
economic aspects of science. Indeed, with their focus on mainstream economics, none of 
these bodies of work is concerned with investigating the social structures within which 
scientific activity is carried out and embedded, their links to the division of labour (both within 
scientific activity itself and across society as a whole), and the changing dynamics of funding 
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 This process is not dissimilar from the way in which reaction against, and retreat from, the excesses of 
postmodernism across the social sciences have been one of the sustaining forces of the (complex and 
uneven) reception of economics imperialism in “colonised” or otherwise “attacked” disciplines (Fine, 
Milonakis, 2009). For more on the ESK, see Zamora Bonilla, 2012 and, for sustained critiques, Hands, 
1997, 2001. In particular, the ‘most influential and most self-conscious attempt by a philosopher of 
science to enlist economics in an effort to salvage scientific rationality and normative epistemology from 
the threat of relativism and social constructivism’ (Hands, 2001, p.367) can be found in the work of 
Philip Kitcher (see, for example, Kitcher, 1993), but see Hands, 2001 and Mirowski, 1996 (now ch.5 in 
Mirowski, 2004) for critical assessment. A brief overview of ‘what might be called an indirect challenge 
to mainstream-based ESK’, that is, ‘the use of relatively nonmainstream economic ideas in the study of 
scientific knowledge’ (Hands, 2001, p.382), can be found in Hands, 2001, pp.382-388. 
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and their drivers (Sent, 1999). In short, what is left out is the specific historical character of 
science and knowledge production, i.e. the way in which different concrete and historically-
determined institutional arrangements (and their determinants) favour or impair the use, 
production, accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, science and technology themselves. 
Therefore, neither of these bodies of work fits PROPOSITION 2 of Foray’s definition of the EK. 
But, then, if the EK is reduced to PROPOSITION 1, the departure from the core contribution of 
economists (rooted in the attributes of knowledge as a public, semi-public, or private good) 
announced by Foray is nowhere to be found. In this sense, Foray’s EK stands reduced to a new 
bottle for the sour old wine of knowledge as a public good, albeit corrected with insights from 
David and Dasgupta’s “new economics of science” (1994) and the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. 
1.4.4) Knowledge as aporia55 
 
Interestingly, Foray (2006) himself provides useful pointers as to why knowledge represents an 
aporia for mainstream economic theory and a neoclassical EK is a contradiction in terms. 
Firstly, as discussed above, Foray understands ‘knowledge’ as ‘something more than 
information’, something which ‘empowers its possessors with the capacity for intellectual or 
physical action’, in short, ‘cognitive capability’ (Foray, 2006, p.4). In this, Foray follows 
Steinmueller (2002), for whom it is the failure to operate this distinction that has pushed 
‘economics, usually an imperialistic discipline intent on colonising the other social sciences’, to 
leave treatment and discussion of knowledge to other disciplines. ‘The problem’, for 
Steinmueller, would be that to incorporate issues relating to knowledge in economics ‘implies 
abandoning the “representative” firm and individual, introducing a range of distinctly non-
economic variables into the analysis, and rethinking the fundamental assumption that the 
individual is the appropriate unit of social analysis’ (Steinmueller, 2002, p.146). Indeed, and 
although neither Foray nor Steinmueller go as far as making the following point, agents in 
mainstream economic models have very little (if any) agency, given that their behaviour is the 
outcome of constrained optimisation problems and, therefore, predetermined by the 
mathematical specification of the model itself. However, this analytical endeavour negates 
from the onset the very possibility of understanding and incorporating within the mainstream 
model knowledge as cognition (or cognitive capability). A similar point is argued by Mirowski 
(2011, p.335), for example, with reference to the ‘asymmetrical’ cognitive status of the agent 
and ‘the economist/analyst in modern mainstream economic theory’, whereby economists 
arrogate for themselves a ‘constitutional capacity’ which they deny to the agent in the model: 
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 Many elements in this section directly call into question endogenous (or new) growth theory, but a 
proper discussion is delayed till the next section. 
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‘the ability to survey the rules and institutions imposed by the “model”, to critically engage in 
self-reflexivity, and to decide whether or not the agent (it?) will accept the terms and 
conditions dictated by the model’. The outcome of this asymmetry is that ‘the agent is doomed 
to be a total slave to the model, a cognitive robot, a fixed nonentity rather than a person in 
process of becoming someone else’, since, ‘by construction, the agent cannot under any 
circumstances rebel against the scripted role imposed by the economist’.56 Put otherwise, ‘if 
the economist and the agent were on the same epistemic footing, then the cognitive 
acceptance by the agent of the model putatively describing their experience would be a 
necessary precondition for the validity of the model’.57 Secondly, ‘[e]lements of knowledge are 
heterogenous’ and, therefore, incomparable (Foray, 2006, p.9) and irreducible to a common 
denominator, standard or homogeneous stock (Boulding, 1966; Metcalfe, 2002, 2010; 
Steedman, 2003). Thus, ‘measuring stocks, already difficult in the case of physical capital, 
becomes an impossible undertaking in the case of knowledge’ (Foray, 2006, p.10) (similarly, 
Metcalfe, 2002, 2010; Steedman, 2003; and Cowan et al., 2000, on the basis of the distinction 
between tacit and codified knowledge). However, and although Foray does not make the 
following point, the full implication of the incomparability of knowledge is that any type of 
evaluation based on the maximisation of utility would be logically flawed, and the concept of 
marginal utility meaningless when applied to “additional units” of knowledge. Indeed, 
acquisition of new knowledge often entails calling into question and redefining old or previous 
knowledge and beliefs. This significantly undermines the idea that individual preferences are 
invariant, a prerequisite for the definition of a utility function to be maximised (similarly, 
Mirowski, 2011, pp. 59, 335). Similarly, if a stock of knowledge cannot be defined, the concept 
of (increasing or decreasing) marginal product of a stock of knowledge (considered as a factor 
of production) is meaningless (Steedman, 2003) (see below). At this juncture, lest the reader 
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 This contradictory notion of the agent, together with the latter’s asymmetrical status with respect to 
that of the economist, can be seen as related to, and outcome of, how the conception of the “freedom” 
of the individual within economic theory has changed throughout time. See Medema, 2009 for an 
implicit account of how the conception of individual freedom has become mechanically and rigidly (pre-
)determined in the passage from Classical political economy (and Adam Smith’s liberalism) to 
neoclassical economics. See also Hands, 2010 for an account of how the tension within neoclassical 
economics between the aspiration to preserve ‘volition (and its associated normative implications)’ and 
pursue ‘causal science (and the predictive power, explanatory understanding and the epistemic 
distinction it brings)’ (p.642) has framed the (selective) incorporation (or not) of (specific kinds of) 
psychology into consumer choice theory. A perfect example of how the coexistence of these 
(conflicting) aspirations leads to contradiction is readily found in Friedman’s work, where Friedman’s 
“freedom to choose” (Friedman, Friedman, 1990) cannot be axiomatically predicted, thus standing in 
contradiction with Friedman’s own methodological stance (Friedman, 1953b), and can only be 
appended (or brought back in) as an afterthought. 
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 In addition to this, see also Mirowski, 2009b for detailed discussion of ‘the fundamental logical 
obstacles to equipping the neoclassical agent with a consensus technology to take knowledge on board’ 
(Mirowski, 2009b, p.134) encountered from within each of the main post-war schools of neoclassical 
economics according to how it treats (and collapses knowledge into) information (i.e. information as a 
thing, information as inductive inference, and information processing as computation). 
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(still) think that the reception of the KBE within economics and the elaboration of an EK 
represent a welcome move forward beyond the limitations of the mainstream (for their break 
with the basic theoretical assumptions of the latter), it is extremely important to emphasise 
how, on the contrary, the two contradictions highlighted above do not deter the mainstream 
from turning to the issue of knowledge but, rather, are symptomatic and exemplary of the 
current state and resiliency of the orthodoxy within the discipline. Indeed, after having grown 
secure in its technical apparatus (organised around utility and production functions) and its 
technical architecture (organised around equilibrium and efficiency) – or TA2 (Fine, 2011, 2013) 
– economics has come to perceive itself as ‘a set of techniques and statistical methods of 
universal applicability’. This self-perception has been the driving force of the extension of the 
principles of economics both within the discipline and beyond to the subject matter of other 
disciplines, in ‘thoughtless’ fashion and ‘without regard to the nature of the topic, appropriate 
methodology, inductive foundations, and continuing traditions’  (Fine, 2011, p.207). Therefore, 
even if, on the surface, current developments at the margins of the discipline may seem to 
contradict the standard assumptions and staples of TA2, in practice the latter is never 
dethroned nor substantively questioned (especially in the teaching of economics itself). In this 
sense, attention to knowledge within economics through the reception of the KBE concept and 
aim to develop an EK is exemplary of the state of ‘“suspension”’ (Fine, 2011, p.207) in which 
the discipline thrives, implying its capability to ‘both’ float ‘free of its origins and core material 
whilst remaining irrevocably attached to them’, to ‘go anywhere’ without ever departing 
(p.208).58 
Thirdly, ‘[k]nowledge is largely unobservable’, especially when tacit: indeed, the ‘most 
distinctive feature of tacit knowledge is its incorporation in thoughts and deeds, and its 
invisibility, even for those who possess it and use it “automatically”’. Thus, ‘[k]nowledge 
appears only when it is expressed and written and when it becomes possible to attach a 
property right to it. Yet tacit knowledge is constantly being reconstituted, so that a vast world 
remains perpetually invisible’ (Foray, 2006, p.9). But, if knowledge is in large part tacit, 
contextual (i.e. localised in institutions and routines, produced and reproduced for specific 
purposes) and weakly persistent (i.e. people forget), and if its acquisition and reproduction are 
in large part the outcome of processes of learning-by-doing (Foray, 2006), then the 
restructuring of labour markets which has characterised advanced economies since the 1970s, 
together with the attendant increasing flexibilisation and casualisation of labour relations, 
should also be seen as having caused a great deal of “de-knowledgeing”, that is, processes 
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 The concept of suspension will be taken up again and in more detail in the second chapter, where it 
will inform the interpretation of Italian post-workerist Marxism peculiar to this thesis (but see also 
footnote 78). 
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whereby firms are “deskilled” through ‘hollowing out of skills and knowledge by outsourcing, 
loss of key skills and loss of corporate memory’ through donwsizing (Littler, Innes, 2003, p.76), 
whether empirically valid or not.59 This is also recognised by Foray, for whom ‘[i]nternal labor 
markets ... are approaching a state of crisis in which increasing externalization, turnover, and 
mobility are making traditional methods of knowledge management ... ever more uncertain’ 
(Foray, 2006, p.84). But, then, investigation of the conditions of production and reproduction 
of knowledge should include consideration of whether the current material organisation of 
production is actually conducive to the production and accumulation of knowledge, especially 
since Foray’s definition of the field of analysis of the EK explicitly calls into question the 
historical and institutional conditions of knowledge production, see PROPOSITION 2 in sub-
section 1.4.3 above. However, this would inevitably require shifting attention to the systemic 
properties of markets and the current material organisation, functioning and embedding of 
production and labour processes. 
Fourthly, for Foray ‘[t]here is no stable model that can be used to convert inputs (into the 
creation of knowledge) and outputs (economic effects)’, because knowledge, ‘has no fixed 
capacity in terms of impact of an additional quantity on the economy’ (Foray, 2006, p.9). 
Indeed, whether new ideas can be conducive to societal change or remain ineffective depends 
on a variety of social factors, including ‘the prevailing spirit of initiative, the situation of 
competition or the social organization’ (p.9) (similarly, Mokyr, 2002). Therefore, ‘there is no 
production function that can be used to forecast, even approximately, the effect that a unit of 
knowledge will have on economic performance’, and, ‘[c]onversely, it is very difficulty [sic] to 
impute an economic effect to particular knowledge’, as externalities and cumulativity stand in 
the way of incontrovertible attribution of ‘a particular improvement in the economy’ to any 
particular element of knowledge (Foray, 2006, p.9). Last but certainly not least, for Foray 
‘market institutions face daunting problems when a price has to be set for knowledge’: indeed, 
in transactions whose object is knowledge, ‘the seller – by selling knowledge – does not lose 
anything’, as ‘knowledge is acquired definitively, even if it is shared or sold afterward’, and ‘the 
                                                 
59
 In this sense, the dynamics and processes affecting labour markets in advanced capitalist societies 
since the 1970s run against the accumulation of knowledge and skills within and without firms and, 
therefore, contradict an important element of the rhetoric of the KBE. The recognition, within the 
managerial and business literature, of the negative effects – in terms of loss of organisational and firm-
level (tacit) knowledge – of business process re-engineering and downsizing have led to the birth of ‘a 
new set of practices called “knowledge management” … to help firms perform the tasks that’ have ‘been 
disrupted by downsizing’. However, it is obvious that managers manage people (and the business and 
labour processes) and not knowledge itself (Nightingale, 2012, p.384) – although management control 
of workers’ knowledge can be one of the aims and/or results of managerial practices (Marx, 1976; 
Braverman, 1998 [1974]). Further, for its neglect to investigate the causes of business process re-
engineering, the development of the knowledge management literature is one more example of the 
failure to confront finance as the heartbeat of the KBE, as well as what this implies for work, labour 
market trends and the workplace more broadly (see Thompson, 2013). 
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buyer does not need to buy the same knowledge several times, even if it is to be used several 
times’; moreover, ‘the buyer cannot really assess the value of knowledge without actually 
acquiring it’ (p.9). While the first two of these points relate to the non-rival character of 
knowledge, and can be easily relegated to the realm of market failure, the third point is 
revealing of a fundamental logical contradiction: in order to know whether to enter a 
transaction whose object is knowledge, buyers have to know the piece of knowledge itself to 
assess whether it is useful to them or not; but, if they possess the piece of knowledge in the 
first place, they have no reason to enter the transaction at all.60 Thus, if the conditions for 
perfect competition are to be realised, information is perfect and there simply cannot be 
markets for knowledge; or, for knowledge to be considered a commodity and be traded, then 
the conditions of perfect competition, assumed by mainstream neoclassical economics, cannot 
apply. For Boyle (1996, p.115), the reasons for this aporia can be summarised as follows: 
‘perfect information is a defining conceptual element of the analytical structure used to 
analyze markets driven by the absence of information, in which imperfect information is 
actually a commodity’. Pointing out this contradiction is certainly not going to convince 
mainstream economists of the flaws of their analyses, nor is it meant to deny that, despite 
what economists think, information and knowledge are going through processes of 
commercialisation, not least through the expansion and extension of IPRs. However, it can 
help explain the economists’ ambivalent assessment of the patent system, epitomised by 
Penrose’s and Machlup’s expressions of doubt provided at the end of sub-section 1.3.2, or that 
the public good problem, once perceived as requiring public intervention as its solution 
(Arrow, 1962a; Nelson, 1959), can today be seen as requiring patents as obvious solution 
(Foray, 2006). Indeed, ‘[i]n practice, economists tend to treat some information issues in their 
“efficiency–perfect information” mode’, and other issues ‘in their “incentives for future 
producers–solve public goods problems” mode’, with ‘commodification or restriction of 
information’ judged negatively in the former case, and positively in the latter. However, there 
is ‘no master principle or algorithm to explain when to be in the first mode and when to be in 
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 Precisely because of this paradox, it is interesting to speculate as to why the approach pioneered by 
Oliver Hart and John Moore (1988, 1990, 1999) has not been taken up as an explanation for the role of 
patents as solution to the problem of underinvestment in knowledge production. After all, following 
their logic, property rights are a solution to situations of incomplete contracting, i.e. situations in which, 
since all future states of the world cannot be known in advance, conditions attached to them cannot be 
stipulated and, therefore, contracts are often incomplete. ‘As time passes and uncertainty is resolved, 
the parties can and do renegotiate their contract, in a Coasian fashion, to generate an ex post efficient 
outcome. However, as a consequence of this renegotiation, each party shares some of the benefits of 
prior (noncontractible) relationship-specific investments with the other party. Recognizing this, each 
party underinvests ex ante’. Thus, this ‘literature studies how the allocation of asset ownership and 
formal control rights can reduce this underinvestment’ (Hart, Moore, 2008, p.2). A first, tentative 
answer may lie in the limited success garnered by Hart and Moore’s approach within the mainstream of 
the discipline (for example, see Maskin, Tirole, 1999 for a rebuttal from illustrious orthodox economists). 
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the second’, and it is always possible, ‘with eminent formal correctness, to reverse the polarity 
and switch the categories’. Thus, for example, ‘[c]opyright could be portrayed as an intolerable 
monopoly over information production’, and ‘legalized insider trading as a necessary incentive 
to bring information to market’, or vice versa (Boyle, 1996, p.36).61 This theoretical 
ambivalence sustains and reinforces the influence of external political circumstances on the 
discipline, as can be seen with the ‘shift of attitude among pro-market thinkers, from a default 
position of relative hostility to patents to one where patents’ are ‘praised as a most wonderful 
inducement to the growth of knowledge and encouragement of innovation’, which has 
coincided ‘with the elaboration and stabilization of neoliberalism’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.144; 
similarly Van Horn, Klaes, 2011a, 2011b). 
1.4.5) Endogenous growth theory, or knowledge as aporia continued 
 
While all of the above should suffice to dispense with the KBE and EK or altogether with the 
idea that mainstream economics can possibly have anything purposeful to say about 
knowledge and its relation to the economy, it is important to examine how many of the 
conceptual flaws, contradictions and paradoxes highlighted thus far reach paroxysm in 
endogenous (or new) growth theory (henceforth EGT). Indeed, the latter is exemplary of how 
issues relating to the relationship between knowledge and the economy have been 
incorporated within economic theory consistently with economic imperialism (rather than 
purposefully) and without leading to questioning of the mainstream (despite their conflict with 
the latter’s foundations). The literature regarding EGT is immense and ever-expanding, 
reaching high levels of mathematical sophistication in the process, and the present sub-section 
has no ambition of providing a full account of it (but see Snowdon, Vane, 2005, ch.11 for a 
standard account, and Fine, 2000, 2003b, 2006a and Herrera, 2006 for detailed critical 
accounts). The thrust of this sub-section is to provide a streamlined account contesting the 
main claim to fame of EGT, i.e. that it constitutes a sound, if not the most important, 
contribution of economics to the understanding of the links between knowledge and the 
economy, as both conventional academic (Snowdon, Vane, 2005) and popular journalistic 
(Warsh, 2006) narratives have it. Interestingly, as for the aporetic character of knowledge for 
economics discussed above, a first assessment of the inadequacies of EGT is offered by Foray 
himself. Indeed, he concedes that ‘[i]t is toward growth models that endogenize technological 
change that we naturally turn to evaluate the capacity of neoclassical theory to solve problems 
of the economics of knowledge’ (Foray, 2006, p.12), since these have brought ‘formal 
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classified and understood as one or the other depends upon inner substantive content and external 
context (see Fine, 2001, 2010b for discussion along these lines). 
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theoretical work on economic growth closer to ... the immediate determinants of growth’ 
(notwithstanding that the econometric studies on economic growth in the form of Barro-type 
regressions have been shown as unable to identify the causes of economic growth, see Fine, 
2003b, 2006a and Kenny, Williams, 2001). However, Foray also believes that EGT leaves ‘many 
other aspects of the economics of knowledge, of the utmost importance in explaining the 
determinants of growth ... still overlooked or considered only superficially’. Indeed, Foray 
laments that ‘[k]nowledge itself, the vehicle of externalities, is always represented in models of 
endogenous growth in the form of ... a set of codified instructions which provide access to 
immediate and free exploitation of the technology’, which is ‘a huge simplification, with 
disastrous consequences on our understanding of knowledge-based economies’ for its neglect 
of the ‘tacit and naturally excludable’ dimension of much knowledge (Foray, 2006, p.13; 
similarly, Cowan et al., 2000) (but see below for more on EGT and the non-excludability 
component of the public good). Secondly, the firm, locus primum of innovation, ‘remains a 
black box’, with issues of organisation, managerial form and strategy left unexplored (both in 
general and with specific relation to their role in harnessing innovation). Thirdly, scant 
recognition is given to ‘the corporate environment, apart from the market’, with ‘many aspects 
of that environment’, which are ‘determining factors in economic growth’, left unduly 
neglected (for example the relations between firms and universities, the specifics of IPR 
regimes, the functioning of financial markets, and labour market regulation). However, 
contradictorily (if not opportunistically), what Foray draws from his short assessment of EGT is 
‘the importance, for economic research, of constant dialogue and mutual attentiveness 
between the formal theory of growth and what is [sic] called appreciative theories’ (Foray, 
2006, p.13).62 
Unfortunately, though, the problems with EGT run much deeper than this. As is well known, 
EGT takes old (or exogenous) neoclassical growth theory (in the version provided by Solow, 
1956, 1957) as point of departure (Mirowski, 2011; Fine, 2000, 2003b, 2006a; Herrera, 2006). 
The latter is a special case of the Harrod-Domar model for growth, for which the conditions 
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 The last two points of Foray’s short summary are also stated, in greater length and depth, in Nelson, 
1997, 1998. Foray does not explain in his book what he means by appreciative theory, but a definition 
can be found in Nelson, 1997 and Nelson, 1998 (p.500): ‘What we called appreciative theorising tends to 
be close to empirical work and provides both interpretation and guidance for further exploration. 
Mostly it is expressed verbally and is the analyst's articulation of what he or she thinks really is going on. 
However, appreciative theory is very much an abstract body of reasoning. Certain variables and 
relationships are treated as important, and others are ignored. There generally is explicit causal 
argument. On the other hand, appreciative theorising tends to stay quite close to the empirical 
substance’. Nelson understands appreciative theorising as a critique of, as well as a complement and an 
alternative to the insufficiencies of, formal modelling in economics. However, for Nelson (1998), if the 
interaction between appreciative theory and formal modelling is fruitful, it has been very limited in 
practice in EGT. 
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ensuring a steady-state balanced growth path require equality of natural and warranted 
growth rates.63 The former is posited as exogenously given by the rate of growth of population, 
 , whereas the latter is given by the growth rate of the capital stock  . Since this grows each 
period by    (where   is the savings rate, which is assumed to be constant, and   is output),64 
the rate of growth of the capital stock can be rewritten as     , or     (where   stands for 
the capital-output ratio). Reformulated in capital per worker terms, output per capita       
will depend on capital per worker      , as specified by the production function for capital 
per worker,       . In order for the economy to satisfy the Harrod-Domar conditions for 
steady-state balanced growth, it is required that      , which can be rewritten as 
         , and, therefore,         . This last equation implies that saving/investment 
per worker must equal the new investment required for   new workers in the economy to 
allow for a constant growth rate with capital and labour remaining in the same proportions 
over time (Fine, 2003b). As Mirowski (2011, p.71) points out, it is worthwhile to note ‘the 
extent to which the model was supposedly cast in “materialist” terms, dictated by technology, 
demographics, depreciation, and the like’, with the ‘phenomenon of economic growth’ 
understood as a set of ‘timeless physical relations dictating timeless natural growth rates with 
smooth adjustments to timeless steady state ratios between key variables’. Further, with per 
capita output remaining constant as equilibrium shifts along the steady-state balanced growth 
path, ‘productivity increase’ could ‘only be added on as an afterthought and explained outside 
the model as exogenous’, or, as was said at the time, ‘“manna from heaven”’ (Fine, 2003b, 
p.202).65 Nonetheless, and however obvious its limitations,66 it must also be noted that old 
growth theory was conceptually and contextually a product of the 1950s, attached to the 
Rostowian idea(l) of development as modernisation, and, therefore, deferring to the 
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 Steady-state balanced growth implies a form of equilibrium over time whereby the economy grows 
while at the same time remaining unchanged in all respects, since all relevant variables grow at constant 
proportional rates (Fine, 2003b, p.202; Mirowski, 2011, p.79). 
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 All savings are assumed to be invested. 
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 It is following from, and as opposed to, this that EGT gets its name, with the “endogenisation” of 
technology and the savings rate implying that the parameters expressing them in the model are the 
outcome of the optimising decisions of agents in the model, and, therefore, determined within the 
model itself. 
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 These are several, and include the assumptions of perfect competition and full employment in and 
across all markets (albeit mitigated by their validity in an unspecified long run), and the striking neglect 
of historical experience, which shows that growth is neither steady nor balanced but, rather, part and 
parcel of processes of structural change and socio-economic development which, by raising productivity 
across all sectors and shifting the economy from agriculture into manufacturing and then services, 
involve major transformations in the proportions of economic activity and composition of output (but 
see Fine, 2000, 2003b, 2006a for more). However, the most devastating limitations of old growth theory 
(even if assessed on its own terms) stem from its reliance upon the neoclassical production function as 
representative of the whole economy (one-sector model), which makes it vulnerable to the Cambridge 
Critique formulated during the Cambridge capital controversies (Fine, 2000, 2003b, 2006a). In particular, 
for the Cambridge Critique, see Robinson, 1953-1954 and Harcourt, 1972 for classic accounts, and Fine, 
1980 (ch.5, 6), 2012a for shorter and more accessible accounts (but see also footnote 68). 
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(consideration of) non-economic (factors) as supplement to economic theory in explaining 
growth.67 Thus, while its intrinsic limitations do not make it a complete and all-encompassing 
theory of economic growth, it must be noted that this was not something that old growth 
theory itself aspired to be (Fine, 2003b). 
However, to reintroduce technical change into the model would prove to be the ‘Revenge of 
the Repressed’, with ‘the intrinsic reinsertion of the temporal and the social into the 
explanation of growth’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.71). As is well-known, in attempting to test the 
model econometrically with U.S. data for the period 1909-1949, Solow (1957) allowed for the 
possibility that the production function had changed during the period by adding an additional 
variable to the model. Thus, he redefined the production function as           , where the 
‘variable   for time’ appeared ‘in   to allow for technical change’. Incidentally, this was to give 
birth to the habit of adding variables to the production function, characteristic of EGT. 
However, as Solow himself admitted, ‘the phrase “technical change”’ was to be understood as 
‘a shorthand expression for any kind of shift in the production function. Thus slowdowns, 
speedups, improvements in the education of the labor force, and all sorts of things’ would 
‘appear as “technical change”’ (Solow, 1957, p.312). Much to his own surprise (Solow, 2005), 
Solow found that most of the growth experienced during that period could not be explained by 
the growth of productive factors but, rather, was to be understood as due to shifts in the 
production function. However, as opposed to rejecting the model altogether (which could 
have been a reasonable path to take, given that most of the growth was to be explained by … 
“all sorts of things”), this led Solow to identify “technical change” as the main determinant for 
growth (Mirowski, 2011). This “discovery” opened the way to “growth accounting”, i.e. 
statistical exercises aiming to measure ‘technological progress or the contribution of 
exogenous productivity increases to increases in output’ (Fine, 2003b, p.205). Thus, ‘the 
increase in output … minus contribution to output from increase in capital … minus 
contribution to output from increase in labour’ came to be understood as ‘the output increase 
that is not explained by increases in inputs’ and, therefore, ‘designated as due to technological 
progress and named total factor productivity’. Yet, the latter was ‘recognised to be a residual 
after the contribution of increases in inputs have been netted out from increases in output’, 
and, although measured, it was left unexplained (Fine, 2003b, p.206). Indeed, and however 
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 Solow himself has recalled this intellectual “division of labour” between the old neoclassical theory of 
economic growth and a broader conception of development, informed by the consideration of socio-
economic processes: ‘in the early 1950s everybody was interested in economic development, for the 
obvious reason that most of the population of the world was living in poor economies. I was passively 
interested in economic development, but I have never been actively interested – in a research way – in 
what happens in underdeveloped countries. But I got to thinking about development issues and I had 
read Arthur Lewis. I knew I was not going to work on development issues, but it did get me interested in 
the general area of economic growth’ (Solow, 2005, p.663). 
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fraught with conceptual mistakes and inconsistencies, even on its own terms, the 
measurement of total factor productivity (Fine, 2003b, 2006a),68 all of this testifies to what old 
growth theory saw as its own limits and theoretical ambitions.69 Incidentally, the lack of any 
pretence within old growth theory to explain the origins of technical progress went well with 
Arrow’s (1962a) and Nelson’s (1959) characterisation of knowledge, innovation and research 
as public goods, on the one hand, and with the faith in the linear model of innovation within 
U.S. public and science policy circles, on the other (Mirowski, 2011). Thus, ‘[b]y the 1960s, the 
combination of the linear model, the public good, and Solow-defined technical change became 
cemented together in the’ U.S. ‘science policy community as the Cold War explanation of 
choice’ to be used in justifying ‘the continuation of the largesse of government subsidy of 
science in that era’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.73). 
                                                 
68
 These descend from the vulnerability of old growth theory to the Cambridge Critique. In a one-sector 
model, represented by the production function in per capita terms       , distribution between 
capital and labour is determined by appeal to their respective marginal products, with the rate of profit 
equalling       and the wage rate equalling            . Following from this, the relations between 
profits, wages and the capital stock in per capita terms are set algebraically, with profit falling as   
grows because of diminishing marginal returns of     . However, by taking into consideration the 
existence of more than one sector, these results do not hold. ‘First of all, capital as such cannot be 
measured and placed within a production function   with the properties required. Essentially, capital 
now has both a physical aspect (quantities of machines) and a price aspect – at the very least      
where   is price and   quantity of physical capital. The quantity   depends on  , and this cannot be 
derived from within the one-sector model, as there is only one good and so no (relative) prices’ (Fine, 
2003b, p.205). This invalidates measurements of total factor productivity, since ‘changes in   are a 
combination of changes in both the evaluation and the quantity of capital’, but the measure of total 
factor productivity stemming from the one-sector old growth theory treats all changes in   as if they 
were changes in physical quantity (Fine, 2003b, p.206). 
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 Solow himself has clarified various time what he took “exogenous” to mean. For example, he has 
affirmed: ‘When I say that in my work in the 1950s I treated technical change as exogenous, that does 
not mean that I really believed at the time that it had no internal economic causes. In the very same 
papers I always treated population growth as exogenous, but I did know about Malthus, and there is 
clearly a connection between economic development and demographic patterns. What I meant by 
saying something is exogenous was that I do not pretend to understand this; I have nothing worthwhile 
to say on this so I might as well take technical change as given … I do not know what the determinants of 
technical change are in any useful detail’ (Solow, 2005, p.668; similarly, Solow, 1994). This conception of 
the analytical task of the neoclassical old growth model and the analytical questions it could address are 
at the basis of Solow’s antipathy towards EGT and its empirics based on multivariable cross-country 
regressions (see, for example, Solow, 2001), and of Solow’s concern with how ‘the long run in which so 
much is taken as given or in which the grandly endogenous, such as stages of capitalism and shifting 
social institutions, are tied’, in EGT models, ‘exclusively to the most simplistic optimising behaviour’ 
(Fine, 2000, p.261) (see below). Unfortunately, such ‘cautionary notes, even if within the neoclassical 
paradigm’, have been ignored in EGT, ‘as models based on simple intuitions are worked out 
mathematically and tested empirically against the conveniently available large data sets across regions 
and time’ (Fine, 2000, p.261). Incidentally, this, in itself, is exemplary of the relevance of Boulding’s 
(1966, p.10) prescient concern with the dangers that advances in computing represent for the 
development of abstract thought in general and economic theory in particular: ‘I confess I am a little 
worried about one aspect of this movement, fruitful as it undoubtedly is. The very power of the 
computer to simulate complex systems by very high-speed arithmetic may prevent search for those 
simplified formulations which are the essence of progress in theory’. Nonetheless, as Solow himself 
laments, there is still no understanding, in EGT, of the (socio-economic) determinants of technical 
change (despite claims to the contrary from within EGT). 
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But the old growth theory ended up running into a series of paradoxes of its own. Of these, the 
most “striking” (that is, for mainstream economists) was that, despite obvious differences in 
economic and growth performances across developed and developing countries, the full 
implications of the Solow model were that, given a common production function (and, 
therefore, exogenous technology), as well as free mobility of capital, knowledge and 
technology, the marginal rate of return to investment in developing countries (where capital is 
scarce) should be much higher than that in developed countries (where capital is abundant). 
Further, this should lead to overall convergence across developing and developed economies, 
with the former converging at faster rates of growth than the latter. But none of this was to be 
found in reality (Lucas, 1990). However, while this lack of realism was perceived as having 
brought research within old growth theory to a dead end, it also proved key in pushing 
mainstream economists to believe that ‘physical capital accumulation alone’ could not 
‘account for either continuous growth of per capita income over long periods of time or the 
enormous geographical disparities in living standards’ observed across national economies 
(Snowdon, Vane, 2005, p.624, emphasis added) (as well as generating interest for testing 
conditional convergence, thus setting the bases for the empirics of EGT). Therefore, after two 
decades of stagnation, the “new” research programme in neoclassical growth theory saw the 
light in the 1990s, following the impulse of seminal contributions by Lucas (1988) and Romer 
(1986, 1990a). From these origins, EGT has expanded enormously in both theoretical and 
empirical content. However, despite the wide variety and mathematical sophistication of EGT 
models, these ‘have settled down to have common theoretical elements’ (Fine, 2003b, p.207). 
Indeed, while old growth theory crucially assumed ‘perfectly working markets and constant 
returns to scale’, ‘in order to endogenize growth and productivity’, EGT models breach both 
(Fine, 2006a, p.78). Thus, and firstly, EGT models are dependent on increasing returns to scale, 
from which follow that bigger economies will have higher productivity, and, consequently, the 
advantage of developed over developing countries (Fine, 2003b, p.207; Snowdon, Vane, 2005, 
pp.624-625). Secondly, and to substantiate the existence of increasing returns to scale, most 
EGT models rely ‘upon the presence of positive externalities’, with ‘constant returns to scale 
for the individual producer but positive spillover effects for the economy as a whole’, ‘as 
education, invention, learning, networks such as industrial districts’ or whatever other positive 
externality of choice ‘spread individual gains more widely’ (Fine, 2003b, p.207, emphasis 
added). Thirdly, and since both increasing returns to scale and positive externalities have long 
been acknowledged within the discipline as central examples of market failure, EGT models 
depend critically on the latter. Therefore, any ‘market imperfection can be used to generate’ 
an EGT model ‘as long as it generates increasing returns’, and ‘almost any sector of the 
economy can be perceived to experience market imperfections’ (Fine, 2003b, p.207). 
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Ultimately, translated in the mathematical apparatus of neoclassical economics, these are all 
sources of non-convexity. Therefore, this leads EGT models to drop the assumptions of 
technological convexity and overall concavity of the production function (which assures 
decreasing marginal returns to the factors of production and globally constant returns to scale, 
i.e. homogeneity), to allow for increasing returns to scale (Herrera, 2006; Romer, 1990b, 
2005).70 Further, it is important to stress that, while these are far from being new elements in 
economic theory, they had, until the emergence of EGT, been relegated to the area of 
microeconomic (welfare) theory, where they have been traditionally identified as causes of 
static deadweight losses.71 Thus, ‘[w]hat is remarkable is that’ EGT ‘has taken such static, 
microeconomic deadweight losses … and transformed them into a macroeconomic influence 
on the growth rate’ (Fine, 2003b, p.208). This is extremely significant in an age of expansion of 
scope and applicability of IPRs. Indeed, (as discussed in sub-section 1.3.2) patents have been 
traditionally perceived within economics as implying a trade-off between static and dynamic 
inefficiency, since the monopoly power which they institute is a cause of deadweight losses 
measured by consumer surplus triangles. Thus, EGT, by identifying sources of (microeconomic) 
static deadweight losses as positive influences on (macroeconomic) growth, and, therefore, 
elevating the former to pride of place, has proved extremely important in shifting the 
conception of economists away from the characterisation of knowledge as a public good and 
towards favouring its commercialisation. Thus, EGT has complemented Coase’s redefinition of 
the “attributes” of the commodity, hitting the final nail on the coffin of (the non-excludability 
component of) the characterisation of knowledge as a public good.72 Indeed, in essence, 
Romer, 1990a transported within growth theory Coase’s attack to the non-excludability 
component of the public good, for it consecrated ‘[r]ivalry’ as ‘a purely technological attribute’ 
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 Incidentally, it should be noted here that, if we take the task of a theory of economic growth to 
explain the hierarchical relations and causal mechanisms linking factors of production and socio-
economic structures, dynamics and processes to each other, and these to economic growth, to call EGT 
a theory could be seen as inappropriate, since it involves no new theoretical content or reflection, but 
merely tinkering with the mathematical apparatus of neoclassical economics. Thus, whether there is, 
and what kind of, growth depends, in EGT models, on the mathematical properties of the model; but 
this is nothing like a theoretical explanation of actual economic growth and processes, rather the 
collapsing of the latter into mathematics (similarly, Herrera, 2006). 
71
 Indeed, as is well known, increasing returns to scale, externalities and market failure unsettle the 
‘equivalence between Pareto optimum and competitive equilibrium’ (Herrera, 2006, p.246). 
72
 This has been acknowledged by Romer himself, for whom: ‘What endogenous growth theory is all 
about is that it took technology and reclassified it, not as a public good, but as a good which is subject to 
private control. It has at least some degree of appropriability or excludability associated with it, so that 
incentives matter for its production and use. But endogenous growth theory also retains the notion of 
non-rivalry that Solow captured. As he suggested, technology is a very different kind of good from 
capital and labour because it can be used over and over again, at zero marginal cost. The Solow theory 
was a very important first step. The natural next step beyond was to break down the public-good 
characterization of technology into this richer characterization – a partially excludable nonrival good. To 
do that you have to move away from perfect competition and that is what the recent round of growth 
theory has done’ (Romer, 2005, p.681). 
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(p.S73), and ‘[e]xcludability’ as ‘a function of both the technology and the legal system’ 
(p.S74). By ‘addressing the public good notion, and yet subordinating it to the privatization of 
knowledge through strengthened intellectual property rights, Romer took what had previously 
been the canonical justification for state subsidy of science and inverted it into a brief for the 
privatisation of science as a solution to the problems of flagging productivity and growth’ 
(Mirowski, 2011, p.74; similarly, also with respect to education and human capital as a 
productive factor in EGT, see Herrera, 2006, p.247, p.252). Significantly, in Romer’s own words, 
‘[w]hat matters for the results’ of his model ‘is that the knowledge is a nonrival good that is 
partially excludable and privately provided’ (Romer, 1990a, p.S85), and this amounts to having 
the best of both worlds: on the one hand, non-rivalry allows for positive externalities and 
spillovers on the economy as a whole, while, on the other hand, the negation of the non-
excludable character of knowledge allows to tout patents (a source of static inefficiency) as 
good for growth. 
However, that EGT cannot constitute a genuine engagement with the issues related to the 
production, reproduction and distribution of knowledge and technology is a clear consequence 
of its reliance on the neoclassical production function. Indeed, and firstly, as discussed (in 
footnotes 66 and 68) above, the neoclassical production function has been proven 
conceptually wrong and refuted in the heat of the Cambridge capital controversies. These saw 
the opposition of neoclassical economists and their radical political economy critics hailing 
from (or otherwise associated or aligned with), respectively, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Cambridge, England. Despite intellectual defeat 
having been inflicted on the neoclassical camp, as even acknowledged by Samuelson (1966), 
the revival of neoclassical growth theory represented by the rise of EGT has simply taken the 
neoclassical production function for granted as the starting point for empirical and theoretical 
work, as if the Cambridge controversies had never taken place (Fine, 2000, 2003b, 2012a; 
Mirowski, 2011; Herrera, 2006). Therefore, as such, EGT is premised on an obsolete and 
discredited, albeit not therefore discarded, element of (disciplinary) knowledge. Secondly, the 
neoclassical production function is meant to represent a technological relation linking factors 
of production to (physical) output and, therefore ‘the physical/technological boundaries of 
what can be accomplished in the production process’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.76; similarly, 
Mirowski, 2007). However, the history of the production function within economics shows 
that, whatever its mathematical form, the latter was not dictated by engineering principles or 
physical laws but, rather, conceived in analogy with the utility function, and in deference to 
mathematical tractability and compatibility with the overall technical apparatus of neoclassical 
economics (Mirowski, 2007, 2011; for more on the history of the production function see 
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Mirowski, 1989 and Ingrao, Israel, 1990). Indeed, the neoclassical production function was 
originally ‘modeled upon the original utility function … to permit an equal freedom of “choice” 
between supposedly coexistent yet distinct means of producing the good in question, the 
same way the consumer could “choose” between different baskets of commodities’ (Mirowski, 
2007, p.491). 
Thus, in the standard neoclassical economics framework, firms are posited as choosing 
techniques of production by solving constrained optimisation problems of cost minimisation, 
selecting the combination of inputs for which the isoquant of production is tangent to the 
lowest possible isocost line. This requires that marginal rates of technical substitution between 
inputs (i.e. the ratio between their marginal productivities, indicating the proportions in which 
one input can be exchanged for the other leaving the maximum level of output unchanged) 
equal the ratio of costs of production. But this is a fallacious and unrealistic representation of 
production on two important accounts. On the one hand, it is not possible to choose and 
change techniques of production freely and effortlessly, as ‘it takes time, new knowledge and a 
period of breaking the new process in’ before techniques of production can be developed, put 
to use and mastered effectively within any concrete production process (Mirowski, 2007, 
p.491), especially since productive activity involves transformative processes over the physical, 
spatial and temporal dimensions (Metcalfe, 2010). On the other hand, and more subtly, the 
neoclassical representation of the choice of production technique requires, conceptually and 
for marginal rates of technical substitution to be calculable in the first place, that inputs are 
freely and infinitely substitutable for one another. However, this breaches the second law of 
thermodynamics. Indeed, the latter affirms that the level of entropy (or disorder) of a closed 
system increases continuously and, therefore, that all closed systems transition from a state of 
order to one of disorder through degradation and decay through time (Boulding 1966; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1976); this implies the irreversibility of physical processes and that the 
representation of inputs in a production function as infinitely substitutable for one another is 
illegitimate (similarly, Mirowski, 2007, 2011 drawing on Georgescu-Roegen, 1976). Thus, to 
claim that EGT has endogenised technical change and knowledge, i.e. that it has made their 
production, reproduction and accumulation explicable from within the neoclassical model, 
other than in the shallow sense understood by mainstream economists, is, at best, a 
misunderstanding, for EGT is based on an obsolete and unrealistic element of knowledge (with 
respect to both the socio-economic processes it is meant to represent and the laws of physics). 
Thirdly, many contributions to EGT (though not necessarily all) rest on the assumption that 
there exists a “stock” of knowledge, ideas or human capital, which can be introduced as an 
argument in the production function and which occupies a central place in the analysis, for it is 
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its accumulation and properties which allow for increasing returns to scale (see, for key and 
seminal examples, Romer, 1986, 1990a; Lucas, 1988). Those upholding the distinction between 
codified and tacit knowledge have criticised EGT models for being ‘constructed around (the 
formalized representation of) a universal stock of technological knowledge to which all agents 
might contribute and from which all agents can draw costlessly’, thus neglecting the natural 
excludability deriving from the part of knowledge which is tacit (Cowan et al., 2000, p.226). 
Following the role of EGT in attacking the non-excludability component of the conception of 
knowledge as a public good, this criticism is clearly beside the point. More debilitating, though, 
is the heterogeneous nature of different elements of knowledge. Indeed, the definition of a 
stock of knowledge implies the ‘need for a metric in which the constituent parts can be 
rendered commensurable’ (Cowan et al., 2000, p.227), but competitive markets are incapable 
of performing such a task precisely because of the heterogeneity of knowledge (Boulding, 
1966; Cowan et al., 2000; Metcalfe, 2001, 2010). Indeed, as perceptively put by Metcalfe 
(2001, p.580), ‘[a]re  ideas to be added, multiplied together, or aggregated in combinatorial 
fashion, in which case the stock grows faster than exponentially? Whatever the process of 
aggregation, we still need the weights (prices) with which an idea in carbon chemistry, say, is 
to be combined with an idea in the production of insurance services. It is not obvious what the 
weights are, and they certainly are not to be found in market prices’. Further, this implies that, 
assuming that a stock of knowledge is measurable at all, this can be done in ordinal (as 
opposed to cardinal) terms only. Yet, although EGT models do not ‘explicitly suppose the stock 
of knowledge to be cardinally measurable’, ‘they often assert this by implication’ (Steedman, 
2003, p.128). Indeed, when a stock of knowledge   is inserted as an argument in a production 
function exhibiting constant returns to scale, or when   exhibits decreasing or increasing 
returns, or when ‘        is set equal to some power of   multiplied by other variables’, it is 
implicit that the stock of knowledge   is thought of as cardinally measurable, otherwise all of 
these assertions would be entirely meaningless. Yet, no contribution to EGT has demonstrated 
that a stock of knowledge can be measured cardinally, nor is any such demonstration possible, 
given the heterogeneous character of different elements of knowledge (Steedman, 2003). 
Therefore, rather than genuine engagement with the issues posed to economic activity and its 
material organisation by phenomena associated with the use, production, reproduction and 
distribution of knowledge, concerns for the latter (together with technology, research and 
development, learning-by-doing, etc.) within EGT are indicative, and part and parcel, of a 
second phase of economics imperialism (Fine, 2000, p.247). Indeed, in a nutshell, EGT models 
make appeal to some form or other of market imperfection to allow, directly or indirectly, for 
the explanation and endogenization of increasing returns to scale; these, in turn, determine 
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differences in productivity and growth rates across countries (Fine, 2006a, p.79). Thus, the 
theories of technical change and of market imperfections provide EGT models with intellectual 
content, with respect to which EGT is ‘essentially cannibalistic’. For the former, token insights 
on productivity increase drawn from the theories of Schumpeter, Kaldor, Smith or Arrow, for 
example, together with insights from otherwise heterodox economics or other social sciences, 
are incorporated within models. But, in the process, they are simplified for the purposes of 
modelling, ‘reconstructed on an individualistic basis’, detached from their intellectual origins 
and roots in socio-historical frameworks of analysis and, ultimately, debased (Fine, 2000, 
p.250).73 Thus, for example, Nelson (1997, 1998) highlights how there is little novelty in the 
theoretical ideas and insights of EGT models with respect to the relations between economic 
growth and technological advance, apart from these being formalised and, therefore, made 
‘more legitimate’, ‘even sexy’ (Nelson, 1998, p.506), for the economics profession. However, 
he also points out how this acts as a straitjacket for the theory which, through mathematical 
formalism and allegiance to equilibrium, misrepresents the evolutionary nature of 
technological processes and advances and reduces the Knightian uncertainty characterising 
them to calculable risk. With respect to the incorporation of market imperfections within EGT 
models, ‘[t]he discipline can plunder itself for’ all kinds of ‘sources of Pareto inefficient 
outcomes and translate these into sources for growth as opposed to deadweight losses’, with 
special favour accorded to sources concerning ‘imperfect competition, since innovation 
involves temporary monopoly rents’ (Fine, 2000, p.250) (as discussed above with respect to 
patents). Therefore, both these tendencies and EGT are exemplary of a second phase in the 
development of economics imperialism. Indeed, while in the first phase of economics 
imperialism (usually associated with the work of Gary Becker) economists analysed any aspect 
of social life and the non-market as if it were a market and, therefore, through the lenses of 
economic rationality, in the second, new, phase of economics imperialism economists take the 
social (entities, institutions and outcomes) as resulting from the actions of rational individuals 
operating in the presence of market imperfections, especially informational ones (Fine, 
Milonakis, 2009). In other words, while economics continues to be based upon individual 
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 Questioned about whether the work of Joseph Schumpeter had influenced his ideas, Romer 
responded: ‘No, I can honestly say that it has not. Schumpeter coined some wonderful phrases like 
“creative destruction” but I did not read any of Schumpeter’s work when I was creating my model. As I 
said, I really worked that model out from a clean sheet of paper. To be honest, the times when I have 
gone to try to read Schumpeter I have found it tough going. It is really hard to tell what guys like 
Schumpeter are talking about [laughter]’ (Romer, 2005, p.686). Similar opinions are expressed, in the 
same interview, about Allyn Young, Gunnar Myrdal and Nicholas Kaldor (as proponents of cumulative 
causation within economics), whose work is charged by Romer of being ‘purely verbal’ (as opposed to 
‘purely mathematical’) and, therefore, prone to ambiguity in interpretation. 
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optimisation, now social institutions and structures are rendered endogenous.74 While this has 
allowed economics to bring back in within its purview the social and the historical, although on 
debased terms (Fine, Milonakis, 2009), it also speaks volumes about the cumulative nature of 
knowledge within economics itself. Indeed, in a very superficial sense, the latter can be said to 
be strongly cumulative, for mainstream economics builds on, and reproduces, its technical 
apparatus based on abstract mathematical formalism and its hypothetico-deductive method, 
especially as the discipline has expanded beyond its own limits to incorporate the non-
economic within its purview. Yet, at a deeper level, disciplinary knowledge can be said to be 
strongly non-cumulative, since the orthodoxy’s commitment to its own technical apparatus 
and method comes at the expense of content and realism, as well as through active neglect of 
any alternative or critique that may come from other disciplines or from within economics 
itself (even when these confront it with its own inadequacies as judged from its own 
standards, as in the Cambridge capital controversies) (Fine, Milonakis, 2009). 
1.5)  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered an overview of the reasons why mainstream economics is unfit for the 
purpose of understanding the problems posed by the use, production, reproduction and 
accumulation of knowledge as judged from the standpoint of any contribution taking a 
different view of the economy, knowledge, and the relation between them. The discussion has 
been organised around five axes, each, respectively, highlighting: the reasons for the 
discrepancy between the rhetoric and the policy in practice of the KBE; the problems raised by 
the notion of historicity with respect to both the KBE and the EK; the inability to sustain the EK 
as a new sub-discipline within economics (as defined by the main proponent of the 
expression); the aporetic character of knowledge for mainstream economics; and the 
inconsistencies of EGT with respect to issues relating to knowledge and technology (not least 
as a key illustration of the pertinence of the previous axe). At this point, two observations are 
in order. Firstly, the rhetorical, if not outright ideological, function of the KBE concept and 
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 In this regard, another example (germane to the concerns of this chapter) of this shift within 
economics can be found in the passage from the justification of publicly-funded science based on the 
(“old”) economics of science promulgated by Arrow, 1962a and Nelson, 1959, to Dasgupta and David’s 
(1994) “new economics of science”. Indeed, the former was concerned with warning policy makers of 
the systematic failure of markets to provide adequate investment in basic research, ensuing from the 
public good character of knowledge and the resulting divergence of private and social returns to 
scientific activity. Dasgupta and David, on the other hand, are concerned with explaining ‘the underlying 
logic of the salient institutions of science’ (with emphasis on the coexistence of “open” and commercial 
science), and examining the ‘implications of those differentiating institutional features for the efficiency 
of economic resource allocation within this particular sphere of human action’. ‘To carry out this 
program’, Dasgupta and David propose a framework which builds ‘upon the foundations laid down by 
the classic contributions in the sociology of science, adding to the insights provided by the “old” 
economics of science some new ones ... drawn principally from the ... analytical literature that treats 
problems of behavior under incomplete and asymmetric information’ (Dasgupta, David, 1994, p.492). 
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putative need for the development of an EK must be emphasised. In many ways, the latter 
represent an upbeat take on, if not the stubborn resolution to ignore the causes and 
consequences of, what have been disquieting phenomena and developments in the polity and 
material organisation of economic activity in and across Western economies. Indeed, ‘the loss 
of manufacturing base in most of the post-World War II self-identified industrial economies’ 
(Mirowski, 2011, pp.7-8) cannot be simply characterised as ‘some smooth shift from one 
indifferent economic “sector” to another, as in the adjustments to “comparative advantage” 
imagined by economists’, since an ‘elaborate industrial base had previously defined many 
aspects of what it meant to live in a developed economy, in everything from the culture of 
consumption to the promotion of certain versions of science, so’ that ‘the erosion of the 
manufacturing base within these economies could not help but have far-reaching ripple 
effects, even for those who might have been proud never to have set foot on a shop floor’ 
(p.8). Thus, praises of the “weightlessness” of Western economies, together with the 
concomitant “rise” of the service sector, have performed the discursive function of covering a 
reality characterised by processes of outsourcing and off-shoring, the “rewiring” of the labour 
process, commercial activity and competition through powerful injections of ICTs (Mirowski, 
2011; Huws, 2003), and, most importantly, the hypertrophic growth of the financial sector (the 
primary sector of the economy in which “knowledge” and ICTs have been actually put to work 
to their maximum potential).75 
Secondly, while the five axes mentioned above have provided useful organising principles, a 
common theme has run beneath them, periodically resurfacing: the inadequacies and 
contradictions of the mainstream in dealing with the production, reproduction and 
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 As Mirowski (2011, p.10) points out, such an ideological function of the KBE found manifestation and 
material support in the US in the construal of statistical categories, for it is possible to ‘pinpoint the 
emergence of the information society as a self-conscious statistical category with the revision of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) as the 1997 North American Industrial Classification System’ 
(following Malone, Elichirigoity, 2003). ‘This modification took various industrial activities that had been 
scattered by function throughout the previous SIC code and grouped them together for the first time as 
dealing with a product called “information”, which itself could be rendered amenable to ownership and 
control’. Similarly, on the role of changes within the classification of economic activities as support for 
the rhetoric of the KBE, see Huws, 2003. Further, with regard to the absence of any attention to the 
hypertrophy of finance within the rhetoric and scholarship of the KBE, Thompson and Harley (2012) 
(following Lazonick, O’Sullivan, 2000) demonstrate that, while the KBE rhetoric has been much more 
prominent than the (competing) shareholder value discourse/rhetoric, it is the latter that has had 
greater and more significant material outcomes. Lastly, with respect to the relationship between 
finance, knowledge and ICTs, it is worthwhile to notice how ‘advances in computing power have shifted 
decisively the frontier of electronic, and in particular algorithmic, trading over the past few years’ (not 
least through the rise of “high-frequency trading”) (Haldane, 2011, p.4), and (irrespective of content) 
how it is not casual that an attempt to understand the socio-economics of finance (through deployment 
of ethnographic studies) has spawned from the sociology of scientific knowledge of Callon, Latour and 
the like (see, for example, MacKenzie et al., 2007). For examples of applications of the latter theoretical 
development to the former development in the material organisation of financial markets and practices, 
see: Zaloom, 2006; Lenglet, 2011. 
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accumulation of knowledge are such and so many, that declarations of the centrality of 
knowledge within contemporary capitalism from within mainstream economics could be read 
as tantamount to as many proclamations of its own irrelevance. Yet, however devastating the 
criticisms that can be voiced against mainstream economics, both in general and with respect 
to its treatment of knowledge and its relation to the economy, its stronghold upon the 
discipline remains as strong as ever, regardless of whether and how the latest research fads 
and fashions (of which the KBE and the EK are but one example) may contradict its own 
apparatus and method or put strain on its logical consistency. However, this apparent paradox 
can be easily dispelled by reference to the history of the discipline. Indeed, as is well-known, 
the marginalist revolution of the 1870s set the base for the technical apparatus (organised 
around utility and production functions) and technical architecture (organised around 
equilibrium and efficiency) of mainstream economics, while the formalist revolution of the 
1950s elevated to pride of place the mathematisation of the discipline (under American aegis), 
thus sanctifying the predominance of form over content. Further, the passage from the 
marginalist to the formalist revolution has been marked by the will to extract as much as 
possible from, and bring to their furthest implications, the deductivist method and 
mathematical apparatus of neoclassical economics. Consequently, this has entailed the 
removal and repression of anything (in terms of method, conceptual tools, and technical 
assumptions) that could potentially unsettle such a project, and the consequent implosion of 
economics (in terms of content and scope) onto the narrow, unrealistic assumptions at the 
basis of microeconomics. But, once the technical apparatus, technical architecture and 
analytical principles of mainstream economics have been secured, this has constituted the 
basis upon which to bring back in, and draw upon, whatever the mainstream likes, regardless 
of conceptual or logical consistency and with the technical apparatus and architecture 
remaining firmly at the core of the discipline (Fine, Milonakis, 2009; Fine, 2013). This has 
resulted in a veritable explosion of economics, exemplified by economics imperialism in both 
its first and second phases and the firm belief of economists that ‘they can superannuate and 
subsume all other social sciences within their own “paradigm”’ (Mirowski, 2011, p.333). 
Following from this, interest in the KBE and the development of an EK within economics are to 
be understood as the opportunistic appropriation of ideas that have been “in the air” since at 
least the 1960s. This, complemented by the sloppy reception of concepts from economics 
(irrespective of their meaning, intellectual origins and functions within economics), has 
provoked the enthusiasm of those wanting to defend knowledge from privatisation. The 
present chapter has intended to show how such hopes and sentiments are derived, and 
provide reasons as to why they are misplaced.  
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Chapter 2 – Historical Immaterialism: From Immaterial Labour 
to Cognitive Capitalism76 
 
2.1) Introduction 
 
The protean nature of capitalism is a permanent invitation to renew its theoretical analysis. 
Thus, the need to understand the changing socio-economic dynamics and processes 
structuring and shaping its contemporary material reality runs across debates in the social 
sciences. While a major shift towards the service sector and the (putatively) increased 
importance of the role of knowledge are widely recognised, their implications have 
commanded a wealth of contrasting interpretations. In radical accounts of capitalism, these 
shifts have not only come to be taken as representing a new phase in the development of 
capitalism, but they are also taken to put into question a whole series of categories hitherto 
taken for granted. For example, the implications of such shifts for the distinction between 
mental and manual labour, together with the meaning of concepts such as work, free time, 
profit, rent and exploitation, are seen as having become unclear in a world where material 
production seems less important. This chapter considers the way in which these issues have 
been addressed by Italian post-workerist autonomist Marxism, which has recently come forth 
and established itself as one of the most radical accounts of the KBE and its dynamics. 
Such an analytical project has developed and consolidated in the first decade of the new 
century, finding a cornerstone in Hardt and Negri’s trilogy comprising Empire (2000), Multitude 
(2004) and Commonwealth (2009). With its three volumes, respectively, concerned with 
outlining the changing nature of contemporary capitalism, the new social subjectivities active 
within it, and the political prospect of “the common”, the trilogy has aimed to update Marxist 
political thought in light of French post-structuralism while, in the process, also framing the 
evolution of its authors’ thought (and post-workerism itself) in response to its own internal 
logic, the critiques it received, and political contingency. Underpinning each volume, the 
concept of immaterial (or biopolitical) labour is meant to provide ‘a socio-economic foundation 
in the contemporary world for the philosophical and political elements’ of Hardt and Negri’s 
thought (Camfield, 2007, p.21). Indeed, by drawing and elaborating upon the Italian and 
French autonomist Marxist underworld of the 1980s and 1990s, Hardt and Negri’s trilogy has 
canonised the debate on immaterial labour and the attendant interpretation of the putative 
reconfiguration of capitalism born from the ashes of previous post-workerist thought surviving 
around the journal Futur Antérieur (Hardt, Negri, 2000, pp.28-29; Dyer-Witheford, 1994, 2001; 
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Bowring, 2004). Subsequently, this experience has given way to the publication of the journal 
Multitudes, with first issue appearing in 2000 and still published today, and it is within and 
around this journal that the debate on cognitive capitalism is born and has been developed, in 
resonance and close connection with Hardt and Negri’s trilogy and theory of immaterial 
labour. Although distinct, the two debates have grown in parallel, strengthening and mutually 
informing one another, coalescing into a post-workerist theory of contemporary capitalism. 
The latter posits the increasing autonomy of the contemporary social process of production 
from capital and, ultimately, portrays contemporary capitalism as suspended, i.e. surviving in 
form and appearance, yet undermined in practice and substance by its own functioning, 
dynamics, and modality of operations. Accordingly, this post-workerist reading of 
contemporary capitalism also proposes and prospects a rethinking of political economy along 
“biopolitical” lines, which it perceives as consistent with Marx’s commitment to grounding 
social theory in the changing historicity of its object of analysis (i.e. capitalism, together with 
its nature and functioning) (Negri, 2003; Hardt, Negri, 2004, 2009). 
However, sharing common intellectual roots in the last phase of Italian operaismo (for 
accounts of which see Turchetto, 2008 and Wright, 2002), and later in the post-operaista 
underworld of the 1980s and 1990s (both under the leading light of Negri himself), the debates 
on immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism are plagued by mutual shortcomings. These can 
be traced back, in many ways, to Negri’s (1991 [1979]) (re)reading of Marx’s (1993) Grundrisse 
and consequent rejection of value theory, his reading of contemporary capitalism, and the 
various sleights of hand and selective and casual use of sources in Hardt and his trilogy (Hardt, 
Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009). Drawing on all of this, the present chapter interprets the debates on 
immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism as the latest reincarnation and endpoint of Negri’s 
post-operaismo.77 Thus, and ultimately, this chapter aims to shed light on the apparently 
paradoxical nature of a theory which, despite appealing to Marx and Marxism to decipher 
contemporary capitalism and its dynamics, undermines in practice the basis for, and logic of, 
such an analytical endeavour. The chapter will do so by demonstrating that, while capitalism, 
its logic and functioning persist unabated, it is post-operaismo which is itself in a state of what 
might be termed “suspension”; specifically posturing as a radical and critical account of 
contemporary capitalism rooted in Marxist political economy and the tradition of the original 
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 This chapter and thesis adopt Tronti’s periodisation (2009, p.7), whereby the classical operaismo of 
the 1960s is understood as spanning from the birth of the journal Quaderni Rossi in 1961 to the death of 
the journal Classe Operaia in 1967. As a result, the phase of (post-)operaismo starting in the 1970s is 
interpreted here as initiating the movement, under Negri’s leading light, from the classical operaismo of 
the 1960s, through Negri’s (1991 [1979]) (re)reading of the Grundrisse (Marx, 1993), to contemporary 
post-operaismo (and the corresponding debasement of the original proposal of the classical operaismo 
of the 1960s). But see also footnote 93. 
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Italian operaismo of the 1960s, yet undermining its own analytical and political ambitions in 
practice and substance by the development of its very own (flawed) analysis.78 To address and 
refute the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism, the following sections will 
discuss and critically review the debates on immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism as 
follows. Section 2.2 maps the evolution of the concept of immaterial labour through its 
gestation, redefinition and expansion, as well as the systemic implications characteristically 
drawn from it. Section 2.3 discusses how the cognitive capitalism debate cumulatively builds 
on that of immaterial labour, completing and complementing it as a socio-economic 
foundation for post-workerism and its reading of contemporary capitalism. In the process, 
intra-paradigmatic discussion about the location of (the) cognitive capitalism (debate) with 
respect to Regulation theory, post-operaismo and post-Fordism will be addressed, not least by 
assessing the (failed) attempt to depart from these through recasting the debate in Marxist 
terms. Section 2.4 discusses the prospects for capitalism and political economy deriving from 
the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism, highlighting Hardt and Negri’s 
rhetorical turn to concepts from (mainstream) economics within their intervention in the 
debate on the commons. Lastly, section 2.5 will discuss the shortcoming of both the 
immaterial and cognitive capitalism debates, give an account of their intellectual sociology, 
and assess them with respect to broader debates and trends across the social sciences. This 
threefold analysis will emphasise how post-workersim has become increasingly disconnected 
from the real functioning of capitalism and the positive understanding of it allowed by the 
tools and concepts of Marxian political economy, the real experiences of the working class, 
and the political project of Marxist political economy itself. 
2.2) Immaterial labour 
 
As canonised by Hardt and Negri, the concept of immaterial labour synthesises and updates 
the post-workerist and autonomist Marxist body of work guided and inspired by Negri’s earlier 
attempts, from the 1970s onwards, to identify the ‘new revolutionary subject that would 
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 This reading consciously mobilises the Hegelian philosophical notion of “dialectical suspension”, or 
“sublation” (Aufhebung), as appropriated by Marx (see Smith, 1993 for an account). For Hegel, ‘to 
sublate (aufheben) has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to 
maintain, and equally it means to put an end to … Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved’ 
(Hegel, 1969, p.107). Therefore, in the language of dialectical thought, “dialectical suspension” indicates 
a ‘contradictory movement’ where, ‘in the progression of forms, the substance of earlier forms is both 
negated by and contained within the new, more complex form that develops out of the old content’ 
(Best, 2010, p.77). Thus, with ‘Hegel's term Aufhebung’ connoting ‘overcoming and preservation at 
once’ (Smith, 1993, p.152, footnote 45), “suspension” ‘expresses the contradictory state of both putting 
an end to the earlier form and carrying it forward’ (Best, 2010, p.77). Although the words “sublation”, 
“supersession”, “suspension” and “transcendence” have all been ‘used as … English equivalent[s] of 
Hegel’s “Aufhebung”’ (Saad-Filho, 2002, p.116, footnote 45), and although “sublation” has been 
probably the most prominent, the word “suspension” has been preferred here for its capacity to express 
‘adequately … the dual movement of negating and carrying forward’ (Best, 2010, p.224, footnote 3). 
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succeed the “craft worker” and the “mass worker” and restart the cycle of struggles posited by 
the autonomist Marxist tradition’ (Dyer-Witheford, 2001, p.70). The purpose of this section is 
to show how, in the process of this canonisation, the concept has undergone significant 
redefinition and expansion, allowing the derivation from it of a systemic understanding of 
contemporary capitalism (although this has remained incomplete until the more recent debate 
on cognitive capitalism). 
2.2.1) From shifting definitions … 
 
Hardt and Negri’s theory of immaterial labour posits the increasing loss of centrality of ‘the 
labor power of mass factory workers in the production of surplus value’ on behalf of 
‘intellectual, immaterial, and communicative labor power’; in doing so, it responds to their 
perceived necessity for ‘a new political theory of value’ to conceptualise ‘this new capitalist 
accumulation of value at the center of the mechanism of exploitation’ and ‘potential revolt’ 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000, p.29). Thus, to identify the composition of living labour in 
contemporary capitalism, and as starting point of Empire’s analysis, Hardt and Negri refer to 
the concept of immaterial labour which, as they acknowledge (2000, p.461, note 17), has been 
originally proposed by Maurizio Lazzarato (1996). The latter defines ‘immaterial labor ... as the 
labor that produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity’, and considers 
this definition itself as the culmination of earlier ‘research ... concerning the new forms of the 
organization of work ... combined with a corresponding wealth of theoretical reflection’ 
allowing for ‘the identification of a new’ ontology of work and the ‘new power relations it 
implies’ (Lazzarato, 1996, p.133). While it is understood as ‘an initial synthesis of these results’ 
attempting ‘to define the technical and subjective-political composition of the working class’, 
Lazzarato’s definition encompasses two different aspects: ‘on the one hand, as regards the 
“informational content” of the commodity, it refers directly to the changes taking place in 
workers’ labor processes in big companies in the industrial and tertiary sectors, where ... skills 
involved in direct labor’ increasingly involve ‘cybernetics and computer control (and horizontal 
and vertical communication). On the other hand, as regards the activity that produces the 
“cultural content” of the commodity, immaterial labor involves a series of activities ... not 
normally recognized as “work” ... involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, 
fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and, more strategically, public opinion’ (Lazzarato, 1996, 
p.133). Therefore, according to Lazzarato, the re-shaping of the labour process by ICTs and the 
incorporation and increasing importance for capitalist social relations of production of 
activities previously located outside the sphere of capital (or at least considered to be so), 
would be at the heart of a corresponding redefinition of (the character of) labour in 
contemporary capitalism. 
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For Lazzarato, the origins of these processes are to be found in ‘the “great transformation”’ 
beginning in the 1970s, which putatively changed ‘the very terms in which the question [of 
work] is posed’ (Lazzarato, 1996, p.134). Indeed, for Lazzarato, such “great transformation” 
has determined a renewal of the relation between production and knowledge, changing the 
content of labour so that ‘manual labor is increasingly coming to involve procedures that could 
be defined as “intellectual”, and the new communications technologies increasingly require 
subjectivities that are rich in knowledge’ (Lazzarato, 1996, p.134). But, for Lazzarato, the 
novelty would not simply be ‘that intellectual labor has become subjected to the norms of 
capitalist production’; rather, the novelty would lie in that ‘a new “mass intellectuality” has 
come into being, created out of a combination of the demands of capitalist production and the 
forms of “self-valorization”’ produced by ‘the struggle against work’. Thus, Lazzarato posits 
‘[t]he old dichotomy between “mental and manual labor”, or between “material labor and 
immaterial labor”’, as ineffective in attempting to grasp ‘the new nature of productive activity’, 
since he understands ‘[t]he split between conception and execution, … labor and creativity, … 
author and audience’ as having been ‘simultaneously transcended within the “labor process” 
and reimposed as political command within the “process of valorization”’ (Lazzarato, 1996, 
p.134). As a result, for Lazzarato, ‘waged labor and direct subjugation (to organization)’ would 
‘no longer constitute the principal form of the contractual relationship between capitalist and 
worker’, since the content and character of the labour involved in immaterial production 
suffices (putatively) to grant to labour an increasing degree of autonomy from capital and 
simultaneously lead to the emergence of ‘a polymorphous self-employed autonomous work ... 
as the dominant form, a kind of “intellectual worker” who is him- or herself an entrepreneur’ 
(Lazzarato, 1996, p.140). 
Part and parcel of the body of work taking place within and around the journal Futur Antérieur, 
Lazzarato’s (1996) definition and analysis of immaterial labour exemplify and summarise the 
Italian autonomist underworld of the 1980s and 1990s, while also forming the embryo of all 
subsequent debate on both immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism. However, although 
praised for re-establishing ‘the importance of production within the biopolitical process of the 
social constitution’, this early work has also been charged by Hardt and Negri (2000, p.29) as 
guilty of isolating immaterial labour from other struggles ‘by grasping it in a pure form’. Thus, 
to depart from their previous work in Futur Antérieur and to address the critiques of it on the 
grounds of ‘Cartesian dualism’ and ‘masculine bias’ (Dyer-Witheford, 2001, p.72), Hardt and 
Negri have proceeded to redefine immaterial labour, in Empire (2000), as ‘the communicative 
labor of industrial production that has newly become linked in informational networks, the 
interactive labor of symbolic analysis and problem solving, and the labor of the production and 
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manipulation of affects’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.30). Furthermore, in doing so, Hardt and Negri 
have also specified and qualified Lazzarato’s claim of the dominance and centrality of 
immaterial labour in contemporary capitalism through theorising what they see as the 
‘passage […] from the domination of industry to that of services and information’ and, 
concomitantly, as a ‘process of economic postmodernization, or better, informatization’ 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.280). Thus, Hardt and Negri distinguish ‘three types of immaterial labor’ 
driving ‘the service sector at the top of the informational economy’: a) the labour ‘involved in 
an industrial production that has been informationalized and has incorporated communication 
technologies in a way that transforms the production process itself’; b) the ‘immaterial labor of 
analytical and symbolic tasks, which itself breaks down into creative and intelligent 
manipulation on the one hand and routine symbolic tasks on the other’; and c) the labour 
involving ‘the production and manipulation of affect and requir[ing] (virtual or actual) human 
contact, labor in the bodily mode’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.293). Through this redefinition, the 
concept of immaterial labour is expanded and posited as becoming increasingly central in the 
valorisation process, spreading across various sectors of the economy and pushing even 
traditional types of labour to incorporate its qualities. Thus, for Hardt and Negri, the archetype 
of immaterial labour is performed in ‘[t]he service sectors of the economy’, which (putatively) 
‘present a richer model of productive communication’, since ‘most services’ are ‘based on the 
continual exchange of information and knowledge’. With ‘the production of services’ resulting 
‘in no material and durable good’, Hardt and Negri can therefore redefine ‘the labor involved 
in this production as immaterial labor – that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such 
as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.290). 
While receiving much critical appraisal and becoming a landmark of critical thinking and radical 
scholarship in the first decade of the century, Hardt and Negri’s (2000) Empire also sparked 
controversy. Particularly contentious was its central claim that the Empire emerging ‘from the 
twilight of modern sovereignty’ acted, ‘[i]n contrast to imperialism’, as ‘a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule’ progressively incorporating ‘the entire global realm within 
its open, expanding frontiers’, with the ‘distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the 
world hav[ing] merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.xii-
xiii). In light of the military invasion of Iraq of 2003, and the continuing character of 
geopolitical rivalry and imperialism in the world economy since the end of the Cold War (see, 
for example, Burgio et al., 2005), such a position seemed untenable. While also addressing 
these critiques, Hardt and Negri’s (2004) Multitude primarily aimed to describe the (new) 
social subject posing the ‘living alternative’ growing ‘within Empire’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.xiii). 
To do so, and setting an ‘unacknowledged shift’ (Camfield, 2007, p.23) from their earlier work 
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in Empire (Hardt, Negri, 2000), Hardt and Negri’s (2004) Multitude provides a redefinition of 
the concept of immaterial labour, while also strongly reaffirming its predominance; thus, for 
Hardt and Negri, ‘in the final decades of the twentieth century industrial labor lost its 
hegemony and in its stead emerged “immaterial labor”, … labor that creates immaterial 
products, such as knowledge, information, communication, a relationship, or an emotional 
response’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.108). Following this redefinition, for Hardt and Negri 
immaterial labour is to be understood as comprised of two often overlapping typologies of 
labour: a) ‘primarily intellectual or linguistic [labour], such as problem solving, symbolic and 
analytical tasks, and linguistic expressions’, and b) ‘labor that produces or manipulates affects 
such as a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or passion’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, 
p.108). The third term of the definition given in Empire, i.e. ‘the communicative labor of 
industrial production ... newly become linked in informational networks’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, 
p.30), has now been dropped. In short, for Hardt and Negri, labour in contemporary capitalism 
has become biopolitical, for it is posited as now creating ‘not only material goods but also 
relationships and ultimately social life itself’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.109). Worthy of notice, 
although the expression cognitive capitalism does not come up in the book, Multitude (Hardt, 
Negri, 2004, p.374, footnote 8) indirectly acknowledges the debate by referring to Vercellone, 
2003 for the concept of ‘cognitive labor’ (even if the latter is seen by Hardt and Negri as only 
referring to some of the ‘aspects of immaterial labor’ without capturing its generality, similarly 
to other ‘conventional terms such as service work’ and ‘intellectual labor’, p.108).79 Even more 
subtle is the shift recently operated in Commonwealth (Hardt, Negri, 2009), which proposes a 
reading of the current financial crisis as caused ‘by the new ontology of biopolitical labor’ 
(Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.264). Indeed, in line with Hardt and Negri’s own earlier admission that 
‘immaterial labor is a very ambiguous term’ and that ‘it might be better to understand the new 
hegemonic form as “biopolitical labor”’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.109), and potentially in response 
to those critics highlighting the contradictory and ambiguous nature of a definition of 
immaterial labour meant to designate, alternatively, the activity itself and its result (such as, 
for example, Harribey, 2004, or even Vercellone, 2007a as quoted in footnote 79 of this thesis), 
the concept of immaterial labour is silently dropped (appearing only once as ‘immaterial labor-
power’, Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.258) and replaced by ‘biopolitical labor’ (pp.133, 139, 140-152, 
158, 165, 172, 179, 244, 264, 270-272, 286-292, 309, 315-316, 352-354). 
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 Note, though, that on the contrary Vercellone insists on supplementing immaterial labour with the 
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2.2.2) … to systemic implications 
 
Following from the presumed hegemonic character of immaterial production (Hardt, Negri, 
2000, 2004, 2009), the putative hegemony of knowledge in production (Vercellone, 2007a) 
and, ultimately, the hegemony of (the putatively new) immaterial (character of) labour, a 
systemic understanding of contemporary capitalism ensues. Indeed, since knowledge and 
information are believed to be the most important means of production, labour power is seen 
as having become inseparable from the individual worker (Moulier Boutang, 2008, p.179; 
Vercellone, 2007a, p.33), and living labour and knowledge are consequently seen as inherently 
inexpropriable. Further, this is taken to imply the breakdown of the division between work and 
leisure time and, therefore, ‘the progressive indistinction between production and 
reproduction in the biopolitical context’, highlighting ‘the immeasurability of time and value’ 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.402). Indeed, for Hardt and Negri, ‘[a]s labor moves outside the factory 
walls, it is increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction of any measure of the working day and 
thus separate the time of production from the time of reproduction, or work time from leisure 
time’. In their view, bereft of ‘time clocks to punch on the terrain of biopolitical production … 
the proletariat produces in all its generality everywhere all day long’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, 
pp.402-403). Furthermore, for Hardt and Negri, the putative breakdown of the distinction 
between work and leisure, together with that between production and reproduction, implies 
the blurring of the distinction between profit and rent, with capital posited as ‘captur[ing] and 
expropriat[ing] value through biopolitical exploitation ... produced … externally to it’, 
becoming ‘predatory ... insofar as it seeks to capture and expropriate autonomously produced 
common wealth’. As a result, for Hardt and Negri, ‘the exploitation of labor-power and the 
accumulation of surplus value should’ now ‘be understood’ and reconceptualised ‘in terms of 
not profit but capitalist rent’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.141; see also p.258). 
Understanding these systemic properties as both ‘presupposition and result’ of the hegemony 
of immaterial production and immaterial labour (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.148), Hardt and Negri 
posit them as also setting the context for a changing relationship between capital and labour in 
the direction of greater autonomy of the latter (and the social productive process as a whole) 
from the former. Indeed, since immaterial labour is seen as drawing upon, and reproducing, 
human faculties posited as outside the scope and control of capital – such as communication 
and knowledge, together with the affective, cognitive and linguistic abilities of individuals – it 
is also seen, as a consequence, as constantly opening spaces outside capitalist control. 
Therefore, for Hardt and Negri, ‘the cooperative aspect of immaterial labor’ should not be 
understood as ‘imposed or organized from the outside, as … in previous forms of labor’; rather, 
it should be seen as naturally flowing from the new immaterial and biopolitical character of 
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labour, whereby ‘cooperation is completely immanent to the laboring activity itself’ (Hardt, 
Negri, 2000, p.294), and capital becomes parasitical on the (social) commons, defined as ‘the 
incarnation, the production, and the liberation of the multitude’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.303). 
Thus, for Hardt and Negri, it is “multitudinous” social movements that ‘determine new forms 
of life and cooperation’, creating ‘that wealth that parasitic postmodern capitalism would 
otherwise not know how to suck out of the blood of the proletariat’, since they posit 
production as increasingly taking ‘place in movement and cooperation, in exodus and 
community’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.397, emphasis added). Therefore, ‘rather than an organ 
functioning within the capitalist body, biopolitical labor power’ is seen by Hardt and Negri as 
‘becoming more and more autonomous, with capital simply hovering over it parasitically with 
its disciplinary regimes, apparatuses of capture, mechanisms of expropriation, financial 
networks, and the like’. Hence, for Hardt and Negri, the ‘rupture of the organic relationship’ 
between capital and productive social life as understood by Marx ‘and the growing autonomy 
of labor are at the heart of the new forms of crisis of capitalist production and control’ (Hardt, 
Negri, 2009, p.142, emphasis added). By now, readers familiar with autonomist Marxism and 
the history of Italian operaismo will have recognised Negri’s lineage (see Negri, 1991 [1979]), 
for which departure, or, more figuratively, suspension, from its origins in Marxian political 
economy is strikingly apparent. 
2.3) Cognitive capitalism80 
 
As Camfield notes, ‘in the shadow of Hardt and Negri’s hegemonic figures of labour lurks [the] 
potentially more credible notion ... of globally-dominant forms of capitalist accumulation’, a 
notion that Hardt and Negri themselves fall short of proposing. Indeed, although bearing 
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 Other than by post-workerist autonomist Marxists, the concept of cognitive capitalism is also used 
systematically by Enzo Rullani (2000, 2004) and André Gorz (2003). Several points of contact exist 
between their work and post-workerist autonomist Marxism. Indeed, while Rullani straddles economic 
theory and (critical) management and business studies (with specific emphasis on the EK, industrial 
districts and post-Fordism), Gorz’s own trajectory closely resembles the (declining) trajectory of Italian 
post-workerist Marxism (an account of which will be provided in the following sections). Hailing from 
the Marxist analysis of the labour process (Gorz, 1973), Gorz gradually shifted to arguing the loss of 
relevance of the industrial working class in light of the changes of work and the labour process in the 
last decades of the twentieth century (1980), and arguing against work itself and a work ethic posited as 
deriving from an existentially and culturally limited economic rationality (1988). Finally, in dialogue with, 
and drawing from, post-workerist writing, Gorz has recently come to reject the persistent validity of 
value theory in light of the putative rise of knowledge as the central factor of production and, therefore, 
of cognitive capitalism itself (2003). Although this chapter refrains from providing a full assessment and 
account of the intellectual trajectories of Rullani and Gorz, reference to Gorz’s work will be made as part 
of the debate on cognitive capitalism. For a collection of (appreciative) accounts of Gorz’s work and 
trajectory, see Fourel, 2012; for a critique of Gorz’s rejection of value theory in Gorz, 2003, see 
Hermann, 2009; and, for assessments of Gorz’s contribution to the debate on cognitive capitalism, see: 
Pouch, 2004; Harribey, 2004; Gollain, 2010; Vercellone, 2009, 2012; Gorz, 2004. An assessment of 
Rullani’s (2000, 2004) views on the KBE can be found in Bologna, 2007. 
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implications for contemporary capitalism, and based on a classification of ‘the succession of 
economic paradigms since the Middle Ages in three distinct moments, each defined by the 
dominant sector of the economy’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.280), Hardt and Negri’s theory of 
immaterial labour does not, by itself, stand up to the challenge of elevating ‘to the global scale 
concepts which regulation-school and social-structure-of-accumulation-style political economy 
have usually applied at the level of nation-states’ (Camfield, 2007, p.38, note 89), leaving the 
socio-economic foundations of their political theoretic edifice incomplete as a theory of 
contemporary capitalism. Nonetheless, as this section will show, the debate on cognitive 
capitalism, in close connection with Hardt and Negri’s theory of immaterial labour, has sought 
to respond precisely to this challenge along similar lines as those perceptively anticipated by 
Camfield. 
2.3.1) Completing the paradigm 
 
Taking stock from the crisis of the 1970s, the (presumed) primacy of knowledge in the 
accumulation process, and earlier debates on the current nature and configuration of 
capitalism itself, the concept of cognitive capitalism has been recently proposed as a 
description of the new mode of regulation characterising contemporary capitalism (Corsani et 
al., 2001, p.3). Indebted to Hardt and Negri’s (2000) Empire (see, for instance, Moulier 
Boutang, 2008, pp.33-34, for a passionate defence of the latter’s daring theoretical nature) 
and developed by drawing from, and in parallel with, the immaterial labour debate itself, the 
debate on cognitive capitalism addresses the lacking element identified by Camfield (2007) as 
discussed above. Further, by providing an economic perspective on the same phenomena 
tackled by Hardt and Negri’s trilogy and their structural implications for capitalism,81 the 
debate on cognitive capitalism supports and reinforces the socio-economic foundation of 
Hardt and Negri’s political thought (and version of post-workerism) by complementing their 
theory of immaterial labour and completing the trajectory of post-operaismo’s reading of 
contemporary capitalism. Flourishing in the noughties around the journal Multitudes and part 
of the work of the research unit Matisse at the University of the Sorbonne (for which, see 
http://matisse.univ-paris1.fr/capitalisme, last accessed on the 9th of August 2013), the debate 
on cognitive capitalism and its research programme have found consolidation in the 
publication of two collective volumes (Vercellone, 2003 and its updated and revised Italian 
translation as Vercellone, 2006a) and one authored book (Moulier Boutang, 2008).82 A 
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 See Negri, 2003 for recognition of how some core contributions to Vercellone, 2003 and the cognitive 
capitalism debate express a kindred perspective to his own reading of contemporary capitalism. But see 
also footnote 83. 
82
 The expression is also starting to gain momentum across radical scholarship as a buzzword in its own 
right, as shown, for example, by the collection published in Peters, Bulut, 2011, and two recent issues of 
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distinguishing feature of the debate on cognitive capitalism is the extent to which it differs 
from the one on immaterial labour in breadth and scope. Indeed, the latter is defined by very 
low heterogeneity in terms of adherence to the paradigm, and strong polarisation around 
acceptance of the concept (with those accepting it deploying post-workerist concepts and 
method, and gaining prominence in the noughties across leftist and radical scholarship and 
activism). On the other hand, the debate on cognitive capitalism has been characterised by: a) 
greater pluralism of contributions, ranging from explicitly post-workerist positions (for 
example: Hardt, Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009; Moulier Boutang, 2008; Marazzi, 1998, 1999, 2008) 
to those critical of the way the debate has developed (as, for example, Chesnais, 2006 and 
Caffentzis, 2011), through those attempting to recast the debate in Marxist terms (Vercellone, 
2007a); b) a more heterogeneous and eclectic theoretical framework, drawing from Italian 
operaismo, but also (and more or less selectively across) Marxian political economy, Veblenian 
institutionalism, classical political economy, Schumpeterian and Kondratiev inspired 
approaches, the Braudelian theory of the longue durée, world-systems analysis, French 
Regulation theory, etc. (see, for examples, the contributions to Vercellone, 2003 and 2006a); 
and c) a varying degree of adherence to the concept and a consequent greater disposition to 
debate, signified in the tentativeness of titles such as Sommes-nous sortis du capitalisme 
industriel? (Vercellone, 2003) and ‘The Hypothesis of Cognitive Capitalism’ (Vercellone, 2005). 
Nonetheless, despite the pluralism characterising the debate and the attempts to recast it in 
Marxist terms, and given the debate’s focus on defining a new regime of accumulation where 
‘knowledge tends to be subjected to direct valorisation’ and ‘production transcends the 
traditional locus of the firm’ (Corsani et al., 2001, p.9), the core theoretical proposition of 
cognitive capitalism lies undoubtedly at the encounter of Italian post-operaismo and the 
French Regulation School (Fumagalli, Lucarelli, 2007). It is with this core (of which Corsani et 
al., 2001, Vercellone, 2007a and Moulier Boutang, 2008 are representative) that issue will be 
taken.83 
                                                                                                                                               
the European Journal of Economic and Social Systems (Fumagalli, Vercellone, 2007 and Lebert, 
Vercellone, 2011) which gather contributions from authors characteristically associated with the core 
scholarship of the cognitive capitalism debate as well as more eclectic takes on the topic. 
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 In addition to the above, there is good reason to doubt the effectiveness and practical relevance of 
the pluralism characterising the cognitive capitalism debate with respect to the adherence of its 
participants to the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism. In this respect, Negri’s (2003) 
review of Vercellone, 2003, together with its response to those contributions within the latter directing 
internal and external critiques to the cognitive capitalism perspective, provides a strikingly eloquent 
example of the limits of, if not intra-paradigmatic tolerance for, such pluralism. Indeed, Negri identifies 
the contributions of Vercellone and Herrera, Dockès, Dieuaide, Vercellone, and Moulier Boutang as ‘pars 
constituens’ of the book because of their development of ‘the thematic of the General Intellect’ and 
their description of ‘a scenario of the post-Fordist economy which realises fully the real subsumption of 
society to capital’, while ‘identifying at the same time the contradictions’ entailed by this process. Thus, 
for Negri, these contributions represent ‘a theoretical basis’ for the definition of the ‘new’ condition of 
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2.3.2) In search of a third historical capitalism beyond the Knowledge-Based Economy and 
post-Fordism 
 
Taking the ‘critique of the political economy of the new liberal theories of the knowledge-
based economy’ as point of departure, and positing the irreducibility of ‘the current mutation 
of capitalism ... to the mere constitution of an economy founded on knowledge’, the very aim, 
within the cognitive capitalism debate, to understand the current configuration of capitalism 
as a ‘knowledge-based economy framed and subsumed by the laws of capital accumulation’ 
(Vercellone, 2007a, p.14; similarly, Toscano, 2007, pp.5-6) is implicit in the designation of the 
research programme itself. Thus, while the appeal to capitalism is meant to refer to ‘the 
enduring element in the change of the structural invariants of the capitalist mode of 
production ... the driving role of profit and the wage relation or, more precisely, the different 
forms of dependent labour on which the extraction of surplus labour is founded’, ‘the term 
“cognitive”’ is meant to emphasise the putative ‘new nature of the conflictual relation of 
capital and labour, and of the forms of property on which’ capital accumulation putatively 
rests (Vercellone, 2007a, p.14, note 1; similarly, Lebert, Vercellone, 2006). Nonetheless, the 
extent to which the debate distances itself from the mainstream, in general and with specific 
reference to mainstream economics, is questionable, as evident from the attitudes of some of 
the main proponents of cognitive capitalism (both as a concept and a debate on the 
contemporary nature of capitalism). For instance, Vercellone (2007a) and Moulier Boutang 
(2008) differ significantly in this respect (although they share the same historical account of 
the development of capitalism and characterisation of its current stage, see below). Indeed, 
Vercellone is critical of the ‘neoclassical theories of endogenous growth and [the] knowledge-
based economy’, for he considers their account of ‘the diffusion and ... evermore central role 
of knowledge’ flawed for its abstracting from ‘capital/labour antagonism’ and the ‘conflicts of 
knowledge and power’ structuring what he sees as the contemporary ‘transformations in the 
division of labour’ (Vercellone, 2007a, pp.13-14; for more of Vercellone’s views on EGT, see 
Herrera, Vercellone, 2000); thus, Vercellone is explicitly concerned with recasting the debate in 
Marxist terms (Vercellone, 2007a; Toscano, 2007). On the other hand, Moulier Boutang (2008) 
builds (even if only rhetorically) on authors and concepts from the mainstream (for example: 
                                                                                                                                               
‘cognitive work and the new anthropological composition of productive subjectivities’ (Negri, 2003, 
p.201). On the other hand, Negri dismisses the internal critiques of Schmeder and Corsani as unable to 
grasp the ‘most characteristic feature of the point of view defended by Vercellone’ and company, i.e. 
that the ‘development’ and ‘mutation of the economic horizon result from class struggle’ (Negri, 2003, 
p.202). Similarly, Negri dismisses (unappreciatively and hastily) the external critiques of Chesnais and 
Serfati for their ‘stubbornness’ in holding undiminished capital’s grip on the production of knowledge 
and division of labour, which both Chesnais and Serfati consider as still subject to the strict logic of 
Taylorism. Polemically, Negri posits such ‘stubbornness’ as only paralleled by what he perceives to be 
Chenais’s and Serfati’s ‘incapacity to understand the most evident mutations of the contemporary 
productive horizon’ (Negri, 2003, p.203). 
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human capital, social capital, EGT, evolutionary economics, externalities), often flirting with 
the mix of anti-authoritarian counterculture, libertarianism, and techno-utopianism 
constituting the Californian ideology typically attached to Silicon Valley and beyond (as 
originally denounced by Barbrook, Cameron, 1996 and, more recently and germanely to the 
concerns of this thesis, by Formenti, 2011 – but see the third chapter of this thesis for a 
critique of the latter). Similarly, Gorz also draws on externalities and the notion of intrinsic 
value, widely used within neoclassical environmental economics (Gorz, 2003, pp. 31, 72-80, 
101; but see Harribey, 2004 for a critique of how this glosses over the distinction between use 
and exchange value). 
Despite this difference, a distinctive feature of the cognitive capitalism debate is its attempt to 
identify ‘breaks and shifts within capitalism’ (Toscano, 2007, p. 5), in resonance and dialogue 
with earlier (and similar, see sub-section 2.3.4) debates (see, for example, Moulier Boutang, 
2008, ch.2, for a classification of earlier characterisations of contemporary capitalism under 
the guiding principle of ‘old wine in new bottles’ versus ‘new wine in old bottles’). Thus, the 
cognitive capitalism debate is characterised by a clear, although not entirely successful (see 
below), will to go beyond the concept of post-Fordism. Taking the debate on the crisis of 
Fordism as its point of departure, the concept of cognitive capitalism is understood by its 
proponents as describing a putatively new historical phase corresponding to the exhaustion of 
industrial capitalism (of which Fordism is seen as the last phase), and the transition to a new 
mode of regulation (Corsani et al., 2001, p.3-4). As such, it is seen as a third historical phase of 
capitalism (Moulier Boutang, 2008, p.81, referring to Wallerstein’s notion of historical 
capitalism, see Wallerstein, 1996), following a first mercantile phase and a second industrial 
phase in the long dynamic of capitalism in the Braudelian sense (Corsani et al., 2001, p.14; 
Vercellone, 2007a, p.14, footnote 3). Also problematic is the joint legacy of the French 
Regulation School and Italian post-operaismo. Indeed, while the first statement of the research 
programme associated to cognitive capitalism (Corsani et al., 2001) is in continuation, or at 
least dialogue, with the Regulation School, drawing from it method and concepts, Vercellone 
(marking a difference with Corsani et al., 2001, of which, however, he is one of the co-authors) 
sees cognitive capitalism ‘as a response to the insufficiency of the interpretations of the 
current mutation of capitalism in terms of the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist model 
of flexible’ accumulation, with the ‘interpretative category of “post-Fordism”, adopted by both 
a critical Left coming from workerism [operaismo] and by economists of the regulation school, 
essentially’ remaining ‘prisoner of a neoindustrialist vision of the new capitalism’ (Vercellone, 
2007a, p.14, footnote 3). Vercellone’s contention with the espousing of post-Fordism by post-
operaismo and French Regulation theory lies in their understanding of ‘the new model of 
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production’ and ‘new nature of the relation of capital to labour ... principally as an immanent 
overcoming of the socioeconomic factors’ terminating ‘the rigid paradigm of mass production’, 
essentially ‘traced back to the technological leap of telematic and microelectronic innovation’ 
characterising ‘the third industrial revolution’ (as opposed to class conflict) (Vercellone, 2007a, 
p.14, footnote 3). Therefore, for Vercellone, although they capture ‘some significant elements 
of rupture’, the concept of post-Fordism and its attendant debates remain ‘bound to a factory-
inspired vision of the new capitalism seen as a further development of the Fordist-industrial 
logic of the real subsumption of labour by capital’; thus, they are understood as ‘inadequate’ 
to comprehend what Vercellone understands as ‘the profound transformation of the 
antagonistic relation of capital to labour related to the development of an economy founded 
on the driving role of knowledge and the figure of the collective worker of the general 
intellect’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.14, footnote 3). Therefore, the main disagreement with the 
theories and concepts of post-Fordism emanating from within the cognitive capitalism debate 
centres on the lack of understanding within the former of what the latter and (especially) 
Vercellone identify as a historical break in the relation of capital to labour, characterised by a 
reversal ‘of the move from formal to real subsumption’ (Toscano, 2007, p.4) similar to ‘the 
return movement from real to formal subsumption’ corresponding, in Hardt and Negri’s 
perspective, ‘to the recent reappearance of many antiquated, parasitical forms of capitalist 
appropriation’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.230). Nonetheless, as the next sub-sections will 
demonstrate, Vercellone’s (2007a) attempt to recast the debate in a Marxist light fails in its 
intent to depart from both post-operaismo and Regulation theory, remaining in line with their 
methods and concepts. Coinciding with Hardt and Negri’s reading of contemporary capitalism 
and with the research programme of the cognitive capitalism debate (Corsani et al., 2001) for 
all practical purposes, Vercellone’s recasting reconfirms the encounter of Italian post-
operaismo and French Regulation Theory as fundamental formulations for cognitive capitalism 
(Fumagalli, Lucarelli, 2007) – both as a concept and a debate – and as necessary complements 
to immaterial labour to complete the post-workerist paradigm. Similarly, the departure from 
the post-workerist interpretation of, and intervention in, the post-Fordism debate is negligible, 
since, as shown by Smith’s (2008) comparison of Vercellone, 2007a (which is concerned with 
differentiating cognitive capitalism from post-Fordism) and Virno, 2007 (which is concerned 
with locating Marx’s concept of general intellect within post-Fordism), the difference between 
the post-operaista interpretation of post-Fordism and cognitive capitalism is ‘terminological’, 
rather than reflective of any ‘major substantive disagreements’ (Smith, 2008, p.8). 
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2.3.3) A theory of the historical development of capitalism84 
 
With its reading of ‘the crisis of Fordism’ as a ‘superior level of “great crisis”’, signalling ‘the 
exhaustion not only of a model of development specific to industrial capitalism but the 
tendential crisis of some of the more structural invariants of the long-period dynamic’ opening 
‘with the first industrial revolution’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.14, footnote 3), the cognitive 
capitalism debate addresses the historical development of capitalism as much as its current 
stage. Two fundamental research questions structure this project: assessing whether or not 
‘the tendency to the diffusion of knowledge’ signals ‘a break with ... the logic of the capitalist 
division of labour and of technical progress operative since the first industrial revolution’, and 
assessing whether or not the use of Marxian concepts can ‘allow for the identification of the 
radically new character of the contradictions and of the antagonism’ characterising cognitive 
capitalism (Vercellone, 2007a, p.15). Therefore, the theory of historical change animating the 
cognitive capitalism debate is underpinned by a theory of crisis resting on the ‘tendential fall of 
... capital’s control of the division of labour’, understood as explicitly opposed to ‘traditional 
Marxist’ approaches investigating crisis ‘in terms of value’, ‘overaccumulation of capital’ and 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Vercellone, 2007a, p.18). Thus, the categories of 
formal subsumption, real subsumption and general intellect, deployed to understand the 
‘conflictual relation of knowledge to power’, structure the understanding of the historical 
development of the capitalist division of labour attached to the concept of, and deployed in 
the debate on, cognitive capitalism. These categories are seen as ‘useful in crafting a 
theoretical reconstruction in historical time ... to identify the significance of the current turning 
point in the dynamic of capitalism in the longue durée’; thus, they inform ‘a periodisation … of 
the capitalist division of labour and of the role of knowledge’ within it in three (partly 
overlapping) stages (Vercellone, 2007a, p.15). In Vercellone’s account (2007a), each phase is 
described as the combination of a particular model of production as basis for capital 
accumulation, a particular form of subjugation of labour to capital, and a particular status of 
knowledge with respect to the production process. Similarly, Moulier Boutang (2008, p.94) 
proposes that, to define cognitive capitalism as a third historical capitalism, it is necessary to 
combine ‘a type of accumulation, a mode of production and a specific type of exploitation of 
living labour’, whereby a ‘system of accumulation’ is constituted by the ‘association of what 
the Regulation school calls a mode of production with a type of accumulation’. While obviously  
influenced by the Regulation school, this historical account echoes closely, in content and 
method, Hardt and Negri’s classification of ‘economic paradigms since the Middle Ages in 
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 This section addresses primarily Vercellone, 2007a. Nonetheless, similar elements can be found in 
Vercellone, 2006b, Corsani et al., 2001, Moulier Boutang, 2008. 
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three distinct moments, each defined by the dominant sector of the economy’ (Hardt, Negri, 
2000, p.280). 
In this vein, the first stage of the historical development of capitalism, spanning from the 
beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries, is identified as the ‘stage of 
formal subsumption’, first instance of capitalism, ‘based on the ... putting-out system and ... 
centralised manufacture’, and defined by a ‘relation of capital to labour ... marked by the 
hegemony of the knowledge of craftsmen and ... workers with a trade, and by the pre-
eminence of ... mechanisms of accumulation of a mercantile and financial type’ (Vercellone, 
2007a, p.15). The second stage, spanning from the first industrial revolution all the way up to 
the (putative) ‘social crisis of Fordism’, is identified as the ‘stage of real subsumption’, 
characterised by a division of labour marked by ‘a process of polarisation of knowledge’ 
through ‘the parcelling out and disqualification of the labour of execution’, and the 
‘overqualification of a minoritarian component of labour-power, destined to intellectual 
functions’. Thus, ‘the attempt to save time, founded on the law of value-labour, is 
accompanied by the reduction of complex labour into simple labour and by the incorporation 
of knowledge in fixed capital and in the organisation of the firm’, with capital accumulation 
based on the large factory ‘of the Mancunian model [at first], then those of Fordism’, 
specialising in the production of standardised mass consumption goods (Vercellone, 2007a, 
p.16). The last and third stage, the current one, is that of cognitive capitalism. It is posited as 
born in the late 1970s after (and out of) the (putative) ‘social crisis of Fordism and of the 
Smithian division of labour’, whereby the ‘social crisis of the Fordist wage’ manifested itself ‘in 
a multiplicity of conflicts’ leading to the ‘destabilisation of the Fordist organisation of work and 
the institutions of disciplinary society’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.27, footnote 37). Putatively 
characterised by a ‘relation of capital to labour ... marked by the hegemony of knowledges’, ‘a 
diffuse intellectuality, and ... the driving role of the production of knowledges by means of 
knowledges connected to the increasingly immaterial and cognitive character of labour’, the 
new dynamic of the division of labour is posited as ‘accompanied by the crisis of the law of 
value-labour and ... the strong return of mercantile and financial mechanisms of accumulation’ 
(Vercellone, 2007a, p.16). Therefore, the main features of this ‘new configuration of capitalism 
and of the conflicts’ deriving from it are seen as understandable through the lenses of the 
Marxian concept of general intellect, taken to anticipate them in large part (Vercellone, 2007a, 
p.16). In this perspective, the current processes of financialisation are understood as tightly 
connected with, if not caused by (Moulier Boutang, 2008, pp.201-217), the transformation of 
the division of labour within the crisis of Fordism: with the posited exhaustion of industrial 
capitalism seen as having pushed capital to privilege indirect instruments of domination, 
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‘financial globalisation’ is ‘interpreted as capital’s attempt to make its cycle of valorisation 
more and more autonomous from a social labour process that it does not subsume anymore’ 
(Corsani et al., 2001, p.14; similarly Vercellone, 2007a, p.23; for post-workerist treatments of 
finance, see Marazzi, 1998, 1999, 2009). 
The first two stages of this historical account, together with their conceptualisation of the 
division of labour and the role of knowledge within it, share elements of similarity with 
standard Marxist accounts of the development of capitalism, as well as with Braverman’s 
(1998 [1974]) and Marx’s (1976) accounts of the subsumption of labour and knowledge by 
capital (although with reductionist overtones). The peculiarity of this account of the historical 
development of capitalism, together with its characterisation of the stage of cognitive 
capitalism, would reside in the identification of a break in the logic of subsumption of labour 
by capital, and the subsequent qualification of the new century as ‘post-Smithian’. Indeed, 
given an understanding of ‘Fordist growth’ as the ‘historical outcome of the industrial model’ 
anticipated by Adam Smith ‘in the famous examples of the manufacture of pins’ (Vercellone, 
2007a, p.19, footnote 16; similarly, Vercellone, 2006a, p.13), the social crisis of Fordism is 
seen, within the cognitive capitalism debate, as forebear of a relation of labour to capital 
characterised by the autonomy of knowledge and labour, implying a reversal of the processes 
of real subsumption and entailing a historical change in the division of labour overtaking the 
principles famously laid out by Adam Smith. While Vercellone’s description of a post-Smithian 
or cognitive division of labour and its consequences (2007a, 2006b) remain at a conceptual 
level, a more concrete definition is given by Moulier Boutang (2008, p.161), for whom the 
‘cognitive division of labour rests on the cooperation of brains working on’ networked 
computers, in a context where the pervasiveness of non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods, 
externalities and network effects undermines both markets and hierarchy as mechanisms to 
organise cooperation. The reader should not hesitate to note the similarity between Moulier 
Boutang’s account and aspects of the accounts provided by Foray, 2006 and Benkler, 2006 – 
on which see the first chapter of this thesis – and even some aspects of the account provided 
by Bologna, 2007 – on which see the third chapter of this thesis. 
2.3.4) An account under the influence 
 
Vercellone’s aim to recast the debate in Marxist terms explicitly claims a legacy of Marx’s 
thought for its ability ‘to offer an interpretative paradigm’ useful to account ‘for the 
transformations of the division of labour’ and the resulting trajectories of societal 
transformation (Vercellone, 2007a, p.16). Thus, for Vercellone, and with specific reference to 
the features of contemporary capitalism identified within the cognitive capitalism debate, 
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Marx’s thought offers: a) a critique of the Smithian division of labour where ‘the polarisation of 
knowledges and the split between intellectual and material tasks are no longer considered [as] 
natural [and] necessary consequence of the development of the productive forces’; and b) ‘a 
conception of technical progress ... not limited to underlining’ its impact ‘on the productivity of 
labour and economic efficacy’ but, rather, one stressing the importance of ‘the relations 
between knowledge and power which have structured the evolution of the technical and social 
division of labour’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.17; similarly, Vercellone, 2006b). 
Nonetheless, despite this claimed Marxist legacy and the stated intention to depart from post-
operaismo, Regulation theory and the debate on post-Fordism, their continuing influence is 
pivotal in allowing for the identification of a reversal of the processes of subsumption. Firstly, 
this clearly transpires from the use of post-workerist terminology and concepts (social crisis of 
Fordism, diffuse factory, diffuse intellectuality, etc.), allowing for the reading of cognitive 
capitalism as the age of the general intellect and crisis of the labour theory of value.85 These 
obvious roots in post-operaismo and profound debt to Negri’s (1991 [1979]) (re)interpretation 
of Marx’s (1993) Grundrisse and Fragment on Machines not only shape cognitive capitalism’s 
account and understanding of both the present and the future of capitalism, but also of its 
past, regardless of historical and terminological accuracy and at the price of reductionism. For 
instance, this reaches an obvious logical contradiction in the redefinition of the putting-out 
system as ‘diffuse factory’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.15, footnote 6).86 Secondly, the influence of 
Regulation theory is also clearly evident in the use of its terminology and concepts, as well as 
in the openly stated dialogue with its research programme (Corsani et al., 2001; Fumagalli, 
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 See Vercellone, 2011 for his acknowledgement of how the cognitive capitalism debate and its 
conceptualisation of ‘the transition’ from the ‘class composition of the mass worker’ to ‘that of 
immaterial and cognitive labour’ draw inspiration from the ‘teachings’ of operaismo (Vercellone, 2011, 
p.16). While this acknowledgement runs somewhat contrary to Vercellone, 2007a, which posits 
cognitive capitalism as a break with the post-workerist and regulationist interventions on post-Fordism, 
it should also be noted how the real influence is Negri’s post-operaismo, and not operaismo as a whole 
(see section 2.5). 
86
 The concept of diffuse factory is closely related to that of social worker (operaio sociale), both part of 
the conceptual toolbox elaborated by Negri and Italian autonomist Marxism (Wright, 2002, chapter 7; 
Palano). Originating from the changing relationship between society and factory identified by Mario 
Tronti as a consequence of the increasing socialisation of capital (Palano), the deployment of such 
concepts was integral to the idea that, since the restructuring of production had “diffused” the wage 
relation outside the factory walls (meaning that more and more activities were performed under 
capitalist relations of production), the whole territory and the whole of society (thus not only those 
workers productive of surplus value) had become productive of value, and were therefore exploited by 
capital, with the consequent displacement of conflict from the labour process to society as a whole. But, 
if the diffuse factory is the outcome of the increasing socialisation of capital, accompanied by the 
breakdown of Fordist methods of production and technological and organisational restructuring in 
response to the struggles of the mass worker (with the industrial districts of the Third Italy often taken 
as exemplary of these dynamics), redefining the putting-out system as diffuse factory is not only 
historically incorrect, but also an obvious internal contradiction, which can be motivated only through 
Vercellone’s claimed reversal from real to formal subsumption as characteristic of contemporary 
cognitive capitalism. 
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Lucarelli, 2007). However, and more profoundly, this influence is manifest in how the cognitive 
capitalism debate echoes Regulation theory’s shift from a critical analysis of capitalism and 
economic growth with an attachment to Marxism to a quasi-religious exercise in search for the 
new growth regime able to succeed Fordism (see Pouch, 2004, p.152; see also Husson, 2008 
for a critical account of Regulation theory and its involution). Furthermore, given its 
attachment to emphasising class compromise and workers’ involvement in the change to, and 
establishment and functioning of, new regimes of accumulation, Regulation theory ended up 
forcefully reading post-Fordism and the restructuring following the putative breakdown of 
Fordism as also beneficial for workers, with the corresponding inability to decipher the full 
extent of the damages of this transition for the working class itself (see Rolle, 2004, pp.163-
164). Although Vercellone (2011) criticises the Regulation school for its reading of the Fordist 
class compromise as if it were an ex ante compromise, when in reality it was the ex post 
outcome of highly conflictual dynamics, the regulationist attitude mentioned above still has a 
clear emphasis on cognitive capitalism’s reading of the current stage of capitalism as entailing 
greater and increasing autonomy of labour from capital, even though class compromise is 
replaced by (an abstract and one-sided notion of) class conflict as primum movens.87 Thirdly, 
consonance and resonance with the debate on post-Fordism is evident in the similarity 
between the latter’s claims of a return to craft and its benefits for labour (see Tomaney, 1994 
for a critical account), and the reversal of the logic and processes of subsumption claimed 
within the cognitive capitalism debate. Not without a hint of malice, it could be said that the 
claimed reversal of the logic and processes of subsumption is not substantively new or 
different from the claimed return to craft, only this time expressed with Marxian terminology 
and reframed as a theory of the historical development of capitalism. Lastly, a striking 
similarity between the cognitive capitalism debate and the debate on post-fordism can be 
identified in the parallel existing with the work of the proponents of the flexible specialisation 
thesis. Indeed, the latter posits social struggles as the ultimately decisive factor in the choice of 
technique of production and industrial organisational form (with flexible specialisation posited 
as a viable alternative alongside industrial mass production), and in setting course and 
direction of technical change more broadly (see Sabel, Zeitlin, 1982, 1985 and Piore, Sabel, 
1984 for the first classical references in this literature; but see also Fine, 1997, pp.76-86 for 
critical assessment). Thus, the only difference between the two debates is that, while in the 
cognitive capitalism debate the breakdown of Fordism is understood as opening a third 
historical phase following the second, industrial stage of capitalism dominated by mass 
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 This is in line with Fumagalli and Lucarelli’s (2007) distinction between ‘institutional’ and ‘conflictual’ 
regulationists (that is, the proponents of cognitive capitalism) on the grounds of the latter’s attachment 
to the ‘capital-labour relation to explain the mutations of the structures on which capital accumulation 
rests and of the institutions which ensure its enlarged reproduction’ (p.21). 
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production, for the proponents of flexible specialisation it re-opens a possibility (i.e. the 
adoption of flexibly specialised forms of production) which has always existed throughout the 
entire history of capitalism (see Zeitlin, 2007 for an account of this approach to the history of 
capitalism, characterised by a rejection of teleology and the adoption of evolutionary 
branching points, punctuated equilibria, or industrial divides). 
Prior to the publication of Commonwealth (Hardt, Negri, 2009), Vercellone’s identification of a 
reversal of ‘the move from formal to real subsumption’ demarcated clearly his ‘understanding 
of cognitive capitalism from Hardt and Negri’s account of the tendency to real subsumption in 
Empire [2000] and Multitude [2004]’ (Toscano, 2007, p.4). Indeed, in the latter account, the 
autonomy of immaterial labour stemmed from the contradiction between social relations of 
production and the development of the productive forces, an account similar in many respects 
to the post-workerist interventions in the debate on post-Fordism (this is unsurprising, given 
Negri’s and Futur Antérieur’s previous involvement in the latter debate, and it partly explains 
Vercellone’s tirade against the adoption of the concept of post-Fordism by post-workerists in 
Vercellone, 2007a). On the contrary, in Vercellone’s analysis, the autonomy of labour follows 
from a reversal of the processes of subsumption and the power relations inherent in the 
production process, rather than from an inescapable logic of history. Nonetheless, even if at 
odds with Empire’s (Hardt, Negri, 2000) and Multitude’s (Hardt, Negri, 2004) almost 
teleological reading of history, Vercellone’s conclusions are very similar to the structural 
implications for contemporary capitalism derivable from the theory of immaterial labour 
underpinning Hardt and Negri’s work. Furthermore, while true for Empire (Hardt, Negri, 2000) 
and Multitude (Hardt, Negri, 2004), the differences discussed above are less significant, if not 
null, with respect to Commonwealth (Hardt, Negri, 2009). Indeed, in the latter Hardt and Negri 
(2009, p.230) signal ‘the return movement from real to formal subsumption’ corresponding, ‘in 
certain respects, to the recent reappearance of many antiquated, parasitical forms of capitalist 
appropriation’. Thus, for them, since ‘the extraction of value from the common is increasingly 
accomplished without’ capitalist intervention ‘in its production’, ‘exploitation of labor power 
and the accumulation of surplus value should be understood in terms of not profit but 
capitalist rent’ (p.141) (for more on Hardt and Negri’s notion of “the common” and how this 
constitutes, albeit implicitly, a flawed intervention in the debates on the commons, see below). 
However, in Hardt and Negri’s typical fashion, although Vercellone (2003, 2006a) and Moulier 
Boutang (2008) are both referenced several times (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.406, footnote 16; 
p.409, footnote 59; p.417, footnote 16), and although Vercellone is directly quoted and 
thanked, the expression cognitive capitalism never appears in the substantive content and 
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analysis of the book (despite Negri’s review of Vercellone, 2003 in Negri, 2003 – also addressed 
in footnote 83 of this thesis), nor is the shift from their earlier position acknowledged. 
2.4) Capitalism suspended? 
 
In providing an account of the debates on immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism, the 
previous sections have emphasised their relations and connections, with the latter debate 
presented as cumulatively building on, and, therefore, completing and complementing the 
former as a post-workerist theory of contemporary capitalism. However, for a full 
understanding of the prospects for capitalism and political economy advanced within this 
theory, it is important to show how these follow from two otherwise related contradictions 
running across both debates. Firstly, as the frontier between productive and unproductive 
labour is constantly pushed back conceptually by positing the breakdown between production 
and reproduction, this is taken to imply the end of the law of value (Gorz, 2003), or that value 
is omnipresent yet immeasurable (Hardt, Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009). However, although 
contradictory, both perspectives amount to holding, at the same time, that nothing is 
productive of value anymore, while any activity or sign of life (biological, mental, affective, and 
so on) can be understood as work and production for capital through the creation of 
subjectivity and, therefore, subject to capitalist exploitation and domination (Harribey, 2004). 
Thus, the law of value and value theory itself are rendered shadowy (suspended) if not 
redundant, and presented as superseded by the very functioning of capitalism itself. Secondly, 
and according to whether one subscribes to the end of the law of value or the immeasurability 
thesis, cognitive capitalism is alternatively presented as the terminal crisis of capitalism itself 
(Gorz, 2003, pp.55, 81), or the age of the general intellect, characterised by increasing 
autonomy of workers and the social production process from capital, yet constrained by 
capitalist power relations and political command, or, in other words, communism, ‘even if it is 
only the “communism of capital”’ (Haug, 2010, p.214) (as in the work of Hardt and Negri and 
Vercellone addressed and assessed in this chapter). However, despite contradicting one 
another, both perspectives portray cognitive capitalism as the modality and form through 
which capitalism, although ‘virtually outdated’, ‘perpetuates itself when its categories have 
lost their pertinence’ (Gorz, 2003, p.81). Thus, the cognitive capitalism debate ultimately 
portrays contemporary capitalism as suspended, i.e. undermined and de facto transcended by 
the current material organisation of production and economic activity, as well as its 
functioning and modality of operations, yet maintaining the form and appearance of 
capitalism. 
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Furthermore, this account of capitalism and its prospects have come to be seen, within post-
workerism, as providing the necessary basis for the urgent rethinking of political economy. 
Thus, taking the ‘key to Marx's method of historical materialism’ to be that ‘social theory must 
be molded to the contours of contemporary social reality’ (in opposition to the ‘various 
idealisms’ proposing ‘independent, transhistorical theoretical frameworks, adequate for all 
social realities’), Hardt and Negri have submitted that, to ‘follow Marx’s method’ today, ‘one 
must depart from Marx’s theories to the extent that the object of his critique, capitalist 
production and capitalist society as a whole, has changed’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.140). 
Similarly, in reviewing Vercellone, 2003, Negri declared the insufficiency of the 
‘“fundamentals” of political economy’ and the ‘end of political economy’ itself in light of the 
current increasing socialisation and globalisation of production. Thus, he proposed the full 
acknowledgement of the (putative) centrality of externalities in economic activity and the 
adoption of a biopolitical perspective within economic theory (Negri, 2003, p.205) as basis for 
the search for ‘the founding principles of value in the common recomposition of labour’ and 
‘the concrete cooperation of the subjects’ inhabiting production (p.204). However, it is only 
with the closing of Hardt and Negri’s trilogy that this methodological rethinking of political 
economy found final elaboration and a clearer statement. Published in the midst of the current 
crisis and focusing on ‘the common’ as source and outcome of a ‘democracy of the multitude’ 
(Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.viii), Commonwealth draws and expands on the theme, absent in Empire 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000) and only cursorily sketched in Multitude (Hardt, Negri, 2004), of the ‘death 
of the dismal science’ in the context of biopolitical production (Hardt, Negri, 2004, pp.153-
157). Reading financialisation as ‘capitalist response to the crisis of the Fordist social 
relationship and the other social bases on which industrial capital relied’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, 
p.289), and the current financial crisis as caused ‘by the new ontology of biopolitical labor’ 
(p.264), Commonwealth leaves Hardt and Negri’s substantive analysis of contemporary 
capitalism unchanged. However, with its rhetorical emphasis on political economy (epitomised 
by the mobilisation of foundational myths and thinkers, and a narrative framed as a classical 
treatise of political economy), this last volume of the trilogy makes recourse to specific 
categories from the discipline of economics to corroborate its socio-political analysis and 
foundation. 
Indeed, to substantiate the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism, Hardt and 
Negri explicitly mobilise from the toolbox of economics the concepts of externalities and 
market failure, and from the toolbox of mainstream social theory the concept of social capital, 
of which they propose their own peculiar reading (shown below to be neglectful and 
incoherent on a number of accounts). Thus, they ascribe the presumed increasing importance 
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of externalities in economic theory to the hegemony of ‘biopolitical production’ and 
‘biopolitical exploitation’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.141), ‘[t]he capacities of biopolitical labor-
power’ exceeding work and spilling over into life (p.152), and the shift ‘from the industrial to 
the biopolitical metropolis’ (p.154), central ‘site of biopolitical production’ (p.250) and ‘vast 
reservoir of common wealth’ (p.153), where social cooperation affects the value of landed 
property through negative and positive externalities (pp.154-155) ‘embedded in the 
surrounding metropolitan terrain’ (p.251). Therefore, in order to conceptualise ‘in economic 
terms’ the ‘political regime’ able to ‘foster and control production today’ (p.271), Hardt and 
Negri propose social capital, understood as ‘the various forms of community’ constituting the 
‘stock of wealth’ allowing the functioning of all other forms of capital, as ‘supplementary 
concept’ to bypass ‘crude economistic notions of production’ (p.271). Nonetheless, they also 
see it as insufficient because of its presumed understanding of ‘the new figures of biopolitical 
production as supplements or appendages to Fordist industry and its mode of accumulation’ 
(p.272); thus, it is in the pervasiveness of externalities and market failure that they recognise ‘a 
spectre of the common’ allowing ‘to rethink some of the standard assumptions of political 
economy’ (p.155). Therefore, for Hardt and Negri, understanding biopolitical production would 
require reversing the economists’ perspective, to ‘internalize the productive externalities, 
bringing the common to the center of economic life’ (p.280): ‘freedom of the common’ being 
essential in the KBE to spur creativity, production and growth, the common would, thus, 
replace the private as ‘locus of freedom and innovation’ (p.282). Since, for Hardt and Negri, 
the common, previously perceived as external to economic activity, is now ‘becoming 
completely “internalized”’, adopting ‘the standpoint of the common’ implies rethinking ‘many 
of the central concepts of political economy’ to understand a biopolitical production 
unconstrained by ‘the logic of scarcity’ (p.283). However, as Hardt and Negri summon concepts 
and tools from mainstream economics and social theory to substantiate their reading of 
contemporary capitalism, this turn is merely rhetorical if symbolic of opportunism and casual, 
even incoherent, grafting of concepts. Rather than being indicative of any substantive change 
in their analysis, it clearly reveals the (seemingly) paradoxical nature and logic of post-
workerism itself: while claiming an attachment to Marxism (in method and for its 
characterisation of society) as point of departure with the aim of highlighting (the putatively 
new character of) exploitation and class conflict, post-workerist Marxism undermines, by the 
development of its very own analysis, the logic and prospects of such a Marxist project itself 
(similarly, Rolle, 2004). 
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2.5) All that is material melts into air: a critique of immaterial and 
cognitive reason 
 
The debates on immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism surveyed in the previous sections 
have the merit of bringing back to the forefront of discussion issues relating to the labour 
process, the historical development of capitalism, the institutions and mechanisms of 
accumulation characterising the latter’s contemporary phase, as well as that of attempting to 
incorporate in the debates on these issues a critical understanding of the role of knowledge, 
information, and technology. Both debates, under the leading light of Negri’s post-operaismo, 
posit that valorisation nowadays takes place outside the labour process and the wage relation, 
with the whole of society as its object and the social process of production understood as 
increasingly autonomous from capital. Yet, these assumptions, together with their presumed 
consequence of greater autonomy of labour from capital, jar with the ongoing attack on labour 
systematically carried out during the current era of neoliberalism (Burgio, 2001; Pouch, 2004; 
Smith, 2008) and the daily reality of work, both clearly located within the persistence and 
functioning of capitalism. Following from this observation, this section proposes a threefold 
assessment of the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism, with the intent of 
shedding light on its apparently paradoxical nature emphasised at the end of the previous 
section. Firstly, its internal logic will be assessed in sub-section 2.5.1, highlighting important 
conceptual ambiguities and theoretical misunderstandings; these are shown to preclude post-
workerism from grasping the functioning of capitalism and the analytical usefulness of the 
categories of Marxist political economy. Secondly, an account of the intellectual sociology of 
post-workerism will be provided in sub-section 2.5.2, highlighting the trajectory leading it to 
depart from its origins in the Marxist analysis of the labour process and, as a result, to become 
increasingly detached from the reality of labour and the working class itself. Thirdly, post-
workerism will be assessed in relation to broader debates within and across the social sciences 
in sub-section 2.5.3, not least by emphasising how Hardt and Negri’s intervention in the 
debate on the commons, together with their attendant rhetorical use of concepts from 
mainstream economics, exemplify the immanent political limits of post-workerism and its 
analysis and, despite the latter’s radical posturing, its ultimate docility with respect to 
neoliberalism. 
2.5.1) Misunderstanding capitalism and (Marx’s) value theory 
To begin with, it is worthwhile emphasising how the genealogy of both the concepts of 
immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism is not fully acknowledged within their respective 
debates. Indeed, ‘the expression “immaterial labour” was coined by Henri Storch in the early 
nineteenth century, following Jean-Baptiste Say and the French “ideologues”’ in the attempt to 
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defuse ‘Adam Smith’s notion that “the labour of some of the most respectable orders in the 
society is … unproductive of any value”’ (Haug, 2009, p.177). Further, the expression 
resurfaced during the 1960s and 1970s in the work of Italian philosopher and semiotician 
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, who elaborated a theory of language in stark opposition with the 
consensus in the semiotics of his time by drawing from Marxian political economy. Through 
the elaboration of concepts such as linguistic production, linguistic alienation and linguistic 
capital, it analysed the role of language in the processes of social reproduction with the aim of 
grounding it in material social practices (Rossi-Landi, 1968). However, the origin of the concept 
in opposition to the labour theory of value, and Rossi-Landi’s different use of the expression, 
are never referenced in the debate (with the notable exception of Marazzi’s discussion of 
Rossi-Landi in Marazzi, 1999; but see Di Fede, 2000 for a critique of Marazzi’s interpretation), 
with neither Negri nor other participants to the debate showing awareness ‘of the history of 
the concept and Marx’s rejection of it’ (Haug, 2009, p.177). Similarly, the expression cognitive 
capitalism was ‘first put forward in the Italian context by Lorenzo Cillario ... in terms of a 
theory of real abstraction, in an enquiry still centred on the transformations taking place 
within the factory itself’ (Toscano, 2007, pp.4-5). Yet, ‘Cillario’s work is not discussed in 
Vercellone’s recent collection on cognitive capitalism [Vercellone, 2006a]’ (Toscano, 2007, p.5, 
footnote 1), and his work on the role of knowledge within contemporary capitalism (Cillario, 
1990, 1996; Cillario, Finelli, 1998) is never referenced in the debate (with the exception of 
Toscano, 2007) (nonetheless, the reasons for this cannot be simply dismissed as ignorance of 
Cillario’s work; indeed, and however anecdotal this may be, I have witnessed personally 
Vercellone admit Cillario’s paternity of the expression in a session devoted to cognitive 
capitalism at the conference “Political Economy and the Outlook for Capitalism”, held in Paris 
in July 2012). 
Moreover, the concept of immaterial labour is spurious, while biopolitical labour and 
biopolitical production are redundant with respect to Marx’s analysis of economic and social 
reproduction. Strictly speaking, no labour is immaterial, with tasks as simple as thinking, 
speaking or reading requiring physical expenditure and involving transformations of material 
reality (for mere existence, let alone work, constantly involves alterations of material reality, as 
cognition requires burning calories, speech produces sound waves, etc.). Hardt and Negri 
acknowledge that ‘the labor involved in all immaterial production … remains material’, 
involving ‘bodies and brains as all labor does’; what, in their opinion, would allow defining 
labour as immaterial, is its result (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.290). However, this reveals a crude 
physicalist conception of materiality. As already discussed in sub-section 2.2.1, in Multitude 
Hardt and Negri recognised the ambiguity of the expression, and that the concept of 
99 
 
‘biopolitical labor’ might be superior to that of immaterial labour ‘to understand the new 
hegemonic form’ of labour; however, they also stated that they preferred to stick to 
immaterial labour because of the ‘numerous additional conceptual complexities’ implied by 
‘biopolitics’, and the fact that, ‘despite its ambiguities’, ‘the notion of immateriality’ seemed 
easier to grasp and better suited to indicate what Hardt and Negri see as ‘the general tendency 
of economic transformation’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.109). Nonetheless, in Commonwealth 
(Hardt, Negri, 2009) immaterial labour is dropped in favour of biopolitical labour, without 
acknowledgement or explanation. Yet, by adopting biopolitical over immaterial labour, things 
do not improve. With ‘biopolitical production’ defined as ‘the production of social life itself, in 
which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another’ 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.xiii; similarly, Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.109, and Hardt, Negri, 2009, pp.x-xi, 
135), one is left wondering whether capitalism (as much as any other mode of production) has 
not always been “biopolitical”, and whether the concept improves on the tools of Marxian 
theory. According to the latter, capital and labour reproduce themselves as social relations as 
much as they produce commodities through the production process; regardless of the physical 
nature of the factors of production, focus is on their location, interaction and integration 
within the production process and capitalist social relations of production as a whole. Thus, 
Marx was concerned with the production of socio-political subjects as much as he was with 
that of commodities, and there is much in his thought allowing for understanding of capital as 
a social relation and of value as immaterial but objective (Harvey, 2009).88 Therefore, ‘just as 
all “immaterial” labor necessarily involves material activity, so conversely all material labor is 
“immaterial” in the sense that it alters not only the material worked upon but also subjectivity 
and social relations’, with ‘no clear distinction between material and immaterial’ existing ‘in 
this respect’ (Sayers, 2007, p.448). Deplorably, Hardt and Negri give too little consideration to 
the objective moment, as opposed to the immaterial (Harvey, 2009), on the grounds of 
arguments often reminiscent of ‘recycled versions of discredited theories of post-industrialism, 
                                                 
88
 A clear illustration of the above is provided by the following passage, drawn from Capital I, which 
exemplifies Marx’s own thinking on these issues (not least with respect to what, in post-workerist 
terminology, represents an instance of immaterial or biopolitical labour): ‘Capitalist production is not 
merely the production of commodities, it is, by its very essence, the production of surplus-value. The 
worker produces not for himself, but for capital. It is no longer sufficient, therefore, for him simply to 
produce. He must produce surplus-value. The only worker who is productive is one who produces 
surplus-value for the capitalist, or in other words contributes towards the self-valorization of capital. If 
we may take an example from outside the sphere of material production, a schoolmaster is a productive 
worker when, in addition to belabouring the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground to 
enrich the owner of the school. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a 
sausage factory, makes no difference to the relation. The concept of a productive worker therefore 
implies not merely a relation between the activity of work and its useful effect, between the worker and 
the product of his work, but also a specifically social relation of production, a relation with a historical 
origin which stamps the worker as capital’s direct means of valorization’ (Marx, 1976, p.644, emphasis 
added). 
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resuscitated by managerial writers in search of a language of discontinuity around which to 
weave their fanciful notions of post-bureaucratic organisation’ (Thompson, 2005, p.94, 
footnote 7). 
The concept of immaterial labour is also problematic and confusing with respect to the 
Marxian distinction between concrete and abstract labour. Concentrating on the 
(re)definition(s) provided in section 2.2 of this chapter, it is clear from the characteristics 
enunciated by Lazzarato (1996) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), that immaterial 
labour refers to specific concrete labours, i.e. labours producing specific use values. 
Nonetheless, since Hardt and Negri see the ‘real homogenization of laboring processes’ as 
‘consequence of the informatization of production and the emergence of immaterial labor’ 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.292), and ‘the relations of capitalist exploitation’ as ‘expanding 
everywhere ... tending to occupy the entire social terrain’, for them ‘the object of exploitation 
and domination tend not to be specific productive activities but the universal capacity to 
produce, that is, abstract social activity and its comprehensive power’, for which they claim the 
character of ‘abstract labor’ (p.209). Indeed, for Hardt and Negri, ‘the computer’ being ‘the 
universal tool, or rather … central tool, through which all activities might pass’, it is through 
‘the computerization of production’ that labour would tend ‘toward the position of abstract 
labor’ (p.292). However, this is an obvious misunderstanding, as the abstract character of 
labour does not hinge, in Marx’s account, on any technical aspect of production (be it the 
physical or “immaterial” character of the product, or the technique and means of production 
employed) (Harribey, 2004). Rather, it depends on the latter’s social character, whereby 
private labours are brought into equivalence and validated as social labour through market 
exchange (Harribey, 2004; Rolle, 2004). Indeed, ‘in commodity society concrete labours 
(producing specific use values) are not performed casually but as part of an intricate social 
division of labour which connects them with one another through the market, or through the 
exchange of their products for money’ (Fine, Saad-Filho, 2010, pp.16-17). Therefore, 
‘capitalism, as generalised commodity production for profit, is characterised by the production 
of social use values, and, therefore, the exchange of the products of concrete labours that 
exist, and contribute to value as abstract social labour’ (p.18-19). Thus, the labour of factory 
workers is not made any less abstract than that of software producers when their products are 
sold on the capitalist market (Harribey, 2004). Furthermore, according to Hardt and Negri, in 
‘capitalist production the specific labors of the mason, the welder, the shop clerk, and so forth 
are equivalent or commensurable because they each contain a common element, abstract 
labor, labor in general, labor without respect to its specific form’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.144). 
However, through this understanding of abstract labour as ‘a physiological category only, as 
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expenditure of human energy irrespective of its specific form’ (Jeon, 2010, p.101), Hardt and 
Negri ‘attribute a rather simplistic theory of value to Marx ... based on the idea that everyday 
concrete labour is recognized as physiological labour embodied in commodities during 
production ... and is measured as an average of concrete labour-times it takes to produce a 
commodity’ (Cremin, Roberts, 2011, p.184; see also, for example, Hardt, Negri, 2004, pp.144-
146). But this is to misunderstand how ‘abstract labour is socially and historically equivalent 
human labour that is expressed through generalised commodity production and exchange’ 
(Jeon, 2010, p.103), meaning that, contrary to Hardt and Negri’s belief that the ‘temporal unity 
of labor as the basic measure of value today makes no sense’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.145), the 
social commensurability of labours and value as socially necessary labour time emerge 
objectively from the social processes shaping and structuring capitalism, since ‘the reduction of 
all types of labour to a common standard is an essential and spontaneous product of the real 
world of capitalism itself’ (Fine, Saad-Filho, 2010, p.19). Therefore, to adopt the concept of 
immaterial labour is to obscure the nature of value and its connection to the workings of the 
market and capitalism. 
Closely related to the previous points, the supposed hegemony of immaterial labour requires 
separate discussion. Indeed, for Hardt and Negri, the hegemony of immaterial labour is not 
exerted in quantitative terms, which would be easily disproved considering that, by Hardt and 
Negri’s own admission, the vast majority of the world population still works in the agricultural 
sector, and that ‘industrial labor has not declined in terms of numbers globally’. Although 
constituting ‘a minority of global labor ... concentrated in some of the dominant regions of the 
globe’, immaterial labour is posited by Hardt and Negri as having ‘become hegemonic in 
qualitative terms’, imposing ‘a tendency’ to adopt its qualities ‘on other forms of labor and on 
society itself’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.109). This follows from Hardt and Negri’s own specific view 
of the historical development of capitalism, put forward in Empire (Hardt, Negri, 2000) and 
carried on in Multitude (Hardt, Negri, 2004), which classifies ‘the succession of economic 
paradigms since the Middle Ages in three distinct moments, each defined by the dominant 
sector of the economy: a first paradigm in which agriculture and the extraction of raw 
materials dominated the economy, a second in which industry and the manufacture of durable 
goods occupied the privileged position, and a third and current paradigm in which providing 
services and manipulating information are at the heart of economic production’ (Hardt, Negri, 
2000, p.280). Every period being characterised by the pre-eminence of ‘one figure of labor’ 
exerting ‘hegemony over the others’ and serving ‘as a vortex that gradually transforms other 
figures to adopt its central qualities’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.107), immaterial labour would be 
‘today in the same position that industrial labor was 150 years ago’, accounting ‘for only a 
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small fraction of global production and ... concentrated in a small part of the world but 
nonetheless’ asserting ‘hegemony over all forms of production’. Therefore, ‘[j]ust as in that 
phase all forms of labor and society itself had to industrialize’, for Hardt and Negri, ‘today labor 
and society have to informationalize, become intelligent, become communicative, become 
affective’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.109). 
However, this account of the rise of services and immaterial production neglects how the 
‘boundaries between’ the primary, manufacturing and service sectors of the economy and the 
sphere of reproduction are ‘not only extremely blurred, but also dynamic’ (Huws, 2003, p.63). 
This has two important consequences. Firstly, from ‘accountants to lorry drivers to cleaners’, 
‘there are many large groups of workers whose classification is essentially an arbitrary by-
product of the size and degree of specialization of their employers’, and ‘whether or not there 
is a policy of subcontracting work’ (Huws, 2003, p.64). Thus, the rise and expansion of the 
service sector is in large part due to processes of outsourcing and subcontracting of labour, 
which, in turn, presuppose management reorganisation of work through fragmentation, 
routinisation and rationalisation of work tasks, and can subsequently lead to the specialisation 
and reintegration of these to increase productivity (Greenbaum, 2004). Thus, while post-
workerists present the rise of services as implying a break with, the transformation, or the end 
of the capitalist division of labour and organisation of the labour process, the expansion of the 
service sector reconfirms these, both as prerequisite for the process to happen in the first 
place (through outsourcing of activities), and conduit for the creation of new jobs which can 
also involve a variety of different tasks, seem rich in knowledge, communication, and so on 
(new jobs which, in turn, can be subject to the same processes of fragmentation, routinisation 
and rationalisation of work tasks, in accordance with the needs and imperatives of surplus-
value production). Secondly, Hardt and Negri’s account of the historical development of 
capitalism through the articulation of economic paradigms stresses a univocal tendency 
towards dematerialisation, but this is one-sided in its neglect of the dynamism of the processes 
of commodification shaping capitalism itself. Indeed, these imply the movement of activities 
from the reproduction to the market economy, through manufacturing and into the service 
sector, but are also paralleled by the movement of activities from the service into the 
manufacturing sector, and back into the reproductive economy (see Huws, 2003 for an 
account). Thus while ‘it may possibly be the case that dematerialization is taking place in some’ 
activities, ‘in others precisely the opposite tendency is occurring, and … in the long run this 
tendency of commodification, or the transformation of services into material products, is the 
dominant one in capitalism’ (Huws, 2003, p.131). 
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As previously noted, the systemic properties derived from the hegemony of immaterial labour 
are completed and complemented by the debate on cognitive capitalism. Anticipating how 
Hardt and Negri’s theory of immaterial labour could be recast as a ‘globally pre-eminent social 
structure or régime of accumulation’, improving ‘on the putative hegemony of figures of 
labour’, Camfield also suggested that such a prospect ‘would probably reproduce the 
weaknesses of regulationist and social-structure-of-accumulation political economy, including 
a focus on institutional arrangements at the expense of the contradictory dynamics of 
capitalism itself’, and failure ‘to capture the articulation of different forms of accumulation’ 
simultaneously existing ‘in every phase of capitalist development’ (Camfield, 2007, p.38, 
footnote 89). The core of the cognitive capitalism debate consisting in the encounter between 
(Negri’s) Italian post-operaismo and French Regulation theory, Camfield’s comments could not 
have been more foretelling. Indeed, as shown earlier on in this chapter, cognitive capitalism 
falls prey to the shortcomings of both. Nonetheless, two specific conceptual features of the 
post-workerist account of contemporary capitalism require further elucidation. Firstly, the 
post-workerist use of the Marxian categories of formal and real subsumption is highly 
problematic (if not outright impressionistic). Without disagreement, these concepts do 
describe the division of labour and organisation of production during specific historical phases 
characterising the development of capitalist relations of production, and, conceptually, the 
logic of subsumption can be reversed, given the existence of favourable conditions. However, 
cognitive capitalism’s account and use of these categories lacks a full-blown conception of 
formal and real subsumption as dynamic processes potentially taking place in any kind of 
productive activity and at any historical moment (in accord with the processes of 
commodification discussed above, and the corresponding movement of activities out of 
unsocialised and into socialised labour and vice versa). To conceive of them as each merely 
characteristic of a particular historical phase, not only flattens out different levels of 
abstraction, but also fails to capture the ways in which they are imbricated, structured and 
differentially at play in the division of labour and organisation of production, both in specific 
productive processes as well as all the way through to the world economy. In addition to this 
impoverished understanding, these Marxian categories are deployed, within the cognitive 
capitalism debate, to characterise the capital-labour relation with respect to the ‘conflictual 
relation of knowledge to power that determines the development of the capitalist division of 
labour’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.15). However, this account neglects other important economic 
processes shaping the structure of industries and the adoption of innovation (both 
technological and organisational), such as competition, the international division of labour, 
capital accumulation, etc. These mutually reinforcing shortcomings inform cognitive 
capitalism’s account of crises as caused by the ‘tendential fall of ... capital’s control of the 
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division of labour’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.18), typically post-workerist in both its neglect of 
political economy and its ‘one-sided stress on the agency of living labor’ (Smith, 2008, p.35). 
Echoing  Hardt and Negri’s neglect of (Marxist) political economy (Thompson, 2005), these 
shortcomings derive from the old post-operaista habit of identifying the hegemonic figure of 
labour, projected onto the whole history of capitalist development through the analytical tools 
of Regulation theory and (a progressively debased post-)operaismo. 
Secondly, the characterisation of the current stage of capitalism as dominated by the general 
intellect, the triumph of a post-Smithian division of labour, the inseparability of labour power 
from individual workers allowing for autonomy, and a return to formal subsumption, rests on a 
flawed conception of labour which, coupled with Negri’s (1991 [1979]) reading of the 
Grundrisse (Marx, 1993), leads to the rejection of value theory. In this account, ‘the activities in 
which the cognitive and immaterial dimension of labour is dominant’ are posited as witnessing 
the ‘destabilisation of one of the structuring conditions of the wage relation, that is to say, the 
renunciation – compensated by the wage – by the workers to any claim on the property of the 
product of their labour’. Therefore, in ‘cognitive-labour-producing knowledge, the result of 
labour’ would remain ‘incorporated in the brain of the worker and … inseparable from her 
person’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.33). However, while this fetishizes knowledge and irons out the 
Marxian distinction between labour and labour-power, echoing in many respects human 
capital theory and its understanding of education as a form of investment,89 it also glosses over 
that intellectual work can be fragmented, routinised and rationalised according to the 
imperatives of the capitalist labour process.90 Furthermore, positing ‘cognitive or knowledge 
labour (conception) and industrial labour (execution)’ as ‘independent forms of labour’, 
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 See Rolle, 2004, Pouch, 2004 and Harribey, 2004 for critiques along these lines. For human capital 
theory itself, see Schultz, 1961, for whom labourers ‘have become capitalists not from a diffusion of the 
ownership of corporation stocks, as folklore would have it, but from the acquisition of knowledge and 
skill that have economic value’ (p.3). More generally, see Fine, Rose, 2001 and Rose, 2006 for critical 
accounts of human capital theory and its ascendancy in the rhetoric and scholarship of the Washington 
and post-Washington consensuses. 
90
 Indeed, not only can intellectual work be subjected to the division of labour like any other activity 
under capitalism, but it is telling that Charles Babbage himself drew on Gaspard de Prony’s work to 
defend ‘what may, perhaps, appear paradoxical to some of our readers’ (and, maybe, post-workerists), 
that is ‘that the division of labour can be applied with equal success to mental operations, and that it 
ensures, by its adoption, the same economy of time’ (Babbage, 1835, ch.XIX, p.153). Gaspard de Prony 
was a French government official charged, in 1793, ‘with the Herculean task of superintending the 
production of a series of logarithmic and trigonometric tables that would facilitate the transition to the 
recently adopted decimal system’ (Rosenberg, 1994, p.39). Inspired by the chapter on the division of 
labour in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, de Prony divided the workload in different phases to be 
carried out by different groups of “computers” with different, and only the necessary, levels of 
mathematical knowledge for each phase, thus anticipating the Babbage principle and the basic 
principles of Taylorism (see Manacorda, 1976 for an account). Further, Braverman (1998 [1974]) has 
provided significant elements to understand how the principles underlying the division of labour could 
be shown to inform clerical work and its organisation, and Greenbaum (2004) has provided an account 
of the role of technology in the organisation of office work from the 1950s to the present. 
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potentially coexisting but with one dominating the other, ‘the validity of value theory is argued 
to depend on’ the prevailing ‘form of labour’ (Fine et al., 2010, p.80). Therefore, assuming the 
prevalence of a ‘relation of capital to labour ... marked by the hegemony of knowledges, ... 
diffuse intellectuality, and ... the driving role of the production of knowledges by means of 
knowledges connected to the increasingly immaterial and cognitive character of labour’ 
(Vercellone, 2007a, p.16), the labour theory of value is rendered redundant. Thus, cognitive 
capitalism neglects the ‘important role’ of knowledge ‘in value production per se’, played 
through determination of the productivity and complexity of labour, with its ‘dualistic 
approach ... precluding diverse forms of ... interaction between conception and execution in 
deference to the necessary predominance of one over the other’ (Fine et al., 2010, p.80). 
Thus, on the one hand, overstating the importance of knowledge for work in contemporary 
capitalism (as opposed to previous phases of capitalism and human history), cognitive 
capitalism mistakes quantitative shifts in the arrangement of different sectors of the economy 
for epochal qualitative change. Underpinning this flawed analysis, on the other hand, is the 
reading of the general intellect as a historical category (Smith, 2008, p.4), coupled with Hardt 
and Negri’s flawed understanding of Marx’s value theory as an ‘embodied theory of value’ 
(Cremin, Roberts, 2011, p.184). With this leading to the rejection of value theory on the 
grounds of the immeasurability of immaterial and biopolitical labour, both errors derive from 
Negri’s (1991 [1979]) (re)reading of Marx’s Grundrisse (1993) and, in particular, the Fragment 
on Machines as against Capital (1976, 1978, 1981). Interpreting the restructuring of the labour 
process in the 1970s through micro-electronics, automation, decreasing wages, fragmentation 
of productive units and increased labour market flexibility as capital’s response to the struggles 
of the operaio massa (mass worker) of Fordism, Negri claimed the spread of productive 
cooperation from the factory to the whole of society, the emergence of the operaio sociale 
(social worker) as a result of working class re-composition and, ultimately, the subsumption of 
the whole of social life (as opposed to the sole labour process) by capitalism (Corradi, 2011a, 
pp.203-207). Marking a break with the original operaismo of the 1960s, Negri’s reading of 
society and of the Grundrisse against Capital has dominated the last phase of operaismo, the 
post-operaismo of the 1980s and 1990s, and Hardt and Negri’s trilogy, thus enabling the 
reading of the recent restructuring of the labour process as (at least partial) confirmation of 
‘Marx’s “general intellect” prognosis of the increasing scientific constitution of capitalist 
production through the erosion of its capitalist forms’ (Haug, 2010, p.212) (note, though, how 
in Hardt and Negri’s trilogy the general intellect is only brought up in critical discussion of the 
post-workerism of the 1980s and 1990s in Empire – Hardt, Negri, 2000, pp.29-30, 364-368 – 
disappearing in Multitude – Hardt, Negri, 2004 – and Commonwealth – Hardt, Negri, 2009 – 
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where it is replaced by “the common”). Last in this line of permutations of Negri’s post-
workerism, cognitive capitalism understates ‘the degree to which the general intellect’ 
operated ‘in Fordism’, overestimating ‘the extent to which it flourishes in contemporary 
capitalism’ (Smith, 2008, p.23). This is due to a one-sided reading of knowledge, science and 
technology in the form of mass or diffuse intellectuality, neglecting the factors undermining 
their dissemination and democratisation (restriction of access, commodification, de-skilling 
and re-skilling, etc., see Smith, 2008, pp.27-30). However, with ‘“the real abstractions of 
modernity” – value, money, capital’ – holding ‘with undiminished force in contemporary 
capitalism’, not least within the labour process, cognitive capitalism’s claims of a realisation of 
the general intellect ‘in anything like the manner Marx anticipated in communism’ and of 
reversals of the logic of subsumption are easily dispelled. Indeed, with ‘the real subsumption of 
the labor process’ occurring ‘whenever the substantive content of the labor process is subject 
to the valorization imperative’ (Smith, 2008, pp.30-31), the autonomy of labour celebrated by 
post-operaismo is yet to come.91 
2.5.2) From the search of political actors to the neglect of real existing workers 
Upon closer inspection, Hardt and Negri’s characterisation of the historical development of 
capitalism through the succession of economic paradigms defined by the predominance of the 
agricultural, industrial, and then service sector of the economy, and cognitive capitalism’s own 
account of it as the succession of a mercantile, industrial and then cognitive capitalism, are 
very similar. While this is evident in the overlap of the features, content and periods putatively 
characterising each phase, at a deeper level both accounts reproduce and project onto the 
whole history of capitalism the standard arguments and class analysis of Italian operaismo and 
its later offspring, post-workerism. Indeed, despite its original commitment to the 
identification of an agent of social change in the production process, this approach has 
resulted, ultimately, in the successive elaboration of social figures with little bearing on the 
real working class, and the corresponding exclusive and strategic predicament of one of its 
sections, posited as “hegemonic”, against that of the whole. While this process has led post-
workerism to become disconnected from the reality and condition of the (majority of the) 
working class, telling examples of the lack of radical character for workers of post-workerism 
itself can be found in the failed recognition of the socially devastating character of neoliberal 
restructuring, doctored by the characterisation of cognitive capitalism as age of the general 
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 Here Smith refers to Virno, 2007, but note how this applies equally (if not even more 
characteristically) to Negri, for the latter has been convinced of living in communism from the 1970s 
onwards, ‘even if it is only the “communism of capital”’ (Haug, 2010, p.214). 
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intellect, and the positions held by post-workerists on issues and debates relevant to social 
justice and economic democracy. 
In its genuine attempt to break with the orthodox Marxism of the Italian Communist Party of 
the 1950s and 1960s and bring back communist politics to a class-based practice, the main 
merit of operaismo has been to use ‘analytical instruments rediscovered in Marx’s texts … to 
interpret the processes underway in Italy’ through development and use of ‘new and original 
interpretative categories’ (Turchetto, 2008, p.287). Focusing on class self-awareness and 
articulation within the labour process (through elaboration of the distinction between 
technical and political class composition) and, ultimately, on the analysis of cycles of struggle, it 
posited an active role for the working class in determining the dynamic of class struggle, 
capitalist development and accumulation, with labour process restructuring as capital’s 
response to workers’ unrest and refusal of work. Thus, the elaboration, in rapid succession, of 
the concepts of the operaio massa of the 1960s (the mass worker of the Fordist model), the 
operaio sociale of the 1970s (the social worker of the “diffuse factory” of the Italian Veneto 
and North-East), the mass intellectual of the 1980s and early 1990s, all the way up to the 
knowledge worker, the multitude, and the immaterial or biopolitical labourer of the noughties, 
responds to this logic. Nonetheless, despite departing from orthodoxy through reviving the 
politics and analysis of the labour process, operaismo followed a trajectory of descent of its 
own. From the original operaismo of the Quaderni Rossi to the post-operaismo of the 1980s 
and 1990s, its proposition underwent progressive debasement, becoming in the process ‘a 
blocked form of thinking’ (Turchetto, 2008, p.298), although consolidating as ‘a powerful 
apparatus of recognition’ whose function is ‘more linguistic than theoretical, and evocative as 
opposed to genuinely propositional’ (Turchetto, 2008, pp. 285-286). Indeed, as part and parcel 
of the last great throw of the working class dice in Italy, operaismo was caught between a 
period when it was extremely prominent at the highest points of the cycles of struggle of the 
1960s and 1970s, and the rapid decline of these after the subsequent tide of repression (also 
entailing the incarceration of many of the thinkers and organisers of operaismo itself, such as 
Negri, among others). Thus, progressively moving away from an analysis of the labour process 
fully fledged in a political economy of capitalism, operaismo ended up reducing its analysis and 
politics to the continual attempt to identify, in each historical phase and contingency, as if 
unable to process defeat and under the hold of a “compulsion to repeat”,92 the hegemonic 
figure of labour able by virtue of its centrality in the production process to become the 
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 This comment is to be understood as an explicit reference to the Freudian concept of “compulsion to 
repeat”, which indicates the psychological phenomenon whereby individuals are compelled indefinitely 
to re-enact or repeat traumatic events and their circumstances. See Freud, 2003 [1920] for the first 
elaboration of this concept. 
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transcendental political subject in struggle against capital. Rooted in this tradition, the 
multitude and the hegemony of immaterial labour represent the culmination of a series of 
political subjects identified, after the defeat of the cycle of struggles of the mass worker and 
from the operaio sociale onwards, under Negri’s leading light.93 Thus, both the immaterial 
labour and cognitive capitalism debates recast the method and analysis of the later phase of 
operaismo (and subsequent post-operaismo), previously confined to national cycles of 
struggle, at the level of the whole historical development of capitalism and of the global 
economy, somewhat paralleling the diaspora of those operaisti fleeing Italy in the wake of 
judicial repression (such as Negri himself, for example). In doing so, the shortcomings are 
amplified: with the working class reduced (at best) to one of its segments through super-
imposition of analytical categories, a degraded view of work, workers and struggles of the past 
and in non-hegemonic sectors ensues, with the consequent idealisation of work of the present 
and its prospects in terms of quality and liberational potential (and with the ‘basic traditional 
models of political activism, class struggle, and revolutionary organization’ automatically 
discarded as ‘outdated and useless’, Hardt, Negri, 2004, p.68).94 As a result, this perspective 
obscures the persistence, plurality, and co-existence of forms of exploitation and struggle, 
despite evidence and trends negating the supposed greater autonomy of labour from capital; 
this, in turn, isolates post-operaismo from the condition and reality of the majority of working 
people (similar critiques were made of the Futur Antérieur phase of post-operaismo also from 
within Autonomist Marxism, notably by Caffentzis, see Dyer-Witheford, 2001 for discussion; 
but, despite the redefinitions of the concept of immaterial labour discussed in sub-section 
2.2.1, they have remained unheeded). 
Thus, the ‘search for an economic actor inside the hidden abode of production, who is then 
required to be a transcendent political subject with the responsibility of changing the whole 
society, creates an impossible practical and theoretical burden’, causing post-workerism to 
‘ignore the real insights that can be generated from Marxist political economy, but reproduce 
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 See Corradi, 2011b for an account of the diverging paths of the operaisti in light of the failure of the 
struggles of the mass worker in the early 1970s. While Negri and those holding the autonomy of the 
social ventured on the search for new social subjects, those holding the autonomy of the political (such 
as, for example, Tronti) re-entered the Italian Communist Party. However, and despite their contrasting 
attitudes towards the latter, both positions held the extinction of value in light of the primacy of social 
cooperation or political command over the (capitalist) relations of production, not least at the point of 
production itself. Note, though, that Tronti has subsequently significantly revised and criticised his own 
position on the autonomy of the political (Corradi, 2011b). 
94
 These features are especially evident in the neglect of those workers (often, although not exclusively, 
located in the global south), whose work is essential to build, produce and maintain fully functioning the 
material infrastructures buttressing cognitive capitalism and immaterial production (to use post-
workerist terminology). This infrastructure comprises activities ranging from the production of the 
hardware and consumption goods supporting “immaterial” products and informational goods, to call 
centre work (Gaudillière, 2008; Huws, 2003). 
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what is, arguably, its weakest point – the gravedigger thesis’ (Thompson, 2005, p.92). 
Moreover, the lack of radical character for workers of this approach is nowhere as evident as 
in its cavalier treatment of neoliberalism and corresponding characterisation of cognitive 
capitalism as age of the general intellect. Indeed, post-workerism presents financialisation as 
‘capital’s attempt to make its cycle of valorisation more and more autonomous from a social 
labour process that it does not subsume anymore’ (Corsani et al., 2001, p.14), and portrays the 
‘social crisis of the Fordist wage’ and compromise as deriving from the ‘destabilisation of the 
Fordist organisation of work and the institutions of disciplinary society’ following ‘the 
formation of a diffuse intellectuality’ and ‘the reaffirmation of the cognitive dimensions of 
labour’ (Vercellone, 2007a, p.27, note 37). However, this can be done only at the significant 
price of neglecting the active role of class conflict from above, the role and place of the state 
within it, and the concrete political processes and policies paving the way for neoliberal 
restructuring and the rise of finance since the 1970s. Moreover, this neglect betrays how the 
post-workerist focus on class struggle from below and its portrayal of capitalist restructuring as 
merely and always reactive, are not only one-sided, but also mere conceptual abstractions, 
mobilised ex post facto as explanatory variables within voluntaristic readings of social conflict. 
Thus, any social change, irrespective of its historical dynamics and effects, can be presented as 
the victorious outcome of workers’ struggles. However, while this is conceptually incorrect, it 
is also devoid of the radical character for workers which post-workerism claims for itself, as 
shown at least on two concrete occasions. First, the post-workerist advocacy for a basic 
universal income (as opposed to a call for de-commodification through expansion of free 
public provision, and a politics of full employment and redistribution of work) has played an 
important part in preventing the movement of the unemployed from joining forces with trade 
unions in France at the time of the debates preceding and surrounding the adoption of the 35-
hour-working-week measures (Husson, 2004).95 Secondly, Moulier Boutang has been an 
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 Of course, post-workerists are not the only proponents of basic income (see, for example, Standing, 
2011). While motivations for advocating for the latter vary, post-workerists see it as a ‘programmatic 
political demand of the multitude’ following from the ‘generality of biopolitical production’. Thus, they 
hold that, since in ‘the passage to postmodernity and biopolitical production, labor power has become 
increasingly collective and social’, ‘the distinction between production and reproductive labor fades’ and 
‘the entire multitude produces, and its production is necessary from the standpoint of total social 
capital’. Therefore, the ‘demand for a social wage extends to the entire population the demand that all 
activity necessary for the production of capital be recognized with an equal compensation such that a 
social wage is really a guaranteed income’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.403; similarly, see Gorz, 2003). 
Furthermore, basic income is seen as a necessary element of a politics of inclusive citizenship (Hardt, 
Negri, 2000, p.403) which, if ‘extended beyond the national realm to become a global demand’, could 
‘become an element of a project for the democratic management of globalization’ (Hardt, Negri, 2004, 
p.136). It is also seen as an instrument which would be ‘necessary to save capitalist production’ from the 
current crisis, because, since granting ‘the multitude autonomy and control over time is essential to 
foster productivity in the biopolitical economy’, ‘ensuring that the entire population has the basic 
minimum for life is in the interests of capital’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.310). See also Fumagalli, Lucarelli, 
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enthusiastic supporter of the project of establishing a European Constitution, which he saw as 
a step forward in the direction of federalism bypassing the national state and, therefore, an 
instance of internationalism and proof of the existence of the Empire (despite the 
denunciation, coming from the French federalist left, of the socially regressive nature forming 
the hard core of the constitutional project, see Husson, 2004). 
2.5.3) From the neglect of political economy to the rhetorical use of economics 
 
After having assessed post-operaismo with respect to its internal logic and conceptual 
misunderstandings as well as its intellectual sociology, it is important to analyse and locate its 
trajectory with respect to broader debates and trends across Marxist political economy, the 
social sciences, and society. Doing so highlights how its departure from Marxist political 
economy, together with its acceptance (mediated by postmodernism) of contested categories 
from mainstream business discourse and economics, has resulted in the distancing and 
disconnection of its political and research programmes from those of the original operaismo of 
the 1960s and its roots in the (Marxist) analysis of the labour process. Thus, despite much 
professed radicalism and a claimed Marxist analytical standpoint privileging labour in 
opposition to capital, post-workerism has ended up providing a perspective practically, 
methodologically, and politically subaltern to neoliberalism, as epitomised by Hardt and 
Negri’s recent turn to the politics of the common and corresponding rhetorical use of 
economics (Hardt, Negri, 2009). 
With respect to Marxist political economy, post-operaismo has an origin in specific positions in 
the labour process debate and the debate on productive and unproductive labour. Regarding 
the first, the positions of the original Italian operaismo of the 1960s anticipated, through the 
contributions of Raniero Panzieri (collected in Panzieri, 1976a), Braverman’s (1998 [1974]) 
reflections on the non-neutrality of machines and forces of production within the labour 
process and capitalist development, as well as the  critiques of Marx(ism) and Braverman on 
the grounds of a neglect of the agency of labour and class struggle, especially at the point of 
production, both crucial to account for capitalist dynamism and development, through the 
contributions of Mario Tronti (collected in Tronti, 2006 [1966, 1971]). The movement leading 
to contemporary post-operaismo, starting with the last phase of Italian operaismo in the 1970s 
under Negri’s leading light, resonates with the shift in labour process research from an 
analytical framework inspired by Marx and Braverman to one inspired by Foucault, focusing on 
                                                                                                                                               
2008 for a defence of basic income as necessary for the stabilisation of (a financially unstable) cognitive 
capitalism (understood as the current regime of accumulation) through increasing both productivity and 
demand via, respectively, enhancing network and learning processes, on the one hand, and 
consumption, on the other. 
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‘the “local” constitution of subjectivity’ at the expense of ‘the deeper specific differentiae of 
the capital-labour relation’ (Spencer, 2000, p.224),96 and ultimately leading many labour 
process theorists to relocate in business schools, critical management and organisation theory 
(Rowlinson, Hassard, 1994). With respect to the debate on productive and unproductive 
labour, while the original Italian operaismo of the 1960s represented a genuine and healthy 
break with the rhetoric and praxis of the Italian Communist Party on the basis of more complex 
accounts of class composition and dynamics, the movement from the later phase of operaismo 
to contemporary post-operaismo has been characterised by an attempt to expand the 
category of productive labour similar to that of the first proponents of the concept of 
immaterial labour, the French idéologues, Say and Storch (Haug, 2009), even if on the opposite 
side of the political spectrum and inspired by a politically inclusive, rather than exclusive, social 
ontology. Thus, Negri’s political reading of Marx’s value theory and the stress on its politics of 
inclusion through a redefined and expanded notion of productive labour led to the elaboration 
of immaterial labour and use of the general intellect as ‘collect-all’ categories ‘for all post-
Fordist labour and for the interpellation of a new revolutionary subject’, functioning ‘not as … 
(epistemological or ontological) analytical’ concepts (Haug, 2009, p.177) but, rather, as 
‘sloganistic’ terms ‘for political mobilisation … at the cost of theoretical arbitrariness’ (Haug, 
2010, p.209; the same can be said to apply to the multitude, cognitive capitalism and the 
common). 
Thus, having departed from Marxist political economy and value theory in search of a new 
political theory of value, post-operaismo ultimately developed ‘unhealthy and uncritical 
dependence on mainstream business and management writings on the knowledge economy 
and knowledge work’ (Thompson, 2005, p.75), often sharing the millennialism of many 
information society theorists, post-industrial discourses, and less respectable futurists. 
Furthermore, its focus on subjectivity and a politics of cultural resistance have led to the 
identification of Hardt and Negri’s theory as an instance of postmodern left-liberalism (Cremin, 
Roberts, 2011). This tendency is most evidently manifest in Hardt and Negri’s recent 
intervention in the debate on the politics of the commons and rhetorical turn to the categories 
of mainstream economics in Commonwealth (Hardt, Negri, 2009). Indeed, as discussed earlier, 
the closing of Hardt and Negri’s trilogy marks a new step for the trajectory of post-operaismo 
for its turn to specific categories from the discipline of economics to corroborate the post-
workerist socio-economic foundation, rather than for any substantive change in its analysis of 
contemporary capitalism itself. However, it is not by coincidence that this turn to the 
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 Similarly, see Hyman, 2006; but see also Burrell, 2006 for a positive account of postmodern labour 
process theory. 
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categories of mainstream economics arrives exactly at the moment when the cognitive 
capitalism debate, by building onto the immaterial labour debate, completes and 
complements the latter with a socio-economic foundation for post-workerism. Indeed, rather 
than bringing closure, this last step reasserts the shortcomings of post-operaismo, and reveals 
the real price to be paid for the rejection and neglect of the insights of Marxian political 
economy, clearly putting into question the practical, political and theoretical relevance of post-
workerism itself. Indeed, and although inspired by the political project of instituting and 
managing ‘a world of common wealth, focusing on and expanding’ the capacity ‘for collective 
production and self-government’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.xiii) through rejection of the 
‘pernicious political alternative between capitalism and socialism’ (p.ix), Hardt and Negri’s 
intervention in the debate on the commons entirely avoids addressing and confronting the 
politics of the state and those of the debate itself. Thus, it neglects the (analytical, practical 
and political) necessity to engage with the social forces and processes shaping the capitalist 
state, the role of the state itself and its action as locus and object of class struggle, and the 
potential for the state as basis for the development of an anti-capitalist politics and practice. 
These are significant issues, whose neglect undermines Hardt and Negri’s own analysis of, and 
commitment to, economic democracy.97 Furthermore, while others (see, for example: 
Caffentzis, 2009, 2010; Mattei, 2011; Harvey, 2011; Harribey, 2011; and Fine, 2010a) have 
engaged critically with Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) work (co-winner in 2009 of the Nobel Memorial 
Prize in Economic Sciences for her contributions on community self-management of common-
pool resources), Hardt and Negri do not acknowledge, discuss, nor critique it, failing to qualify 
post-operaismo’s political project with respect to (oddly similar) mainstream (neo)liberal 
visions of community self-management (often a rhetorical device allowing for deeper 
neoliberal restructuring in practice).98 Ironically, while Negri’s (2003) review of Vercellone, 
2003 prospected that ‘economic science will have to open up to political science, that is ... give 
in to political praxis’ (p.204), both the award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Elinor Ostrom 
– a political scientist – and her work’s firm attachment to methodological individualism are 
exemplary of exactly the opposite tendency, as part and parcel, and a token example, of 
economics imperialism (on which see below) (Fine, 2010a).99 
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 See Cumbers, 2012, ch.6 for a critical account of the rise of the discourse on the commons in the 
context of debates on an alternative (and anti-capitalist) globalisation agenda. 
98
 See, for example, Caffentzis, 2009 and 2010 for critical assessment of Ostrom’s work, and recognition 
of the ambivalent character of the commons and their compatibility with capitalism. 
99
 Recently, Lucarelli and Vercellone (2011) have attempted to salvage Hardt and Negri from this kind of 
critique. Thus, they have clarified that the post-workerist ‘approach to the notion of common is based 
on a critique of the naturalistic approach typical of the economic theory of common goods, inspired by 
the work of Elinor Omstrom [sic]’. Therefore, within post-workerism, ‘the common’ is defined ‘as the 
potential of expanding social cooperation which attends the paradigmatic transformation of productive 
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More generally, Commonwealth (Hardt, Negri, 2009) also draws directly on other concepts 
from mainstream economics. Possibly related to the assonance and apparent resonance of the 
concepts of social capital and externalities with post-operaismo’s (and Negri’s) claims of the 
subsumption of the whole of social life by capitalism and of capitalist exploitation as external 
to labour’s autonomous social cooperation, and possibly mediated through the relevance 
attributed to them in Moulier Boutang’s (2008) and Gorz’s (2003) accounts of cognitive 
capitalism,100 these concepts from mainstream economics are arbitrarily superimposed on the 
post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism, rather than purposefully deployed 
analytically. Erroneously presented as if uncontested and unanimously accepted by all 
economists (with Hardt, Negri, 2009 only cursorily mentioning some ‘contemporary heterodox 
economists’ in footnote 37, p. 419, but with no explanation of what their heterodoxy consists), 
externalities and market failure are introduced in the post-operaista system without 
acknowledgement or discussion of their origin in methodological individualism and the 
mathematical apparatus of microeconomics, neglecting whether their use might constrain, let 
alone skew, analysis. This is particularly striking, given that it directly contradicts Hardt and 
                                                                                                                                               
forces and the prominence of new forms of labour in contemporary capitalism’, ‘such as the increasingly 
socialized production of knowledge. Consequently the common is not relegated to specific common 
goods such as water, for example. Conversely the naturalistic approach leads to a subordinate position 
that is not able to overcome the public-private dichotomy. In Toni Negri’s recent writings, the common 
refers to a form of socialization that breaks down the former divisions between work and life, between 
production and reproduction, and between material and immaterial’ (p.79, footnote 4). However, this 
clarification fails to rectify Hardt and Negri’s lack of engagement with the political and analytical issues 
at hand. Firstly, the extent to which the post-workerist take on the common functions as a critique ‘of 
the naturalistic approach typical of the economic theory of common goods’ (p.79, footnote 4) is not 
clear, not least given that: a) this critique has not (thus far) been developed systematically and with 
specific reference to the features of Ostrom’s work and the debate on the commons itself; b) the post-
workerist belief in the "indomitable" character of knowledge (which cannot be commodified or 
separated from the minds of workers) and ‘the cooperative aspect of immaterial labor’, which would 
not be ‘imposed or organized from the outside, as … in previous forms of labor, but rather ... completely 
immanent to the laboring activity itself’ (Hardt, Negri, 2000, p.294) betray ... a naturalistic conception of 
knowledge and labour if there ever was one! Secondly, the justification that the two debates have 
different objects or, rather, take place at different levels of philosophical analysis, so to speak, is poor. 
Indeed, it does not resolve that the exact meaning and relevance of overcoming ‘the public-private 
dichotomy’ (Lucarelli, Vercellone, 2011, p.79, footnote 4) need to be explained with respect to the 
practical implications and repercussions of such a political prospect (for it not to remain a merely 
voluntaristic, or even angelic, plea). This need is especially pressing, given the amenability of the 
commons to capitalist capture and incorporation within neoliberal rhetoric, scholarship and policy in 
practice, and it is telling that an autonomist (though not post-workerist) Marxist such as George 
Caffentzis (2009, 2010) has attempted to provide an answer to it by addressing these very issues. 
Furthermore, Lucarelli and Vercellone's justification does not elide the fact that Hardt and Negri's 
intervention on “the common” follows from their peculiar mobilisation of categories from mainstream 
economics (externalities and market failure) and social theory (social capital) without any real 
consideration of their meaning, history and significance within economics itself, nor consideration of the 
(lack of) coherence of integrating these categories within the post-workerist reading of contemporary 
capitalism (see next paragraph). 
100
 With respect to externalities (not least in the context of “cognitive” production), Hardt and Negri’s 
Commonwealth (2009) provides direct references to Moulier Boutang, 2008 and Vercellone, 2003 and 
2006a (see Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.406, footnote 16; p.409, footnote 59; p.417, footnote 16). 
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Negri’s own (albeit cursory) mention and rejection of the ‘methodological individualism of the 
Chicago School’ as insufficient to account for ‘biopolitical existence’, even if associated with 
‘new concepts like human capital and cognitive capital’, in Multitude (Hardt, Negri, 2004, 
p.157). Furthermore, despite the marxisant use of the expression social capital in Empire 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000, pp.304-307 and 403), Hardt and Negri do not acknowledge, let alone 
explain, the semantic shift implicit in their use of the expression in Commonwealth (Hardt, 
Negri, 2009), the polysemy of the expression itself, nor the implications of adopting one 
meaning of the concept over others. Last but not least, social capital, externalities, and market 
failure are, each in their own way, key illustrations of economics imperialism, the restricted 
and restrictive incorporation of the social within economic theory (for economics imperialism, 
see Fine, Milonakis, 2009; for social capital, see Fine, 2001 and 2010b). To base analysis on 
either concept comes at great costs in terms of both what is left out and what is incorporated 
in piecemeal fashion. Furthermore, with both concepts having gained prominence in World 
Bank rhetoric, scholarship, and policy in practice in the guise of the Post-Washington 
Consensus and Good Governance Agenda (see Fine, 2001, especially ch.8; Fine, 2006b; Jomo, 
Fine, 2006), externalities and social capital have been instrumental in sustaining and pushing 
forward the latest phase of neoliberalism (Fine, 2010b; Saad-Filho, Johnston, 2005; Saad-Filho, 
2005). 
However, these concepts are mobilised by Hardt and Negri and post-workerism irrespective of 
their own specific meaning and use in economics, and without engagement with, or critique 
of, the vast and ever-expanding literature regarding them. Therefore, being mobilised without 
definitional accuracy, and through a complete misreading of economic theory, its history, the 
current economic crisis and the crisis of economics within it, externalities and social capital are 
inserted in the theoretical system of post-operaismo in a manner that is casual and selective at 
best. Similar to, and consistent with, the typically post-workerist hollow coinage and use of 
concepts, their function is not analytical but merely rhetorical. Confirming the identification of 
Hardt and Negri’s theory as postmodern left-liberalism (Cremin, Roberts, 2011), this turn 
reveals the internal exhaustion of post-workerism and its theory of contemporary capitalism: 
having rejected value theory and neglected political economy through postmodernism, 
privileging subjectivity and a politics of cultural resistance (Cremin, Roberts, 2011), post-
operaismo is left without bearing and grounding in the material processes structuring social, 
political and economic life. With the latter and political economy powerfully reclaiming the 
scene with a vengeance as a result of the current crisis, post-workerism, having nothing left 
within its research and political programmes to address the economic, finds nowhere to go but 
to seek explanation externally, forcibly summoning economics to its help. Thus, having 
115 
 
adopted the rhetoric of mainstream business discourses and economics, post-workerism finds 
nothing else to offer but a political rhetoric and project which, with its misconstrual of the 
state, the market and civil society as separate entities, and its focus on externalities, social 
capital and market failure as explanatory principles, mimics the Post-Washington Consensus 
and Good Governance Agenda (albeit in populist guise). Having departed from Marxian 
political economy, post-workerism comes full circle: the debasement of the proposal of the 
original operaismo is complete, and the standpoint of labour lost. 
2.6) Conclusion 
 
This chapter has put forward an assessment of the immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism 
debates, where the latter has been presented as completing and complementing the former in 
building the socio-economic foundation of a post-workerist theory of contemporary 
capitalism. Expanding on this interpretative key, the post-workerist aim of providing a radical 
understanding of the KBE, the concomitant post-workerist portrayal of capitalism as suspended 
(that is, surviving in form and appearance, yet undermined in practice and content by its very 
own workings and modality of operations), and the subsequent post-workerist advocacy for a 
rethinking of political economy along “biopolitical” lines have all been subject to close scrutiny. 
In the process, emphasis has been placed on the apparently paradoxical nature of a theory 
claiming attachment and commitment to Marx’s method and analysis as point of departure, 
but, eventually, coming to propose the use of categories drawn from mainstream economics 
to understand, and account for, the presumed centrality of “biopolitical production” in 
contemporary capitalism. However, this chapter has also demonstrated how post-workerism 
provides a flawed account of capitalism, its functioning and dynamics. Furthermore, the 
chapter has also shown how post-workerism misunderstands and erroneously dismisses 
Marx’s value theory, while at the same time progressively reducing its own socio-economic 
and political analysis to the successive strategic elaboration of social figures and political 
subjects which, despite partial (or, more often, tenuous, if not imaginary) links with the 
working class and its condition, reality and behaviour, are understood as transcendental actors 
with respect to capitalism. Last but not least, this chapter has demonstrated how the post-
workerist political project, reframed by Hardt and Negri as the prospect of “the common”, is 
ambiguously similar, if not outright subaltern, to neoliberalism, not least because of its shallow 
and rhetorical (as opposed to analytically purposeful) mobilisation of categories from 
mainstream economics. 
Thus, that the closing of Hardt and Negri’s trilogy reaches the grotesque endpoint of a 
rhetorical turn to mainstream economics simultaneously with the completion of the socio-
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economic foundation of the post-workerist theory of contemporary capitalism is neither 
coincidental nor fortuitous. Indeed, although parading as an attempt to revive political 
economy in the footsteps of Marx’s method and up to the task of responding to the theoretical 
and practical challenges posed by the putative emergence of the KBE, all the post-workerist 
conceptual “innovations” are, in fact, as many steps back with respect to the theoretical 
advances established by Marx’s value theory and (critique of) political economy in the systemic 
understanding of capitalism. Thus, on the one hand, the attempt to innovate Marxian political 
economy through hybridising it with postmodernism ultimately left post-workerism bereft of 
the appropriate analytical categories and conceptual tools to understand the economic; on the 
other hand, the inescapable necessity to address the latter, both in general and in the burst 
and context of the current crisis, ultimately led post-workerism to seek support from the 
discipline and toolbox of economics, even if only rhetorically. However, this shift from (the 
attempt to correct Marx through) postmodernism to the tools of mainstream economics has 
nothing of the extraordinary; rather, it is exemplary of how, neither here nor there, post-
workerism remains caught between (the memory of) its “glorious” past and its current political 
ineffectiveness. Therefore, the paradoxical nature of post-workerism is easily resolved, and its 
ambiguities dispelled. Indeed, and despite the post-workerist prognosis for capitalism, it is not 
the latter that is suspended, but post-workerism itself: suspended from the processes shaping 
and structuring the functioning of capitalism, and the purposeful understanding of these that 
can be reached through correct application of the tools, concepts and analytical categories of 
Marxian political economy; suspended from its own origins in labour process analysis, the 
original Italian operaismo of the 1960s, and the reality of labour and the working class; and, 
ultimately and despite much radical posturing, suspended from the political project of Marxist 
political economy itself. Although parading as an attempt to revive all of these, post-workerism 
undermines them through the development of its own analysis. In conclusion, rather than 
producing an understanding of the relations between knowledge and the economy that is 
superior to that reachable through purposeful deployment of Marxian categories, post-
workerism produces ignorance of Marxian political economy itself. However, while the 
declining trajectory of post-workerism stands testimony to the unavoidable necessity for social 
theory to address and confront the economic, it also highlights the necessity of developing an 
understanding of knowledge, information and new technology rigorously committed to 
Marxian value theory.  
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Chapter 3 – Between the “Domestication” of Work and 
“Prosumption”: Whither (Post-) Operaismo Beyond Hardt and 
Negri?101 
 
3.1) Introduction 
 
Historically, each new wave of technological change and innovation has come equipped with 
its own rhetoric of path-breaking epochal transformation. Although differently positioned 
along the spectrum running from techno-utopianism to techno-pessimism, commentaries on 
the social effects of technology usually converge on highlighting the unprecedented nature of 
the changes brought about by the new technology at hand, and their radical break with the 
situation preceding them. In this respect, the advent of the networked personal computer has 
not been any less conducive to speculation than previous instances and waves of technological 
change. Indeed, given its character of general purpose machine, the networked personal 
computer has attracted attention for its ability to function simultaneously as means of 
production, communication, and consumption. Thus, its widespread diffusion has prompted 
enthusiastic analyses of its capacity to renegotiate the boundaries between production, 
consumption, and social reproduction. Furthermore, this has been understood as entailing the 
renegotiation of the boundaries between work and home, public and private, and so on. In 
particular, two trends have attracted attention and received emphasis: firstly, the capacity of 
networked computers to allow for the “domestication” of work,102 (that is, the performance of 
work from home – or elsewhere, but always away from the office or workplace – aided and 
mediated by ICTs) and the latter’s effects on the structure of employment; secondly, the 
capacity of networked computers to give a new impetus to the processes of “prosumption” 
(that is, the creation of goods and services for consumption, produced by consumers 
themselves).103 While reflections on these concepts and processes originate in business-
oriented writing, attaching to them the promise of a cleaner, cosier, toil-free and brighter 
future in which the functions of the brain replace those of brawn (see Toffler, 1980 for a 
classical example), radical scholarship and debates have taken them up recently to identify 
new forms of exploitation. This chapter deals with the way in which these concepts and 
processes function as cornerstone of the analyses of contemporary capitalism provided by 
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 All direct translation from Italian and French are my own. Emphasis in quotes is always in the original 
unless otherwise specified. 
102
 This has also been referred to as “teleworking”, “distance working”, “remote working”, “home-based 
telework”, or “telecommuting”. Similar discussions have concentrated on “nomadic work” and the 
“electronic cottage”. See Toffler, 1980 for an enthusiastic account, and Maldonado, 1997 and Huws, 
2003 for reviews and critical assessments of earlier debates on the topic. 
103
 This is also sometimes referred to as “produsage” (Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b; Ritzer et al., 2012). 
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Sergio Bologna (Bologna, 2007; Bologna, Banfi, 2011) and Carlo Formenti (2011). These 
authors are post-workerist critics of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) and of the Negrian 
consensus that has gathered around them in the wake of the debates on immaterial labour 
and cognitive capitalism, and they have focused their critical reflection around, respectively, 
the implications of the domestication of work for the structure of employment and the 
processes of class recomposition, and the socio-economic dynamics of the internet and their 
implications for contemporary capitalism (not least in relation to the processes of class 
recomposition themselves). 
Indeed, over four decades of neoliberalism and the coeval crisis of influence of Marxism, 
Italian post-operaismo has gained prominence at the turn of the century through the work of 
Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) and the concomitant rise of Italian Theory in Anglo-
American academia.104 Thus, it has become one of the most debated reconceptualisations of 
contemporary capitalism. Indeed, Hardt and Negri’s trilogy (Hardt, Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009) 
has been extremely influential in recasting and popularising the conceptual apparatus 
developed over the last forty years by Italian post-workerist autonomist Marxism in its 
encounter with French post-structuralism. With the socio-economic foundation of its political 
philosophy resting on the concept of immaterial labour (Camfield, 2007), now completed and 
complemented by the debate on, and conceptualisation of contemporary capitalism as, 
cognitive capitalism (Toscano 2007; Vercellone 2007a) (as discussed in the second chapter of 
this thesis), Hardt and Negri’s post-operaismo has come to be perceived within Anglo-
American radical scholarship and activism as the radical political economy of the KBE. 
Furthermore, this enthusiastic reception is too often based on, and itself a vehicle for, a 
reading emphasising continuity both within and between operaismo and post-operaismo 
under the organising principle of autonomism,105 implicitly identifying Negri’s post-operaismo 
(and the theoretical work associated with the phase of autonomia) as the only logical and 
legitimate inheritor of the original Italian operaismo,106 and retrospectively attributing his 
positions (as if by osmosis) to the whole paradigm.107 The workings of the publishing world also 
played an important part in shaping and reinforcing this “continuist” reception, giving it the 
character of a Negrian consensus: as the success of Empire (Hardt, Negri, 2000) in the 
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 Once primarily considered a ‘footnote’ to French post-structuralism (Wright, 2007, p.270), 
contemporary Italian political philosophy has come recently to the fore in Anglo-American debates 
relabelled as “Italian Theory” (see Pasquinelli, 2011 and Gentili, 2012 for positive accounts). 
105
 See, for example: Dyer-Witheford, 1994, 1999; Cleaver, 2000 [1979]. 
106
 Which, according to Tronti (2009, p.7), spans from the birth of the journal Quaderni Rossi in 1961 to 
the death of the journal Classe Operaia in 1967. 
107
 Wright’s (2002) careful history of Italian operaismo and his mapping of its intellectual legacy in 
Wright, 2007 and 2008b, stand out as notable exceptions, soliciting praise in Italy in: Bologna, 2007 
(Sulla storia dell’operaismo, pp.244-257); Gambino, 2008; and Bellofiore, Tomba, 2008. 
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Anglophone world spurred a wave of translations and reprints of Negri’s earlier works,108 
together with the translation of like-minded post-workerist literature,109 other currents and 
leading lights of operaismo did not receive similar attention. Thus, key texts of the original 
operaismo of the 1960s such as those of two of its founding fathers (Raniero Panzieri and 
Mario Tronti), although published in Italy as books,110 remain available in English only as a 
handful of old journal articles and book chapters.111 These two tendencies have acted as 
parallel forces, allowing the “continuist” reception of operaismo to gloss over important 
differences between the three main phases of operaismo (each under the intellectual guidance 
of, respectively, Raniero Panzieri, Mario Tronti, and Antonio Negri), not least those related to 
their interpretation and acceptance of Marx’s value theory and their conception of political 
strategy. 
However, albeit lively and energetic, this “continuist” reception is problematic for its neglect 
of, and abstraction from, the history and development of (post-)operaismo within the 
dynamics of Italian Marxism, society and politics, as well as its own internal theoretical 
developments and rifts.112 Accordingly, it is interesting to assess the recent work of Sergio 
Bologna (Bologna, 2007; Bologna, Banfi, 2011) and Carlo Formenti (2011), thus far unavailable 
in English, for two reasons. Firstly, while the former provides an account of independent work 
and its role within post-Fordism and the latter assesses the debates on the socio-economics of 
the internet, their work provides post-workerist dissenting alternatives to the Negrian 
consensus with respect to the features, dynamics, and conceptual tools identified as central to 
contemporary capitalism. Thus, it disputes the Negrian consensus’ claim to fame and reception 
as the (only) radical (post-workerist) political economy of the KBE, while extending the purview 
of post-workerism to new areas and popular topics at the heart of the debates on the KBE 
itself.113 Indeed, while Bologna draws on the German sociological debates on intellectual work 
and self-employment taking place during the Weimar Republic to analyse independent work, 
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 The list is too long to include here, but a simple search on any online bookstore suffices to prove the 
point. 
109
 See for instance Marazzi, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; Fumagalli, Mezzadra 2010; Roggero, 2011. 
110
 Panzieri, 1976a; Tronti, 2006 [1966, 1971]. 
111
 Panzieri, 1976b, 1980; Tronti, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1979a, 1979b. 
112
 Historically-grounded accounts running in the opposite direction include: Corradi, 2011b; Turchetto, 
2008; Tronti, 2009; and Wright, 2002. 
113
 For instance, Bologna’s reflections and analysis intersect and overlap with the debates on the 
putatively ongoing new processes of class formation within contemporary capitalism, especially in 
relation to new technological developments and recent changes in contemporary labour markets (for 
different accounts, see: Huws, 2003, ch.10; Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b; Standing, 2011). Similarly, Formenti’s 
reflections review, cover and assess many popular accounts of the politics and socio-economics of the 
internet, not least by siding with the McLuhanite sceptical readings of the latter against the readings of 
those celebrating them as emancipatory (for the division of this literature in the two camps of 
“celebrants” and “sceptics”, see McChesney, 2013). 
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and Formenti draws on Marx and McLuhan(ism) to denounce the convergence of neoliberal 
and autonomist accounts of the KBE, both propose a reading of the latter which debunks the 
proclamations of a new organisation of capitalism (or altogether new mode of production) 
characterised by greater freedom and autonomy for workers, typical of post-workerism and 
the Negrian consensus. Secondly, their work problematises and challenges the Anglo-American 
“continuist” reading of Italian (post-)operaismo, with the resurgence of the critique of Negri of 
old protagonists (Bologna and Formenti), influenced by their workerist roots and openly critical 
of the Negrian consensus. The persistence and renewal of critiques of Negri should not come 
as a surprise, however muted and unrecognised these may have been: indeed, Bologna and 
Formenti share a similar position within the history of (post-)operaismo, with both 
instrumental at one phase or another in pushing it forward,114 but later coming to dissent from 
Negri and the politics of autonomia.115 
Nonetheless, and whatever the reader’s possible greater sympathy towards these authors (as 
opposed to the Negrian consensus), the search for an operaismo of our times in the work of 
these post-workerist dissenters will be frustrated. Indeed, although showing variety in the 
interpretation of the fundamental dynamics of contemporary capitalism within post-workerist 
reflection, and providing scathing and sometimes penetrating critiques of the Negrian 
consensus, this post-workerist dissent also displays striking similarities with the latter’s core 
features. Thus, not only Bologna and Formenti fail to move beyond the analyses of Hardt and 
Negri and the Negrian consensus guiding the cognitive capitalism debate, but their work is 
equally exemplary of the state of suspension that the previous chapter has identified for post-
workerism (not least in relation to the debates on immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism). 
Indeed, although aiming to provide a radical and critical account of contemporary capitalism 
rooted in Marxist political economy and, de facto, attempting to provide an alternative to the 
Negrian consensus more in line with the heritage of the original Italian operaismo of the 1960s, 
the very development of Bologna and Formenti’s analyses undermines their own analytical 
and political ambitions. This is nowhere as evident as in the ultimate reduction of their analysis 
to the search for an actor of social change no less spasmodic than that of the Negrian 
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 Bologna coined the key operaista concept of mass worker (operaio massa) (Bologna, 2007) – but see 
Turchetto, 2008, p.288, which, relying on Palano, attributes paternity to Alquati, 1962. Formenti was 
one of the founders, with the Gruppo Gramsci, of the journal Rosso, one of the main references for 
Autonomia Operaia (Formenti, 1999-2000). 
115
 Bologna dissented from Negri over the abandonment of the concept of mass worker in favour of that 
of social worker (operaio sociale) – a shift he saw as Negri’s theoretical sleight of hand to bypass the 
political difficulties and organisational failures of the former – and left Potere Operaio because of the 
organisation’s ambiguous flirting with violent action. Similarly, Formenti retreated from active militancy 
out of dissent with the vanguardist turn within the autonomia movement and the consequent 
militarisation of conflict. For personal accounts, see Bologna, 2001 and Formenti, 1999-2000. On 
Bologna’s break with Negri, see also Wright, 2002, pp.170-171, 175. 
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consensus, which, despite a professed radical commitment to the interests of labour, has the 
effect of disqualifying the experience of most of the working class itself. While sections 3.2 and 
3.3 of this chapter review the recent work and intellectual trajectory of, respectively, Bologna 
and Formenti, section 3.4 addresses the issue of whether and why this post-workerist dissent 
is unfit to revive an operaismo of our times, focusing on the immanent contradictions leading it 
to reproduce similar shortcomings to those of the analysis proposed within the Negrian 
consensus. 
3.2) The point is to change it: Bologna’s eleventh thesis. 
 
Bologna’s recent intellectual and political efforts and writing centre around second generation 
autonomous work (lavoro autonomo di seconda generazione),116 a concept he coined to 
describe self-employed and freelance workers falling out of both traditional own-account work 
(first generation autonomous work) in agriculture, commerce and craftsmanship, and 
professions certified and protected by Registers (Bologna, Fumagalli, 1997; Bologna, 2007, 
pp.35-36, 127-128, 159-163). Drawing from his own experience as a freelance consultant in the 
logistics sector – an occupation Bologna had to “invent” for himself in the early 1980s, as his 
life as an academic came to a halt for political reasons (Bologna, 2007, Competenze e poteri, 
pp.137-155) – Bologna’s books pick up the thread of his landmark contribution to the Italian 
debate on post-Fordism (Bologna, Fumagalli, 1997). The latter laid the foundations of 
Bologna’s political economy of second generation autonomous work by tracing the 
characteristics, modalities, and conditions of existence distinguishing it as a precise social 
figure (Bologna, 1997a). In doing so, Bologna tracked the conceptualisations of self-
employment and their legacy from the early sociological debates of the Weimar Republic on 
intellectual work, all the way to the recent expansion of own-account within post-Fordism, 
with special emphasis on the apogee and decline of Fordism (and the culture of work attached 
to it), the refusal of work of the (Italian and German) post-1968 generations and social 
movements, and the neglect of second generation autonomous work in the economic 
sociology of the industrial districts and Third Italy (consequently charged of proposing a one-
sidedly positive account of post-Fordism and its dynamics) (Bologna, 1997b). With a nod to 
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach and Bologna’s own ‘eleventh thesis’ on second 
generation autonomous work (Bologna, 2007, L’undicesima tesi, pp.55-107), the title of the 
current section of this chapter summarises Bologna’s trajectory of the last fifteen years, which 
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 It must be emphasised here how, by contrast with the extremely abstract conception of the 
autonomy of labour put forward by Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), in this context “autonomous 
work” refers to a specific juridical figure (lavoro autonomo), regulated in the Italian Civil Code (Codice 
Civile, Libro Quinto, Titolo IIII) and equivalent to self-employment (i.e. a concrete sector of the labour 
market). 
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can be outlined as follows: conceptualisation of the nature and condition of second generation 
autonomous work through ten theses;117 analysis of the consequences of a changing 
economic, political, institutional, and socio-cultural landscape for second generation 
autonomous work and its growing self-awareness (Bologna, 2007, especially, though not 
exclusively, L’undicesima tesi, pp.55-107); and analysis of constraints and opportunities faced 
by second generation autonomous work in the processes of self-protection, representation of 
its own interests, and coalition-building (Bologna, Banfi, 2011).118 The thrust of this analysis 
provides scepticism on, and an alternative to, the “novelty” announced by both the apologists 
of the KBE and the theorists of immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism.119 Indeed, Bologna 
is critical of the ‘usage of the term “knowledge worker” as an all-embracing’ category, ‘applied 
indiscriminately to all activities entailing cognitive work’, because of its unhelpfulness ‘to 
understand the profound differentiation of the labour market and the real transformations’ 
occurring within it (Bologna, 2007, p.128). On the other hand, he deems the categories of 
multitude and exodus ‘too generic’ and potentially homogenising (p.242),120 and the theories 
of immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism as prone to obscuring the ‘materiality’ of labour 
within a globalisation merging elements of Fordism and post-Fordism (p.91). 
In line with his workerist roots, Bologna’s analysis begins by reassessing workplace dynamics 
from the standpoint of labour. Seen from this perspective, post-Fordism thrives on combining 
stable and precarious employment, aggravating the differences between competing 
components of a segmented labour force (Bologna, 2007, pp.15-16).121 Thus, rather than just 
bad managerial practice, Bologna sees labour contract flexibility and its pervasiveness as 
acquiring a structural status and role within post-Fordism comparable to that of the scientific 
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 Bologna, 1997a identifies ten parameters to conceptualise own-account work (lavoro autonomo) and 
distinguish it from traditional employment: content, perception of space, perception of time, 
professional identity, form of compensation, necessary resources for access to autonomy, necessary 
resources for maintaining autonomy, market conditions, organisation and representation of its interests, 
and citizenship rights. 
118
 Processes which see Bologna and his co-author Banfi, also a freelance consultant, strongly involved 
through active militancy in the Associazione Consulenti Terziario Avanzato, http://www.actainrete.it 
(last accessed on the 9
th
 of August 2013). 
119
 That Bologna’s formulations represent a dissenting alternative to Hardt and Negri’s theory of 
immaterial labour has been recognised (more or less explicitly) by historians of (post-)operaismo. For 
example, Cuninghame (2000, p.98) explicitly presents Bologna’s ‘self-employed “autonomous worker” 
as an alternative to Negri’s “immaterial worker” as the new social subject of this era’. 
120
 ‘By exodus’ Hardt and Negri mean ‘a process of subtraction from the relationship with capital by 
means of actualizing the potential autonomy of labor-power’. Thus, for Hardt and Negri, ‘[e]xodus is ... 
not a refusal of the productivity of biopolitical labor-power but rather a refusal of the increasingly 
restrictive fetters placed on its productive capacities by capital’ (Hardt, Negri, 2009, p.152). 
121
 In this respect, Bologna’s account echoes common understandings of precarious employment 
relations as the ‘product of labour market changes over the last four decades’. However, these have 
been a ‘pervasive feature of labour markets in developed countries since the first industrial revolution, 
apart from a brief interregnum’ in the thirty years following the Second World War (Quinlan, 2012, 
p.19). 
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organisation of labour under Taylorism (p.13), with the intention of eradicating from the 
workplace the material and ideal conditions for coalition-building. Therefore, for Bologna post-
Fordism is not, and cannot be, a regime of generalised precarity or flexibility, as that would 
reconstitute, albeit on different bases, the grounds for unity of the working class (pp.15-16) (as 
if this were sufficient to equip workers with the capacity and the material conditions for 
organising effectively, as opposed to something which cannot be determined or understood in 
isolation from the broader dynamics and categories of capitalism). However, having recognised 
the end of the workplace as terrain of solidarity, Bologna deems futile, if not damaging, the 
attempts to re-enact old coalition-building attitudes, habits, and practices which he sees fit for 
Fordist times (p.15). Indeed, for Bologna post-Fordist contractual flexibility is not produced 
exclusively by capitalist restructuring, but also deliberately pursued by workers to safeguard 
their own autonomy and independence, and reconcile working life with care activities. Thus, 
post-Fordism would result from both capital restructuring and the active refusal of work, and 
the renewal of coalition-building practices and processes cannot but move beyond demonising 
assessments of contemporary forms of work (pp.30-31). 
Indeed, for Bologna, ‘purely pessimistic’ accounts of post-Fordism romanticise stable 
employment and an impossible return to Fordism, obscuring two important processes 
affecting the desirability of such a return. Firstly, the shift from the ‘entrepreneurial mentality’ 
typical of Fordism (aiming to foster and preserve know-how and skills) to the ‘financial 
mentality’ typical of post-Fordism (prioritising short-term flexible objectives) has negatively 
affected human resource management, favouring the degradation of work within complex 
organisations (pp.166-167). This has exerted effects both in ‘absolute’ (length of working time) 
and ‘relative’ (workload per worker) terms, ‘especially for “white collar” tasks requiring specific 
competences’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.24 and, in greater detail, ch.3). Secondly, the 
introduction and rapid diffusion of ICTs has allowed the birth of new professional figures and a 
more direct access to the market for individuals,122 encouraging and supporting the 
‘autonomous’ or ‘semi-autonomous work of those offering external services to firms’ (Bologna, 
2007, p.159) and the ‘domestication’ of work (p.126). For Bologna these two processes 
mutually strengthened and supported one another in shaping and determining the material 
and mental universe of the middle class within post-Fordism, both in the heyday of the new 
economy, when it was hailed as the new hegemonic class, and in the prolonged aftermath of 
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 Bologna, nonetheless, also points out how a presumed indiscriminate access to these has contributed 
to the myth of the knowledge worker, neglecting how direct access for individuals to markets and the 
symbolic language of computers presupposes, respectively, access to good quality higher and secondary 
education, a prerogative of ‘only a part of the population’, especially in the current context of increasing 
costs and polarised quality of provision (Bologna, 2007, p.97-98). 
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the dot-com bubble, where the crisis and decomposition of the middle class have taken the 
form of the ‘deterioration and marginalisation of human capital’ (p.48). 
Thus, to reconceptualise and renew coalition-building practices and processes within post-
Fordism, Bologna proposes ‘second generation autonomous workers’ as ‘best candidates for’ 
re-founding ‘society on new and more humane bases’ (Bologna, 2007, p.70). In outlining the 
characteristics of this social figure in 1997 (Bologna, Fumagalli, 1997), Bologna’s ‘intent’ was 
the same inspiring him to elaborate the concept of the mass worker: that of creating ‘a 
symbolical universe around a way of organising productive labour having characteristics of 
“typicality” for a specific historical epoch’, with both social figures encompassing ‘the coercive 
character of a specific organisation of capital’ and the emancipatory potential ‘intrinsic to 
certain values of which’ they ‘are bearers’, respectively egalitarianism and self-determination 
(Bologna, 2007, p.35).123 However, according to Bologna, for second generation autonomous 
work to be an appropriate unit for analysis, active labour market policies and coalition-building 
practices, two important misconceptions require rectification. Firstly, the assumption that 
second generation autonomous work can be conceptualised as an ordinary business is 
incorrect and misses a fundamental analytical distinction characterising the firm: ownership, 
management and waged labour are distinct social roles and, while the first two can overlap, 
the separation of ownership and labour is fundamental for an organisation to qualify 
analytically as a firm. Second generation autonomous work, on the other hand, draws its 
specificity from the conflation of these roles into a single social figure, a condition which is 
constitutive of both the risks and the opportunities of independent work (pp.63-64). Thus, for 
Bologna, the assimilation of second generation autonomous work to a “business” as opposed 
to “independent work” amounts to a mystifying ideological operation, forcibly incorporating 
‘the activity of autonomous work in the symbolic and cultural sphere of the capitalist firm 
instead of that of work’ (p.65). Consequently, active labour market policies aiming to promote 
and assist second generation autonomous work following the methodologies and prescriptions 
of business schools are seen by Bologna as failing to address the motivations and needs of 
own-account workers. Secondly, Bologna deplores that new forms of work within post-
Fordism are generally understood as atypical employment, a ‘mental scheme’ which, in his 
opinion, frames contemporary forms of labour as deviations from the ‘archetype’ of the 
indefinite duration contract of employment, and consequently leads researchers to ‘neglect’ 
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 Bologna clearly and cautiously states that, in doing so, he never thought the mass worker and second 
generation autonomous work as exhaustive of, respectively, the entire working class and post-Fordist 
labour force (Bologna, 2007, p.35). Furthermore, he sees the second generation autonomous worker as 
‘a compromise figure’ which ‘will never overturn the system’ (p.36). Regardless of Bologna’s intentions, 
though, these figures have acquired a paradigmatic character of their own within operaismo and post-
operaismo. The reasons for this will be explained and discussed in section 3.4. 
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the theme of coalition-building (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.20). However, according to Bologna, 
this reading of post-Fordism is fallacious, as post-Fordist work is not distinguished by the ‘form 
of the contract’ but, rather, by the changing ‘legal nature’ of the employment relation 
(Bologna, 2007, p.161). For Bologna, post-Fordist employment relations, also due to the 
misconception of independent work as firm, are thought of as commercial relations between 
equal parties, both identified as enterprises, with the worker as external supplier receiving a 
service fee upon completion, as opposed to a wage at the end of the month (p.161). The 
reproduction of their labour force rests entirely on workers, as the nature of the contractual 
relation excludes them from both the wage relation and citizenship rights such as benefits, 
pension treatment, etc. (p.162). These conditions, coupled with the ideology of ‘total 
commitment to work’ characterising the middle class in the boom of the new economy (p.70) 
and the pervasiveness of ICTs allowing forms of ‘digital piecework’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, 
pp.181-184), have led to ‘the most significant phenomenon of post-Fordism, namely the 
lengthening of the social working day’ (Bologna, 2007, p.92). However, for Bologna this has 
received ‘scant or no attention’ from the ‘theorists of “immaterial labour”’, because of their 
characterisation of labour with respect to the features of the goods produced (immaterial as 
opposed to material) and simultaneous neglect of the ‘transformations of the salary form’ and 
‘compensation of independent work’ (p.92). 
By contrast with the theorists of immaterial labour, rather than characterising work and its 
changing status within contemporary capitalism after the “dematerialisation” of production, 
Bologna understands labour (together with its status and condition) with respect to its location 
within the productive cycle, and the objective and subjective elements shaping its material and 
mental universe. This endeavour has framed Bologna’s interest in the issues surrounding 
intellectual and ‘high professional content’ work since his involvement with the journal Classe 
Operaia (Bologna, 2007, p.108), combining his roots in operaismo with his deep knowledge of 
the Weimarian sociological debates on the middle class, intellectuals, self-employment, and 
knowledge workers (Bologna, 2007, I “lavoratori della conoscenza” dentro e fuori l’impresa, 
pp.108-136; Bologna, 1997b). Characterising the Kopfarbeiter (‘worker of the mind’, as 
opposed to Handarbeiter, ‘worker of the arm’, Bologna, 2007, p.111) as waged employee 
integrated within a corporate structure and, as such, ‘subject to the same discipline as the 
manual worker’ (p.111), the Weimarian sociological debates on knowledge workers provide 
Bologna with an antidote to contemporary discourses praising the latter for their 
independence, autonomy and greater participation to decision-making within decentralised 
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organisational structures.124 Indeed, as Bologna points out, knowledge workers within 
corporations are not necessarily creative and have very limited scope for innovation, as 
corporations foster creativity and innovation only within the limits of their organisational 
structure, culture, language, habits, etc. (p.101). Moreover, the concept of second generation 
autonomous work owes its greatest debt to the Weimar sociologist Emil Lederer (1882-1939). 
In his footsteps, Bologna deems ‘essential’, when analysing ‘new forms of work’ and ‘cognitive 
work’ in particular, to outline their socio-psychological habitus (sozial-psychischen Habitus, the 
constellation of ‘strongly subjective elements’ defining constraints, potentialities, mentality 
and anthropological status of distinct social figures, p.127; similarly, see Bologna, 1997b). 
Deploying Lederer’s method and conceptual apparatus allows Bologna to debunk ‘the common 
opinion’ about ‘“cognitive” labour’, namely that ‘its incidence on the overall labour force 
increases when applied research and technological innovation’ have greater bearing on the 
production process, or when ‘new tertiary functions’ (such as marketing and public relations) 
increase their weight within corporate organisations (Bologna, 2007, p.95). For Lederer, 
‘“cognitive” work’ and ‘knowledge workers’ increase when firms do not limit themselves to 
offering goods on the market but offer also ‘organisational procedures, formalised systems of 
relations, protocols’ (p.95), processes that Bologna recognises, for example, in the current 
expansion and centrality of supply chain management (pp.82-91, 95) and large-scale use of 
computers (p.95). Thus, according to Bologna, ‘second generation autonomous work is the 
true “cognitive” class’, because it sells to its customers ‘not only a specific competence’, but 
also ‘an organisation of work’ requiring ‘to associate knowledge of formalised procedures’ to 
inventiveness and ‘relational talents’ (pp.105-106). However, with computers being both a 
‘product saleable on the market’ and an ‘organisational system’, for Bologna the ‘knowledge 
worker’s “enslavement”’ becomes traceable to ‘the ubiquity of the work station’ (p.97), with 
significant consequences for the processes and practices of coalition-building. 
Indeed, as the mass worker is ‘inextricably linked’ to mass production technology and the 
conveyor belt, Bologna considers knowledge workers ‘inextricably linked to the laptop 
computer in its double function of instrument of elaboration-communication of thought 
and/or data’ and ‘organ of a specific organisation of labour … characterised by the ubiquity of 
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 Ironically, as argued in section 3.4, this antidote comes equipped with a “poisonous” Schumpeterian 
influence of its own. It is worthwhile noting here, albeit in passing, that the purposeful dialogue and 
debate with authors and traditions alien (if not opposed) to Marxism is a distinguishing feature of 
operaismo. While in the case under discussion this is exemplified by Bologna’s engagement with 
Weimarian sociology and the Schumpeterian echoes within it, another example is readily provided by 
Tronti’s engagement with the work and thought of Weber (see Farris, 2011 for an account). On a similar 
note, and not without a hint of malice, it can be suggested that Negri’s faith in the autonomy of the 
social, the commons, and their capacity for self-organisation (discussed in the second chapter of this 
thesis), resonates with Hayek’s catallaxy (for a discussion of which, for example, see Fleetwood, 1995). 
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the workplace’ and the ‘domestication of work’ (Bologna, 2007, pp.96-97). This inseparability 
(of the locus) of ‘modern work’ from the ‘personal computer’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.12) 
allows for virtual (as opposed, and in addition, to traditional) migration for intellectual (as 
opposed to manual) work, facilitates professional mobility in the form of transition from 
waged to own-account work (pp.10-11), and, ultimately, reshapes the ‘confines of mobility’ 
(p.11). This is important because, in Bologna’s opinion, besides working time and the 
organisation of work (especially with respect to the articulation of the working day and pace of 
work), the locus of work also influences the presence or absence of ‘dynamics of sociality’ 
(p.12), constituting and providing the material conditions for ‘the spontaneous creation of 
cohesion between people subject to the same disciplinary order’ (p.19). Indeed, as Bologna 
points out, in the tradition of the twentieth century workers’ movement solidarity and 
coalition-building arose from ‘within the workplace, among people carrying out the same 
tasks’, sharing ‘the same working hours’ and ‘salaries’ (Bologna, 2007, p.14). Similarly, 
coalitions were built and pursued through public meetings tied to a physical place (p.20). 
However, with the transformations of work described above, Bologna believes that, while the 
‘immediate sense of recognition’ between workers fades, it is also possible that workers 
develop a ‘mental and psychological attitude’ leading them to believe they acquire greater 
margins of freedom the more individual their path and individualistic their behaviour (Bologna, 
Banfi, 2011, p.19). Thus, for Bologna (and his co-author Banfi), If ‘loc[i] of work’ and ‘model[s] 
of civilisation’ are linked by ‘a genetic chain’ inevitably passing ‘through the stage of coalition’, 
the disappearance or radical change of a specific way of organising work calls for different 
processes and practices of coalition-building (p.20). Therefore, ‘a coalition of’ own-account 
‘knowledge workers’ must avoid the pitfalls and inadequacies of understanding second 
generation autonomous work as atypical work (p.20). However, for Bologna, the appeal of 
professionalism, the ‘ideology which created the bourgeois identity’ (p.21), is equally insidious: 
although still an attractive model for many unregistered professions (especially in the Italian 
context), influencing ‘associational models and mortgaging content and forms of coalition’, 
professionalism is ‘worn-out by time and ... the new organisation of knowledge work’ and, 
therefore, a false route leading to the creation of organisations dominated by ‘processes of 
exclusion’ and failing to address what Bologna posits as the ‘real needs of tutelage’ of second 
generation autonomous work (p.21, and, in greater detail, ch.2). 
However, Bologna (with his co-author Banfi) believes that embryonic alternative organisational 
models are emerging. ‘The idea of coalition’ that he sees as slowly developing in the ambit of 
‘own-account work with high specialist competences’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.26) differs 
significantly from the ‘“delegation of the representation of interests”’ (p.27) traditionally 
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characterising the relationship between workers and trade unions. Pervaded by the same 
desire of self-determination at the heart of the choice of self-employment and by a ‘“do-it-
yourself”’ attitude as ‘fundamental state of mind’ of independent work (p.28), in Bologna’s 
opinion, this ‘conception of coalition’ leads second generation autonomous workers to distrust 
delegation mechanisms and institutional negotiation structures (because of the traditional 
extraneousness of independent work to ‘the system of industrial relations’ and ‘labour law’), 
and to disbelieve hopes of public welfare provisions and assistance allowing maintenance in 
old age of ‘the social status acquired’ through ‘independent work’ (p.26). Trust is awarded 
exclusively to coalitions advancing demands directly related to one’s professional activity 
(which, for Bologna, partly explains the ‘persistence’ of wide support ‘to professional 
associations’ modelled along the lines of ‘medieval guilds’), and the fear of losing social status 
induces a conception of coalition as form of mutual help (p.27). Thus, for Bologna, coalition-
building develops framed by a loose sense of organisational belonging, a belief in organisations 
as service providers,125 and the uncertainty of compensation.126 
Furthermore, in Bologna’s opinion, understanding ‘the existential condition of freelance’ 
workers ‘in relation to their typical context’ and, therefore, locus of work from the standpoint 
of the ‘sense of sociality and perception of risk – the two main factors’ which Bologna 
identifies as leading to coalition-building – requires understanding the role of the internet as 
an instrument of knowledge sharing and ‘struggle in the social demand of a new space of 
encounter’ (pp.28-29). Indeed, for Bologna and Banfi, the ‘main risk’ for the self-employed 
resides in confirming their ‘know-how’ while ‘exposing’ their ‘knowledge to the continuous ... 
metamorphoses’ of productive activity, without the protection of ‘positional rents’ preserving 
‘the certainty of revenue’ (p.32). Thus, the internet and social networks provide shock 
absorbers, allowing second generation autonomous workers to tame risk through use of social 
networking websites for self-promotion to counteract ‘the precariousness of intermittent jobs’ 
(p.27), the possibility of strengthening existing knowledge and acquiring new knowledge 
outside the constraints of expert certification and professional orders, and the reduction of 
production costs through use of free, open, and sharable technologies and instruments (pp.32-
38). Furthermore, Bologna and Banfi believe that the internet and web 2.0 provide an 
environment where the weak ties constituting the ‘intrinsic weakness’ of this type of 
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 Although Bologna does not see these as ‘innate characteristics’ of a distinct social figure, but 
‘properties of’ the current ‘historical time’, in which ‘group identity’ is progressively consolidating 
(Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.27). 
126
 Since, as opposed to traditional employees, second generation autonomous workers are not faced by 
a wage acquiring an objective character through parameters set by national contracts and the possible 
existence of laws and regulation setting sectoral minimum wages; further, for Bologna, their 
compensation is highly subjective and largely dependent from their offer, ‘a market gesture’ which he 
understands as ‘“constitutive” of the relationship with the counterpart’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, pp.27-28). 
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organising can aggregate around ‘social collective issues’, gaining the necessary ‘“density” of 
communication’ and ‘exchanges’ (p.40) to allow for successful ‘web-based coalitions’ (for 
instance through communications overflow, fact checking, and ‘“blame & shame”’ tactics and 
campaigns, pp.41-42). 
However, Bologna and Banfi also wonder ‘whether the sedentary mobility of the internet 
combined with the solitary work of the freelance’ can generate ‘a need of sociality entirely 
different’ from that traditionally associated with wage employment. While they see the 
internet as the ‘new locus of knowledge work’ (p.21) and hotbed of new forms of coalition-
building practices and processes, they also see as a negative feature its tendency to become 
the ‘exclusive channel of sociality’ at the expense of the ‘“physicality”’ characterising past 
coalition-building processes (p.43). Indeed, for Bologna, the internet provides, at least initially, 
an accessible instrument for protest fit for the isolated individual (Bologna, 2007, p.19). 
Therefore, the expressions of rage, suffering and unease, and the accounts of experiences ‘not 
necessarily negative’ but framed and determined by ‘today’s peculiar mode of organisation’ of 
work (p.12) available on the blogosphere signal a nascent ‘assumption of identity’ (p.14), 
which Bologna posits as increasingly acquiring a ‘class character’ (p.19). Nonetheless, however 
powerful an instrument for identity assumption and coalition-building, the internet alone 
remains insufficient ‘to kick-start negotiation dynamics with the public powers’, and cannot 
substitute the visibility and ‘public dimension ... of protest’ (p.21). Thus, as this ‘new sense of 
group identity’ is forming, and exactly because ‘remote communication’ is ‘stripped-down’ of 
the energy transmittable through ‘proximity with other individuals’, Bologna and Banfi posit 
the importance of ‘relations of proximity’ as coming back to the fore as an ‘inescapable 
instrument of coalition’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.43). Thus, for Bologna and Banfi, the 
experiences (both libertarian and business-oriented) of spaces for coworking in Berlin, London, 
Paris and Milan (ch.8)127 signify a retreat of the idea that virtual remote communication 
through the internet suffices to build networks, and the re-emergence of ‘a need for physical 
contact’, human relations, and less individualistic instruments and practices to confront the 
workings of the market (p.227). They see this ‘desire of community’ as ‘independent work’ 
starting ‘to learn how to avoid’ the pitfalls structural to its condition (p.227), showing that it is 
in the relation of proximity that knowledge truly forms and that ‘specialist competencies 
represent a valuable asset’ (p.44). While ‘others’ (which the reader should not hesitate to 
identify with the adherents to the Negrian consensus) may read this desire of community as 
instantiation of the ‘“general intellect”’ (as indeed characteristic of the Negrian consensus – 
                                                 
127
 Coworking refers to the activity of own-account workers working independently from one another in 
shared working environments and, often (though not necessarily always), sharing common values (see, 
for instance, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-working, last accessed on the 9
th
 of August 2013). 
130 
 
see the second chapter of this thesis), ‘more modestly’, Bologna and Banfi identify it as the 
‘activity’ of several individuals ‘converging towards a new’ and collective ‘acquisition of 
thought’ (p.44). 
3.3) Against utopianism 2.0 
 
Different from Bologna’s construction, Formenti’s recent work has centred on providing ‘a 
contribution to the sociology of the web’ (Formenti, 2011, p.IX), especially through a trilogy 
analysing its anthropology, economics, and politics (respectively, Formenti, 2000, 2002, 2008). 
While the first volume of the trilogy outlined ‘elements of’ a ‘“cultural anthropology”’ of the 
internet through assessing ‘the impact of the new technological imaginaries on ordinary social 
relations, the world of work’, the culture of social movements, the mass-media system and 
‘new forms of artistic creativity’, the second focused on the ‘Net Economy’ (Formenti, 2008, 
p.IX). In the latter, Formenti suggested that, ‘despite the massive loss of contractual power’ 
affecting knowledge workers after the crisis of the new economy and the attempts of 
‘“normalisation”’ of the internet pursued by ‘western governments’ after ‘the attack on the 
Twin Towers’, significant room for manoeuvre remained for constituting a ‘“social bloc” 
founded on the convergence of cultural values and economic interests’ of the ‘social subjects 
(researchers, hackers, virtual communitarians, etc.)’ having guided and reaped the economic 
benefits of the ‘digital revolution’ and ‘internet entrepreneurship’ (Formenti, 2008, pp.IX-X). 
However, taking stock after the resurrection of the ‘Net Economy’ without ‘the recomposition 
of the social bloc’ supporting its first phase, the failure of the prospected alliance between 
knowledge workers and internet entrepreneurship, and the deepening of the processes of 
‘commercialisation/normalisation’ of the internet (Formenti, 2008, p.X), the third book of the 
trilogy marked a turning point in Formenti’s reflection. Facing ‘the theoretical limits’ of his 
former analysis, it put forward substantial self-criticism without renouncing ‘the revolutionary 
hopes held in the past’ (Formenti, 2011, p.XI), but denouncing the naive rhetoric of those still 
holding similar hopes despite material developments. Thus, Formenti redirected his efforts 
towards criticising the mix of ‘technological determinism, unrealistic libertarianism and 
neoliberalism’ constituting the ideological discourse of the noughties (Formenti, 2008, p.XI). 
However, and without full explicit acknowledgement, much of Formenti’s discussion and 
critique of these hinges upon the concept of “prosumption”,128 and, as will be argued below in 
section 3.4, this poses immanent limits and contradictions to his analysis. 
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 For an introduction to this concept, see Ritzer et al., 2012. For critical review and assessment, see the 
following section of this chapter. 
131 
 
Coming after this reconsideration of the ‘“revolutionary” potential of the web’, Formenti’s 
latest contribution marks a ‘further’ pessimistic ‘evolution’ of his thought (Formenti, 2011, 
p.XI). Deliberately written in the sarcastic style of pamphlets and ideological polemics, the 
book moves from ‘irritation and outrage’ (p.IX) towards a host of discourses functioning as 
legitimation of ‘the relations of control and exploitation founded on the web’ (p.74), although 
with varying degrees of directness, self-awareness, and voluntariness of their legitimation 
effect. The volume comprises two parts. The first, more polemical in tone and intent, 
concentrates on ‘theoretical and ideological discourses’ celebrating the unprecedented 
‘modalities of exploitation of social creativity’ devised by capitalism in recent decades, ranging 
from the ‘free work – individual and collective’ – of prosumers spontaneously cooperating 
through the internet, to the ‘usage of new technologies to intensify’ rhythm, intensity and 
duration of work within and without the networked firm (p.83). Thus, Formenti critically 
reviews the utopian scenarios of the gurus of the new economy (pp.13-44): the ‘digital-
socialism’ (p.13) of Wired magazine, a ‘sui generis collectivism’ (p.18) which, appealing to 
libertarianism and classical American individualism, interprets value as emergent property of 
an internet understood through the metaphor of the living organism, rejects state intervention 
on the internet, and espouses the “natural” laws of the market (pp.13-18);129 the ‘praise of 
piracy’ (p.18) of those reframing the question of whether the ‘“collectivist” practices of online 
communities’ anticipate a ‘post-capitalist society’ into assessment of the possibility, 
desirability, and functioning of a capitalism without private property (pp.18-26);130 the win-win 
scenario of the ‘theorists of wikinomics’ (p.26),131 who see the web 2.0 as a challenge to 
traditional organisational models based on hierarchy and centralisation, allowing for the 
capacity to overcome the traditional trade-off between size of the firm and diseconomies of 
scale, and the attendant capture of value produced outside the boundaries of the firm by 
those involved in peer production networks and practices; and the ‘strange case of Doctor 
Castells’, whereby ‘a rigorous scientific analyst’ of our times becomes ‘an uncritical apologist’ 
of the new media (p.32), praising the breakdown of the distinction between interpersonal and 
mass communication allowed by horizontal networks, the web 2.0, and user-generated 
content as empowerment of the communicating subject against corporations (p.38).132 
With equal critical verve, Formenti provides an assessment of some recent controversies over 
the politics of the internet (Formenti, 2011, pp.47-77). Thus, he reviews favourably the work of 
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 For an example, see Kelly, 2009. 
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 For examples, see: Tapscott, Williams, 2008; Shirky, 2010. 
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the ‘repented gurus’ rereading McLuhan (p.47):133 analysing and criticising their earlier 
enthusiasm in favour of new technology and the web 2.0 (often grounded in one-sided 
readings of McLuhan’s work as ‘unconditional acceptance of the “new time” inaugurated by 
electricity’, now qualitatively deepened by the ‘digital revolution’, p.49), Formenti, however, 
appreciates how the extension of McLuhan’s theoretical construct and concepts to the 
computer contributes to ‘dispel the illusion’ construing networked computers as ‘an ideal 
environment for the enlargement of the critical consciousness  of users’ (p.148).134 Moving on 
to debates on prosumption exalting the provision of work for free, user-generated content, 
and peer production practices likened to gift economies, Formenti highlights how these deploy 
the old ‘ideological trick’ of reducing ‘economic relations’ and the behaviour of ‘social actors to 
subjective motivations’, to mask ‘the reality’ of exploitation and ‘“unequal exchange” hiding 
beneath the “reciprocally satisfactory” relations between’ firms and prosumers (p.58). Thus, 
the neoliberal ‘apology of the amateur’, coupled with the ‘critique of the excesses in the legal 
protection of intellectual property’, are debunked by Formenti as ‘functional to’ an ‘anarcho-
capitalist project’ aiming to ‘accelerate the end’ of the ‘old cultural industry to replace [it] with 
the 2.0 corporations’, and use the ‘cyberpopulism of the smart mobs against the professionals 
of information to crush their resistance – stamped as corporative – to lay-offs and income 
reductions’ (p.60). Lastly, Formenti analyses what remains of the principle of net neutrality 
(pp.60-67), and the hacker ideals underpinning the ethos of the earlier phases of the internet 
(pp.68-74): the former is eroded by the progressive “balkanisation” of the internet and the 
emergence of new commercial platforms which, through closed applications, lock consenting 
costumers within ‘corporate walled gardens’ (p.64);135 the latter stand reduced to nostalgic 
praise of the internet as stage of the ‘heroic battle’ of hackers ‘against power’ (p.73), 
neglecting how increasing use and integration of open-source software within profit-seeking 
projects evidences capitalist cooptation of their ideals (p.70). Therefore, as Formenti points 
out, the libertarian spirit of the internet is undermined by material developments, and the 
unconditional defence of ‘absolute transparency’ (analysed here also with reference to 
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 In particular, the McLuhanite analyses of: Turkle, 1995, 2011; Keen, 2007; Carr, 2008, 2010; and 
Lanier, 2010. 
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 But see Lucas, 2012 for a Marxist assessment of the work and intellectual trajectory of Nicholas Carr 
(2008, 2010), highlighting grey areas and shortcomings of this type of contemporary McLuhanite 
analysis. 
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 For a similar view, see Zittrain, 2008. The concept of “lock-in” of technical standards, together with 
path dependence and network externalities, originates in the work of David (1985) and Arthur (1994) 
(but see Mirowski, 2009a for critical discussion). These concepts have risen to such prominence in the 
literature on technology and innovation (in its academic, business and popular variants) to have become 
common wisdom. Thus, the concept can be summoned by Formenti without providing a reference for it, 
simply absorbed through his engagement with the literature on the politics of the internet. However, as 
will be shown in section 3.5 below, the acceptance of this common wisdom does not come without 
consequences for Formenti’s own analysis. 
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Assange and his role in the Wikileaks affair) has the paradoxical ‘collateral effect’ of 
‘convincing individuals to give up all expectations of privacy, delivering them’ to the control of 
governments and businesses (p.74). Thus, unsuccessful in acquiring ‘awareness of their failure’ 
and denouncing the forces causing it, these utopias and hopes turn, for Formenti, into ‘the 
discourse of the useful idiot’ (p.145). 
In the second part of the book, more academic in tone and style, Formenti deals with a host of 
‘theoretical and ideological discourses which’, although ‘aware of the reality of exploitation 
hiding behind all liberal utopias, including’ the ‘2.0’ variant, refuse the restitution to labour of 
its lost ‘dignity, awareness of its own rights and capacity to fight for’ their affirmation 
(Formenti, 2011, p.83). Asserting that thwarting the recent ‘catastrophe’ of labour entails 
eradicating ‘the very concept of work’ and disconnecting ‘dignity, income, rights, freedom and 
power of community and individuals’ from ‘the social, political and cultural status’ of ‘the 
“worker”’ (pp.83-84), Formenti’s targets are the distinct, yet related, discourses on, 
respectively, the ‘end’ and the ‘refusal of work’ (p.84). Indicted by Formenti as ‘“gravediggers” 
of work’, these have common roots in the critique of the reformist social-democratic wing of 
the workers’ movement, its ‘cooptation’ in the ‘construction of the historical compromise 
between capital, labour’ and (welfare) state (p.84), and its demise of labour as ‘subject of a 
process of liberation’ in favour of a conception of labour as ‘foundation of all citizenship rights’ 
renouncing ‘autonomy in exchange for security’ (p.85). Charging social-democratic parties and 
trade unions of incapacity to react against the structural changes of the 1970s, and of 
involvement in ‘rearguard battles’ protecting ‘an obsolete’ and ‘residual’ image of work 
refused by workers themselves through their struggles (p.87), the theorists of the end of work 
extend their critique of the ‘conservative ideologies of the traditional workers’ movement’ to 
its ‘antagonist and revolutionary variants’ (p.87). Aiming to move from a project of liberation 
of work to the liberation of society from work itself (p.88), they follow Arendt (1999 [1958]) 
and Polanyi (2002 [1944]) and accuse Marx of inheriting from the classical economists a 
conception of labour as a natural anthropological category (Formenti, 2011, pp.88-90). Thus, 
for Formenti, they offer three ‘distinct, yet not necessarily’ opposed, perspectives to liberate 
society from work: the ‘genealogical discourse’ (p.90) attributing ‘the invention of the 
economy’ and ‘valorisation of work’ (pp.90-91) to the convergence of utilitarianism and a ‘new 
scientific spirit’ exalting ‘technique and de-naturalising the world’, which advocates the 
‘“decolonisation of the imaginary”’ from the ‘obsession’ for economic growth and ‘the 
ideology of abundance’ (p.91); the ‘ambivalent’ (p.90) interpretations of ‘the processes of 
individualisation/flexibilisation of work’ which, drawing from post-workerism the concepts of 
‘second generation autonomous work’ and ‘post-Fordist production’ and from the discourses 
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on the KBE the idea that anybody can become an entrepreneur by virtue of him or herself 
(p.91), declare the end of the twentieth century’s ‘declination’ of work as ‘employment’ and 
welcome flexibility insofar as it allows for self-sovereignty (albeit at ‘inferior levels of security’ 
and income) (p.92); and, lastly, the tentative reformulation of ‘a radical reformist project’ 
(p.90) of those (such as, for example, Ulrich Beck) laying the foundations for a political 
economy of risk as base for an ‘ambitious project of transition towards a “second modernity”’ 
(p.92).136 
However, Formenti’s analysis reaches its climax in confrontation and critical dialogue with 
post-operaismo (Formenti, 2011, pp.94-104), of which he develops a focused and vitriolic 
critique (nonetheless, section 3.4 below will show how ineffective this critique is in reality). 
Here Formenti retraces its history and development, from the original operaismo of the 1950s 
and 1960s to the ‘extraordinary publishing success’ (p.94) of Empire (Hardt, Negri, 2000) and 
the theorisation of the multitude (Hardt, Negri, 2004). Highlighting post-operaismo’s merits, 
limits and contradictions, Formenti’s account characterises (post-)operaismo’s trajectory as a 
process of ‘radical “subjectivation”’ of the capital-labour conflict (Formenti, 2011, p.95).137 In 
this account, operaismo’s conceptualisation of a mass worker deskilled and relegated to 
executive tasks by the system of machines of the Fordist factory broke with the ‘communist 
tradition’ linking party hierarchy to the organisation of production, and identified the political 
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(Formenti, 2011, p.147), see below. 
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and cultural cohesive factor of class in the ‘“refusal of work”’ (as opposed to the professional 
pride of the specialised worker) (p.95). This category led to reinterpretation of class 
consciousness as a result of the collective resistance against both deskilled work and the 
‘hierarchies of capitalistic command’ (manifested through forms of sabotage and ‘worker 
“idleness”’) (p.95), and radically changed ‘the strategic objective of class struggle’ (from self-
managing to destroying the factory, to ‘build on its ruins a new universe of productive and 
social relations’) and its ‘organisational instruments’ (advocating the demise of parties and 
unions mirroring the hierarchies of capitalist control, and the abolition of the delegation of the 
representation of interests to the ‘professionals of politics’) (p.95). 
Nevertheless, for Formenti, the greatest implications of this process of ‘“subjectivation”’ were 
theoretical (p.95), with the ‘constant drive to innovation’ characterising capitalism understood 
not only as the outcome of capitalist ‘competition and/or the necessity to face crises’, but ‘also 
and above all’ as capital’s defensive response to the ‘constant pressure of workers’ struggles’ 
(p.95) (see also footnote 136 above). Thus, the operaismo of the 1970s read the effects of 
capitalist restructuring as capital’s response to the cycle of struggles of the mass worker and, 
‘paradoxically’, as ‘confirmation’ that the refusal of work’ had ‘won’, forcing capitalism to do 
away with both the Fordist factory and the mass worker itself (p.96). From this, according to 
Formenti, followed a second, ‘double paradox’: operaismo set forth to become a ‘“workerism 
without workers”’ theorising ‘antagonism without class’, while at the same time moving from 
‘the refusal of work’ to attributing to work (albeit understood in a very particular way, see 
below) a central role ‘for the understanding of the social conflicts’ of our times (p.96). Indeed, 
the elaboration of the concept of social worker (operaio sociale) – indicating a federation of 
social subjects and practices breaking with those traditionally associated with the working 
class, its politics and organisations (pp.96-97) – allowed reformulating resistance to capitalism 
as refusal of the monetisation and incorporation within social reproduction of one’s 
‘knowledge, creative capacities, feelings and emotions’ (rather than opposition to factory 
hierarchy), anticipating themes which would find ‘definitive systematisation’ (p.97) in Empire 
(Hardt, Negri, 2000) and the post-workerist literature of the turn of the century. 
Thus, Formenti identifies the theme linking (post-)workerist reflection spanning the beginning 
of the 1960s to present in ‘the idea that all anti-capitalist struggles can be interpreted as’ 
manifestation of a ‘single antagonist contradiction’ between the ‘collective intelligence (the 
Marxian general intellect) incorporated in dead labour’, and living labour, reinterpreted as the 
‘collective intelligence’ of the working class comprising ‘the mind, creativity, emotions, 
feelings, relations’, and ‘all that we call today social and cultural capital’ (Formenti, 2011, 
p.97). Therefore, for Formenti, the ‘decisive theoretical challenge’ for post-operaismo was to 
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‘demonstrate that’ this ‘contradiction’ remains operative ‘in a post-Fordist era where the 
epicentre’ of value creation has moved ‘from the factory to society’. Providing ‘provisional 
response’ to this challenge, ‘the figure of the social worker’ functioned as ‘joining link’ with the 
‘category of the multitude’ elaborated in reaction to the ‘technological jump associated’ with 
the networked computer (p.97) and the phenomena described in the first part of the book 
(p.98). Thus, for Formenti, three theoretical ‘hybridisations’ have been essential in allowing for 
this conceptual shift. The first is the encounter ‘between Marxism and the philosophies of 
language’, which identifies ‘linguistic interaction’ as driving force of value creation and ICTs as 
capturing free human creativity (as opposed to ‘commanding/controlling’ executive tasks), and 
leads to perceive a ‘reversal of the relationship between’ living and dead labour.138 With this 
type of activity overlapping with the ‘vital experience of the subjects’ performing it rather than 
being work per se, it is understood as becoming ‘work only’ insofar as ‘capital succeeds in 
appropriating its effects’ to integrate them in its valorisation process. Thus, for Formenti, the 
paradoxical affirmation that ‘nothing’ is work anymore and, at the same time, ‘everything 
becomes work’, although formulated with different words and ‘ideological purposes’, recalls 
the themes and theories of ‘wikinomics, crowdsourcing and peer production analysed’ in the 
first part of his book (p.98). 
Furthermore, Formenti sees this ‘thematic convergence’ as even more evident in the ‘second 
contamination’, that between ‘Marxism and Foucauldian biopolitics’ (p.98): since, according to 
Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), networked capitalism does not only produce commodities 
‘but also social relations and forms of life’ (Formenti, 2011, p.98), the ‘expropriation’ of wealth 
generated outside ‘capitalist production’ would prevalently concern today the social commons 
(as opposed to just nature) (p.99). Thus, for Formenti, Hardt and Negri’s belief that ‘value 
production’ arises from ‘forms of spontaneous social cooperation’ autonomous from 
‘capitalistic command’, and whose ‘products’ are not easily ‘subsumable by private property’, 
marks a partial convergence with ‘the liberal critics of the expropriation of the immaterial 
commons’.139 However, while the latter see this condition as ‘an opportunity’ for those firms 
able to ‘coexist with these externalities’ to their own advantage, Hardt and Negri see it as 
inherently contradictory for, in their opinion, ‘capital can valorise itself only imposing its direct 
control on knowledge production’ which, however, tends to escape all forms of control 
hampering ‘the productivity of “biopolitical” labour’ (p.99). The third hybridisation is that with 
the analysis of the processes of financialisation (p.99). In this account of the latter, the ‘advent 
of the New Economy’ radically transformed the relationship between ‘finance and the real 
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economy’, rendering obsolete the distinction between them: since ‘immaterial networked 
capitalism’ can ‘prosper exclusively’ on ‘furious rhythms of technological innovation’ and their 
financing through ‘systematic overestimation’ of stock market listings of firms, to speak of 
speculative bubbles is misplaced. It is ‘only through these processes of “virtual” valorisation’ 
that, in Bologna’s opinion, capital can ‘intercept and translate into profit wealth’ produced 
outside the boundary of the firm, such as, for instance, that resulting from the free work of 
prosumers (which, given its ‘extra-economic nature’, would not be measurable otherwise) 
(p.100). This diagnosis leads to the reconceptualisation of profit as rent (p.111),140 diverting 
attention from the ‘immediate’ capital-labour relation ‘to the processes of financialisation of 
the economy’, to explain ‘how capital’ appropriates ‘social wealth produced outside’ the 
productive process despite the ‘resistance’ of those cooperating ‘autonomously and 
spontaneously’ with ‘extra-economic ends’ (p.99). 
Having closely examined the origins and assumptions of the post-workerist concept of 
multitude and the attendant identification of networked capitalism as ‘biopolitical device’ 
putting life itself to work (Formenti, 2011, p.100),141 Formenti moves on to denounce the 
aporetic character of both. Indeed, given the ‘excessively abstract character of an idea of work’ 
coinciding with ‘any manifestation of vital energy’ and the ‘eminently philosophical nature’ of 
the concept of multitude, for Formenti the latter must ‘inevitably’ evoke ‘an equally abstract 
image of power’, failing to ‘identify’ a clearly distinguishable ‘“enemy”’. Thus, as Formenti 
indicates, in this context the description of contemporary forms of power can only oscillate 
between the ‘enumeration of a series of empirical actors’ competing for the control of the 
‘new productive environments’, and the ‘abstraction’ of a ghostly Empire hovering over the 
world, sucking its ‘vital energy’ as a parasite. Furthermore, Formenti points out how the 
‘expulsion of the concept of class’ from theory and analysis affects negatively their ‘capacity’ 
to deal credibly with ‘the problem of’ identifying ‘the subject of social transformation’ (p.101). 
Indeed, this conception of contemporary capitalism paradoxically holds that ‘the totality of 
human relations’ is ‘subsumed within the capitalistic valorisation process’, while all ‘social 
production’, being ‘biopolitical production of subjectivity’, is ‘external to capital’ and self-
organised through ‘spontaneous and autonomous’ cooperation (p.102). However, for 
Formenti, while post-workerists admit that this implies that revolution can only ‘barge in from 
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outside the capital relation’, they still hold, through ‘dialectical contortion’, that revolution is 
‘an innovation’ emerging from within the system (p.102). 
Formenti highlights how two different traditional justifications are mobilised and revived to 
provide an answer to this dilemma. Firstly, ‘the classic Marxian scenario of a terminal crisis of 
capitalism determined by the contradiction between’ the ‘development of productive forces 
and relations of production’: if production today is first and foremost ‘autonomous production 
of subjectivity’, with the ‘anachronistic survival of private property’ allowing capital’s 
parasitism over ‘self-organised social production’, stepping ‘into a new world’ would simply 
require the liberation from capitalistic control of ‘a social body’ de facto already ‘extraneous to 
the juridical superstructures’ constraining its productivity (similarly, although with greater 
detail, see section 2.4 of this thesis, which identifies this endeavour as portraying capitalism as 
suspended, i.e. undermined and de facto transcended by the current material organisation of 
production and economic activity, together with their functioning and modality of operations, 
yet maintaining the form and appearance of capitalism). However, Formenti dismisses this 
argument as a ‘subterfuge’ hiding the ‘absence of a theory of revolution in Marx’s thought’,142 
and legitimising the point of view of those describing the KBE as ‘a post-capitalistic mode of 
production’ (p.102). The second justification draws on the ‘conviction’ that ‘any new society’ 
grows out of the shell of the preceding, leading to ‘revolution’ being seen as ‘an “excess” of 
the present’ containing and anticipating the future (p.103). For Formenti, this ‘valorisation of 
immanence’ is in ‘strong continuity’ with the ‘operaista tradition of’ the 1960s and 1970s, 
which derived a ‘profound confidence’ in civil society’s spontaneous potential for self-
government from its critique of ‘the party form’ and attendant faith in the ‘autonomous 
capacity of the working class’ to ‘self-organise’. As Formenti points out, this attitude resurfaces 
even more radically in contemporary post-operaismo, which negates any ‘legitimacy to the 
“autonomy of the political”’, positing the self-government and valorisation of the multitude, 
and proposes the ‘new forms of “horizontal” organisation’ of virtual communities as substitute 
for political organisation (p.103). However, while Formenti also stressed in the recent past the 
similarity between these experiences and the ‘structures of direct democracy’ invented by the 
workers’ movement throughout its history (p.103),143 he nonetheless showed how, without 
‘political institutionalisation’, these phenomena would have been ‘neutralised by the counter-
offensive of governments and firms’ in their common effort of ‘normalisation of the web’, and 
how many of them remained ‘constitutionally ambiguous’ and amenable to ‘evolve into 
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productive structures functional to the new forms of’ capitalist accumulation (as discussed in 
the first part of Formenti’s book) (p.104). Thus, for Formenti, post-operaismo’s ‘blind faith’ in 
the ‘multitude’s capacity to invent ever new forms of democratic self-organisation’ determines 
its convergence with the ‘utopian enthusiasms of the Web 2.0 gurus’ (p.104). 
Against these visions of a post-capitalist present, Formenti is motivated by the prospect of 
‘“parenthesising” the thought of Michel Foucault’ (whose analysis he deems helpful ‘to 
understand how the hegemony of dominant classes is constructed’, but devoid ‘of any 
antagonistic value’ for its conception of resistance as a ‘constitutive element of the power 
apparatus’) and proposes to draw instead from the toolbox of a ‘straightened McLuhan’ 
(Formenti, 2011, p.147) (i.e. purged of ‘undue extension to digital media of his ethical point of 
view concerning the emancipatory potential of electrical media’, p.148) as complement to a 
rediscovery of Marxian concepts (p.147). Yet, whether (and to what extent) Marx’s thought 
and Marxism are in need of, and amenable to, such integration is something on which 
Formenti remains silent. This is in itself problematic, since, for example, neo-McLuhanite 
commentators such as Keen (2007) and Lanier (2010) display evidently scathing (though 
equally ill-informed) opinions about Marxism. On the other hand, Lucas (2012) emphasises, 
from a Marxist perspective, the limits of the McLuhanite analysis of Carr (2008, 2010). Further, 
Guy Debord, a Marxist critic of the mass media and their role in the capitalism of the 1960s 
(which he understood as the ‘society of spectacle’, see Debord, 1996 [1967]), emphatically 
defined McLuhan ‘the spectacle’s first apologist’ (Debord, 2002 [1988], p.33). Nonetheless, 
Formenti (2011) aims to reaffirm the enduring significance of Marxian categories as valid tools 
to understand contemporary capitalism and its dynamics (pp.107-119).144 Indeed, for 
Formenti, although the ‘neoliberal theorists’ of networked capitalism and the digital revolution 
implicitly refer to the concept of mode of production, their use of the notion displays reductive 
technological determinism; on the other hand, the persistence of the commodity form and 
private appropriation of value (or, in other words, of ‘social relations of exploitation’) 
determine the persistence of the capitalist mode of production itself (p.108). This, for 
Formenti, has significant implications. Firstly, the distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour maintains an undiminished relevance:145 indeed, for Formenti, the greater 
cooperative nature of the productive process, now intensified by the internet, ‘extends the 
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ambit of application of the concept’ of productive labour up to ‘embracing tendentially the 
totality of interconnected subjects’ (p.109). Furthermore, Formenti recalls how ‘for Marx’ 
whether workers produce ‘material goods or services’ does not matter ‘to establish’ whether 
labour is productive or not; what matters is whether it produces surplus-value. Thus, for 
Formenti, this and the ongoing subsumption within surplus-value production of an ever-
increasing number of activities and social relations suffice to ‘dispel the misunderstanding’ 
associating ‘tertiarisation to the growth of unproductive labour’ (p.110). 
Secondly, the concepts of formal and real subsumption allow attention and emphasis to shift 
from technological evolution per se to ‘the evolution of the social relation of exploitation of 
labour’, of which technology is not a ‘direct cause’ but a ‘catalyser’ insofar as it allows and 
accelerates transition from the production of absolute to relative surplus value (p.112). 
However, although formal and real subsumption are ‘generally interpreted as’ distinct 
‘successive moments of a unidirectional’ and ‘temporally oriented’ process, ‘Marx’s vision is 
not this linear and schematic’: formal and real subsumption, as well as absolute and relative 
surplus-value, ‘coexist and interweave in different proportions’ according to the ‘historical, 
social and cultural’ contexts in which capital ‘concretely’ operates, and the opposition it 
encounters from those ‘forms of life’ resisting incorporation within the market (p.113). Thus, 
for Formenti, while ‘technological revolutions allow’ capitalist colonisation of activities 
previously outside the scope of valorisation, they also allow ‘the birth of new areas of social 
autonomy which’, however, can be subsequently ‘integrated in’ capital’s ‘valorisation process’; 
and, in Formenti’s opinion, the very history of the internet would exemplify this dialectic 
between processes of socialisation and de-socialisation characterising the history and 
functioning of capitalism (p.115). Lastly, Formenti dismisses the celebrations of the end of the 
rule of dead over living labour grounded with the opinion that contemporary capitalist 
valorisation draws on the ‘individual and collective creativity of producers’ (as opposed to a 
labour process subsuming living labour under the control of a system of machines) as 
mistaken, since this is to underestimate the ‘enormous power’ of the computer and internet. 
Indeed, digital technologies ‘are not neutral’; they exert ‘coercion, control and discipline’ over 
the mind, constituting an unprecedented form of ‘“mental taylorism”’. Thus, while ‘new 
relations of exploitation’ may ‘appear similar to those’ characterising the first phase of formal 
subsumption of labour to capital,146 in reality they ‘embody more advanced and sophisticated 
forms of’ real subsumption,147 with formal and real subsumption, and absolute and relative 
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surplus value, continuing to ‘coexist and interweave’ (as opposed to being ‘stages of an 
irreversible temporal process’) (p.116). However, if it is ‘premature to decree the end of the 
rule of’ dead over living labour (p.116), for Formenti the era of digital technology relaunches 
the significance of Marx’s reflection on the general intellect (p.117). Indeed, while this shows, 
in Formenti’s opinion, how the theorists of the KBE have only reframed in ‘“fashionable”’ 
words ideas discussed by Marx more than a century ago (although they do not see a 
contradiction between the development of the forces of production and the social relations of 
production), it also highlights a deficiency in the post-workerist revival of the collapse of 
capitalism due to the terminal contradiction between development of the forces of production 
and the social relations of production, and in Marx’s thought itself. Indeed, for Formenti, 
‘digital capitalism managed to render obsolete’ the ‘illusion that the contradiction between 
productive forces and relations of production’ can, by itself, determine ‘the collapse of 
capitalism’ (p.119). Thus, if for Formenti this highlights how Marx’s thought lacks a theory of 
transition and of the revolutionary subject, it also highlights how the post-workerist attempt to 
address these issues through the concept of multitude fails to undertake a serious analysis of 
class composition within networked capitalism, and to handle appropriately the task of 
political organisation (p.119). 
At this point Formenti wonders whether it is ‘still possible to analyse social conflict’ from the 
standpoint of work, and whether the latter can still provide a foundation for class identity 
(objectively and subjectively intended) in the KBE, i.e. ‘an epoch of fragmentation and 
individualisation of the working classes’ where the ‘Marxian polarisation between owners of 
the means of production and sellers of labour force’ alone is insufficient to provide an answer 
to these issues (Formenti, 2011, p.120). Thus, to assess whether knowledge workers are the 
‘bearers of a unitary’ and ‘potentially “revolutionary”’ class identity, Formenti distinguishes 
two definitions of knowledge workers as a class – a ‘restricted’ and an ‘extended’ definition. 
For Formenti, the ‘most useful version’ (p.120) of the former is identifiable in Florida’s 
“creative class” (Florida, 2002) which, ‘theoretically weak but empirically rich’ (Formenti, 2011, 
p.120), identifies creativity and mutually shared values (free-sprititedness, diffidence towards 
hierarchy, informality in social relations, tolerance, etc.) as unifying factor of the ‘superior 
strata’ (in terms of social and cultural capital endowments) of a varied array of professionals 
(p.120-121). The ‘extended definition’, on the other hand, is identified by Formenti in the post-
workerist ‘concept of multitude’, which extends ‘the concept of knowledge’ work ‘to all 
activities’ contributing, although in different ways, ‘directly or indirectly’, to ‘create value for 
networked capitalism’. From this point of view, ‘creatives are not a social class, but the 
superior stratum of an ample and stratified class composition’ and, therefore, linking with the 
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interests of traditional industrial or other service sectors’ workers ‘is not a problem of 
alliances, but of recomposition on the basis of common antagonism with respect to capital’ 
(p.122). 
As discussed earlier on in this chapter, Formenti tackled this issue in the past (in Formenti, 
2002): after ‘having identified the emergent subject’ in a ‘Fifth Estate … susbtantially 
homologous to the concepts of creative class, hacker class and knowledge workers’, he 
hypothesised that it could exert hegemony on other strata of the workforce, to create, then, 
‘new forms of political organisation able to convert hegemony into’ a ‘revolutionary project’ 
(Formenti, 2011, p.122). However, it is the developments described in the first part of 
Formenti’s book that induced him to abandon ‘this illusion’ (a point to which we will return in 
section 3.4 of this chapter) and to question the pertinence of conceiving knowledge workers as 
an avant-garde in the ‘complex backdrop of global class conflicts’ (p.122). Indeed, for 
Formenti, in the context of the diffusion of the ‘“Wal Mart model” … founded on processes of 
tertiarisation/financialisation’, ‘the purchase of commodities produced in developing countries 
to be sold to an increasingly impoverished middle class’, and the anti-union politics and 
policies of traditional firms (p.123), the ‘firms of the New Economy have not’ had to 
‘neutralise’ the unionised resistance of their workers (p.124). Convinced that ‘flexibility is a 
conquest and not an imposition’, that ‘the horizontal structure of the networked firm could 
liberate them from’ bureaucratic routines and ‘favour rapid careers based on individual merit’, 
and fully identifying themselves with managerial objectives, these have, in Formenti’s opinion, 
unflinchingly adapted to the spillover of working time into free time, unaware of the 
‘structures of power and control embedded in the new modalities of organisation and 
exploitation of work’, and interiorising ‘the “guilt”’ for the failure of firms employing them in 
the crash of the new economy (p.124). 
However, for Formenti, the ascent of the creative class predicated by Florida (2002) is not 
entirely ‘an illusion’ hiding ‘the reality of a process of “proletarianisation” of the middle 
classes’ (Formenti, 2011, p.124). Indeed, in Formenti’s opinion, ‘concepts such as creative 
class, knowledge workers, etc.’ have the ‘limit of concentrating attention’ on the ‘cultural 
values shared by a given social stratum’, thus neglecting ‘differences of income, power, social 
capital etc.’ (p.124). For Formenti, once these are taken into account, it is important to see the 
creative class in the context of the ‘radical semantic shift’ leading to a ‘radical inversion of 
roles between modernisers and traditionalists’, ‘progressives and conservatives’, in American 
politics (p.125) (and, one might add, beyond). With this shift, ‘modernity and progress’ are not 
identified anymore with ‘the enlargement of workers’ rights but with the promotion of 
productive models and lifestyles’ favouring environmentalism, individual creativity, tolerance, 
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etc. (p.125). Thus, for Formenti, ‘the massacre of the American middle class’ since the end of 
the 1970s has been perpetrated at the hands of republican and democratic administrations 
alike, not because of any ‘treason of the clerks’, but rather due to an ‘ideological mutation 
parallel to the ascent’ to power ‘of the class’ debuting on ‘the political scene with the 
movements of the’ 1960s. Therefore, for Formenti, the continuity established by ‘the gurus of 
the New Economy’ between the ‘countercultures’ of the 1960s and the ‘values of the 
protagonists of the digital revolution’ is correct, as long as (following Lacanian commentary on 
contemporary society – most notably Žižek, 2006) the attention is shifted from ‘elements such 
as freedom of expression, meritocracy, anti-authoritarianism’ to the ‘convergence’ between 
the ‘taste for transgression’ of the movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the ‘demeasure of 
capitalist accumulation’ (p.126). Thus, for Formenti, the ‘ascent’ to power ‘of this elite is 
symbolised by the years of the Clinton presidency’, which signalled the rise to power of the 
‘upper strata’ of the generation of 1968 backed by the entrepreneurs of ‘the digital revolution 
and the invention of the first business model of the New Economy’. Hence, with the (first) 
election of Obama, Formenti sees the closure of a cycle, whereby Florida’s claim of lack of 
representation for the creative class does not hold anymore: the ‘Fifth Estate has had its own 
‘89, thanks to the cultural hegemony’ that it has exerted on the lower levels of the ‘networked 
society’, but ‘a third cycle of the revolutionary process’ is not in view. Thus, Formenti proposes 
‘to abandon the dreams’ (p.127) of self-organising and self-governing multitudes to resume 
the analysis of the ‘political composition of the proletariat’ shifting attention to the ‘global 
level’ (p.128). 
Closing his book with a short overview of the role of (control over) the internet in the 
hegemonic strategy of the United States and the struggles of (Chinese) workers (pp.128-138), 
Formenti locates in the emerging economies ‘the perspective of a cycle of struggles founded 
on the convergence of interests between industrial neo-proletariat, creative class and 
migrants’, whose ‘alliance’ can be ‘welded by the use of new networked technologies as 
instruments of mobilisation and political organisation of struggles’. For Formenti, China is 
already exhibiting the ‘objective prerequisites’ of this process under the form of: ‘rapid 
formation of ample workers’ masses due to the processes of outsourcing of Western and 
Japanese industries’; the rapid growth of a ‘creative class’ which is acquiring the duties of its 
Western counterpart (‘destroyed by the crisis’); and the ‘presence of powerful internal 
migratory flows’ from the countryside to big cities. In this context, whether these processes 
are ‘a moment of the ascent of a nation destined to undermine’ the role of the United States 
as ‘leader of the capitalism of the twenty-first century’ or, on the other hand, a moment of the 
emergence of ‘a model of development destined to’ supplant ‘the current mode of production’ 
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in hitherto unimagined ways (p.137), will depend for Formenti on the outcome of these class 
struggles. Holding the latter as a ‘frankly “operaista” opinion’, Formenti believes that the 
Chinese example should lead the theorists of operaismo to ‘self-critical reflection’ on their 
rejection on the ‘“autonomy of the political”’, thus shifting attention from the ‘function of 
representation’ of institutions (‘the state, the party, the union, etc.’) to ‘the capacity ... of 
subaltern classes of using them’ (p.138). 
3.4) Farewell to the working class? Or the limits of post-workerist 
dissent 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the work of Bologna and Formenti (reviewed in sections 3.2 
and 3.3 above) challenges the “continuist” Anglo-American reception of (post-)operaismo by 
offering different interpretations of contemporary dynamics to those central to the Negrian 
consensus. While the work of these post-workerist dissenters shows variety in the post-
workerist reflection on the KBE, it also raises the issue of dis/continuity within the (post-
)operaista paradigm and of the latter’s fortunes directly. Indeed, in reviewing Wright’s history 
of operaismo (Wright, 2002), Bologna emphasises how the heritage of operaismo has been a 
contested issue ever since the death of the journal Classe Operaia (Bologna, 2007, Sulla storia 
dell’operaismo, pp.244-257), asking whether the ‘category of continuity’, typical of the history 
of ‘dynasties’ and ‘parties’, is an appropriate organising principle to trace the history of a 
movement refusing and refuting the perspective and logic of the party itself (p.257). On the 
other hand, Formenti retraces continuity between operaismo and post-operaismo in the 
process of radical subjectivation of the capital-labour relation, up to terming the work of the 
Negrian consensus as ‘neo-operaismo’ and using this term throughout the whole book 
(Formenti, 2011).148 This recently led Mario Tronti (2011) to argue against calling neo-operaisti 
the theorists of “workerism without workers”, and to invite a search for the resurgence of 
traditional operaismo elsewhere.149 However, despite their seeming disagreement on the issue 
of continuity, both Bologna and Formenti find an important cause for (post-)operaismo’s 
shortcomings in its treatment and philosophy of work: indeed, as Formenti blames for the 
subjectivation of the capital-labour relation the ‘excessively abstract character of an idea of 
work’ coinciding with ‘any manifestation of vital energy’ (Formenti, 2011, p.101) and leading to 
neglect of ‘concrete analysis of class composition’ and to ‘lose sight of the problem of the 
political organisation of resistance to capital’ (p.122), Bologna laments operaismo’s ‘substantial 
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 For consistency with the existing literature on the topic (and in agreement with Tronti, 2011, see 
below), I have privileged the term post-operaismo even when discussing Formenti’s work. Formenti, 
2009 also refers to post-, as opposed to neo-, operaismo. 
149
 Tronti, 2011 proposes Gruppo Lavoro del Centro per la riforma dello Stato, 2011 as better suited to 
fit within the description of neo-operaismo. 
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indifference to the nature of work’ and its privileging the concept of general intellect to work 
in crafting a ‘political lexicon’ (Bologna, 2007, p.241). 
Nonetheless, however much these stances show malaise with, and provide scathing critiques 
of, the Negrian consensus, Bologna and Formenti’s dissimilarity from the latter should not be 
overstated. Indeed, it could be argued that, similarly to Negri, both authors carefully pick and 
choose from operaismo and its past in terms of what to retain and explicitly to discard, with 
past intellectual content functioning as a suspended point of reference, combined with 
eclectically selected empirical fragments from the present magnified into descriptions of the 
essence of contemporary capitalism (independent work for Bologna, prosumption for 
Formenti), theoretical constructs more or less arbitrarily grafted onto Marxian concepts (with 
what Foucault and French post-structuralism are for Negri replaced by Lederer and Weimarian 
sociology for Bologna, and McLuhan – although purged of ‘undue extension to digital media of 
his ethical point of view concerning the emancipatory potential of electrical media’, Formenti, 
2011, p.148 – for Formenti), and prefigurative political analysis. However, it is in the debased 
use of class recomposition as analytical and organising principle that the work of post-
workerist dissenters reflects the Negrian consensus, albeit in complex ways and mediated by 
the concepts borrowed from other theoretical bodies. Indeed, similarly to Negri, more or less 
implicitly and with more attention (analytically, but also practically for Bologna) to the issue of 
political organisation, Bologna and Formenti locate the actor of change away from, 
respectively, the working class or the Western working class: in Bologna’s case this is done 
through identifying second generation autonomous workers as class-in-the-making (thus 
dislocating the locus of contradiction and conflict within the reorganisation of the structure of 
society), whereas in Formenti’s case this is done through emphasising the importance of the 
outcomes of social and class struggles in China in determining ‘alignment to the western model 
or’ the ‘ascent of  an alternative model’ (Formenti, 2011, p.138) (thus dislocating the locus of 
class struggle geographically). These views and analytical outcomes recall traditional responses 
to the decline of labour movements and struggles in the West: the demise of the capital-labour 
relation as locus of the main societal contradiction within advanced capitalism, and the 
identification of exploitation, the lasting valence of value production, and the potential for 
social revolution in the developing world as opposed to the capitalist core. However, rather 
than simply dismissing them as such, it is worthwhile to stress how such analytical outcomes 
depend on immanent contradictions likening this post-workerist dissent to the Negrian 
consensus. 
Let us begin by assessing Bologna’s proposal of reconceptualisation and renewal of coalition-
building practices and processes within post-Fordism through emphasis on ‘second generation 
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autonomous workers’ as ‘best candidates for’ re-founding ‘society on new and more humane 
bases’ (Bologna, 2007, p.70). Underlying this agenda is the assumption that this ‘way of 
organising productive labour’ has ‘characteristics of “typicality” for’ this ‘specific historical 
epoch’, with the condition of second generation autonomous work encompassing both ‘the 
coercive character of a specific’ (post-Fordist) ‘organisation of capital’ and the emancipatory 
potential intrinsic to its yearn for self-determination (p.35). Thus, to assess this agenda, two 
related issues need to be analysed: whether independent work can be considered as a distinct 
homogeneous class or class-in-the-making or, on the other hand, as a category ‘formed by the 
simple addition of homologous magnitudes’;150 and whether and how it can be considered 
“typical” within the contemporary organisation of productive activity. On the first of these 
issues, simple considerations lead to rejection of the class character of second generation 
autonomous work. This is not to deny that freelancing comes with its own (very often painful) 
constraints (especially in the Italian context, acutely covered by Bologna and Banfi), nor that 
part of independent work constitutes disguised waged labour.151 But, if, as Bologna asserts, 
assimilating second generation autonomous work to a “business” as opposed to “independent 
work” is an ideological operation forcibly incorporating ‘the activity of autonomous work in the 
symbolic and cultural sphere of the capitalist firm instead of that of work’ (p.65), the opposite 
operation is at least equally analytically doubtful. If anything, independent work functions as a 
‘catch-all statistical category’ including ‘a range of different class positions’: at ‘one extreme 
are the self-employed with a few employees who can perhaps be regarded as petit bourgeois 
in the classical sense’, then ‘there are genuine freelancers’ working ‘for a range of different 
employers’, and ‘at the other extreme are casual workers whose self-employed status is a 
reflection of labour market weakness – people who lack the negotiating muscle to insist on a 
proper contract even though they are effectively working for a single employer’. Furthermore, 
self-employment is often not a permanent state (as also widely acknowledged by Bologna and 
Banfi), with well-documented high rates of churning, which makes it even more ‘difficult to 
regard self-employment as a stable marker of class identity’ (Huws, 2003, p.168). This is even 
more so given that many of the phenomena that Bologna associates with second generation 
autonomous workers have affected the labour force in general. Indeed, and firstly, since the 
1970s, neoliberal restructuring has resulted in the intensification of the pressure for working 
hours to augment with increase in working hours across advanced capitalist countries, both for 
individual workers and socially (Basso, 2003). Thus, the phenomenon of working time spilling 
over into the free time of workers is certainly not confined to independent work. 
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 Much ‘as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes’ (Marx, 1852). 
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 However, assessing how substantial this part is remains an empirical task. 
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Secondly, in the current climate of corporate restructuring, ‘changes in work contexts and 
content’ have entailed a compulsion for employers ‘to seek a more intensive utilization of 
labour power’, resulting in ‘a qualitative intensification of labour’ which, neither classifiable as 
‘conventional upskilling or deskilling’, requires the mobilisation in the workforce of ‘a broader 
palette of skills and sources of labour power’ (including tacit knowledge and skills, emotional 
commitment and involvement, etc.) (Thompson, 2010, p.10). Coupled with the reconfiguration 
of production according to the imperatives of the tight flow,152 and its effects in terms of 
increased flexibility and labour market segmentation, this has led to a new form of 
‘constrained involvement’ for workers, whereby greater autonomy and (albeit limited) 
creativity on the job are counterbalanced by the increased ‘effort required to keep the flow 
tight (no breakdowns, no stoppage of the flow and so on)’ and salary structures based on 
performance (Durand, 2007, p.5). Thirdly, new forms of organisational structures at the core of 
the networked firm and tight flow production involve disaggregation of functions and 
operations through increased recourse to market relations (e.g. franchising, subcontracting, 
etc.), imposing a phenomenal form of real subsumption on the workforce where hierarchy, 
discipline and constraint exercised through direct bureaucratic control of the labour process 
are replaced (or complemented, depending on how “real” in practice is the formal distinction 
between buyer and seller)153 by those provided by market relations (thus bypassing labour 
market regulation and social protection, as capital-labour relations are masked as commercial 
contracts) (Tinel et al., 2007). Judging from the account of Bologna’s work and intellectual 
trajectory provided in section 3.2 of this chapter, it seems fair to say that he would probably 
agree with much of the above. However, precisely because of this and Bologna’s own focus on 
the effects of the current crisis on the middle class (in terms of its decomposition), the 
significance of privileging independent work as analytical category or class-in-the-making is 
directly brought into question. Indeed, while the arguments discussed above highlight the 
relevance and depth of change in the organisation of contemporary economic activity, they 
also provide elements and rationale for ‘rethinking’ the ‘forms of aggregation and organisation 
of conflict’ along class lines (inclusive of the various and differential forms taken by the wage 
relationship within the current organisation of economic activity under capitalism) rather than 
a justification for the ‘loss of centrality of the fundamental contradiction of the socio-economic 
capitalist formation’ (Burgio, 1999, pp.96-97). Furthermore, class being a relational concept, 
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 That is, ‘the elimination of the intermediate stock in the course of production (the buffers) of goods 
and services, and the disappearance of commercial stocks between factory and outlet’. Resulting ‘in 
large part from the development of ICT, which allowed the implementation of complex flow structures, 
the sequential stages in production have been replaced by continuous movement – as in the case of… 
“process industries”’ (Durand, 2007, p.28). 
153
 As, for example, in subcontracting ‘buying firms resort to entities which depend on them, not only on 
a monetary level, but also in terms of power of control of the labour process’ (Tinel et al., 2007, p.158). 
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Bologna’s account of second generation autonomous work implicitly (though not necesarrily 
voluntarily) puts the emphasis, on the other side of this relation, on the state – guilty of 
neglecting the condition and needs of second generation autonomous workers – as opposed 
to capital, and this contributes to shifting the attention further away from the capital-labour 
relation as fundamental contradiction within advanced capitalism. 
But, if these transformations have affected, albeit in different ways, the labour force in 
general, in what sense can a(ny) specific segment of the latter be considered “typical”? The 
issue of the “typicality” of second generation autonomous work is consonant with (although 
not reducible to) the hegemony of immaterial labour posited by Hardt and Negri (see the 
second chapter of this thesis). Indeed, although Bologna is more nuanced and less 
deterministic than Hardt and Negri, the “typicality” of second generation autonomous work 
and the hegemony of immaterial labour share common roots in the reintroduction of the 
category of post-Fordism within Marxist debate ‘by the Italian autonomists, who used it to 
draw attention to the narrow social base of the politics of the Keynesian Welfare State in the 
bureaucratic representation of the “Fordist” mass worker’ (Clarke, 1990, p.153). However, in 
the post-workerist account of Fordism and post-Fordism, social relations of production and the 
capitalist mode of production are reduced to, and collapsed into, respectively, specific 
modalities of deploying and organising labour (the conveyor belt for the mass worker, or the 
networked computer for the second generation autonomous worker) and specific forms of 
exploitation of labour (relative surplus value extraction mediated by the hierarchy and 
discipline imposed via the conveyor belt for the unskilled mass worker; expansion and 
extension of working time mediated by networked computers – the ubiquity of the 
workstation – and exclusion from social benefits for second generation autonomous workers). 
Allowing Bologna to hold that ‘the social and productive function of self-employed work is not 
very far from that of the mass worker of the Fordist epoch’ (Bologna, 1992, p.19, quoted in De 
Angelis, 1993, p.172), this approach is analytically flawed, as it conflates two very different 
levels of abstraction: the concrete (or the historical) – i.e. the concrete modalities in which 
labour is deployed within the material organisation of production – and the abstract (or the 
logical) – wage labour ‘in the strict economic sense’, that is ‘capital-positing, capital-producing 
labour ... living labour which produces both the objective conditions of its realization as an 
activity, as well as the objective moments of its being as labour capacity, and produces them 
as alien powers opposite itself, as values for-themselves, independent of it’ (Marx, 1993, 
p.463).154 
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 This type of reasoning is in no way exclusive province of post-operaismo; see Banaji, 2010 for an 
account of its relevance and persistence within Marxist debates. 
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This conflation is at the very heart of the reasoning whereby the scholarship of the cognitive 
capitalism debate, together with the Negrian consensus guiding it, (mis)construe Marx’s value 
theory as valid only in, and for the analysis of, industrial capitalism (as opposed to the 
mercantile and cognitive phases of capitalism, posited as, respectively, preceding and 
following that of industrial capitalism) (Jeon, 2010; but see also the second chapter of this 
thesis).155 Furthermore, this conflation favours a reductio ad unum precluding from view the 
plurality of the forms in which labour is deployed and exploited at any given historical time. 
Thus, not only is precariousness understood as a specifically post-Fordist phenomenon,156 but 
specific forms of labour and segments of the labour force are identified as hegemonic (as in 
Hardt and Negri’s case) or typical (as in Bologna’s case). It is noteworthy that the purposes 
justifying this analytical process for Hardt and Negri, on the one hand, and Bologna, on the 
other, are diametrically opposed. While the former are moved by strategic concerns (whereby 
immaterial labour and the multitude are privileged for their hegemonic character within 
biopolitical production, see Hardt, Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009, and Camfield, 2007 for further 
discussion), the latter is moved by ethical ones. Indeed, Bologna deems second generation 
autonomous workers the ‘true “cognitive” class’ because of their being compelled to provide 
‘an organisation of work’ requiring ‘to associate knowledge of formalised procedures’ to 
inventiveness and ‘relational talents’ in addition to specific competences (whereas the ‘waged 
knowledge worker’ is only required to adhere to structured procedures and is not compelled to 
invent new systems) (Bologna, 2007, pp.105-106). 
Furthermore, for Bologna, this state of things makes second generation autonomous workers 
directly responsible for their actions and destinies (as opposed to traditional employees, 
posited as always able to act in deference to the organisational hierarchical structure of 
command as substitute for responsibility), while subjecting them to greater risks, not least that 
of confirming their ‘know-how’ while ‘exposing’ their ‘knowledge to the continuous ... 
metamorphoses’ of productive activity without the protection of ‘positional rents’ preserving 
‘the certainty of revenue’ (Bologna, Banfi, 2011, p.32). Yet, while this depiction of 
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 For example, and in this vein, Hardt and Negri (1994, p.278) propose the following account of the 
historical development of capitalism: ‘the history of capitalism and its historical merit were 
characterized by the process of successive abstractions of labor. In the most recent period, Taylorism 
determined the process of the abstraction of labor-power; Fordism made this abstract subjectivity 
available to the mechanisms of the collective negotiation of consumption, posing the bases of the State 
(and its public expenditures) within the productive mechanism; and Keynesianism proposed a 
progressive schema of proportions between socially necessary labor and surplus value, thus 
accomplishing the State's enormous task of organizing continuous compromises between antagonistic 
social subjects. Today, in the field of organized labor, these relationships have been overthrown’, for in 
‘the passage from Taylorism to post-Taylorism and from Fordism to post-Fordism, subjectivity and 
productive cooperation are posed as conditions not results of labor processes’. A similar example is 
found in Vercellone, 2007a (as abundantly discussed in the second chapter of this thesis). 
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 Despite its persistence in the history of capitalism, see Quinlan, 2012. 
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contemporary workers with permanent contracts of employment as benefitting from 
positional rents is inaccurate and unjustified, it also betrays, looming not so distantly, the 
influence and echo of Schumpeter’s favour for the risk-taking entrepreneur as romantic hero 
of capitalism and creative destruction and his equal dislike for the bureaucratised engineer (on 
which see Heilbroner, 1999 [1953]). This should not surprise, given Schumpeter’s participation 
in, and exchange with, Weimarian sociology (documented in Bologna, 1997b), from which 
Bologna draws significantly (see section 3.2). Further, Bologna’s preference is also predicated 
on the grounds of second generation autonomous workers’ incapacity to generate conflict, not 
due to a subjective reluctance but because of ‘the changed structure of the relations of 
production’ (Bologna, 2007, p.242).157 However, and regardless of the relatively greater 
purchase of Bologna’s analysis over that of Hardt and Negri, both accounts privilege a reductio 
ad unum over-emphasising selected elements of novelty into a “centrifugal” reading of 
contemporary dynamics drawing attention away from the direct capital-labour relation. 
Moving on to Formenti’s denunciation of the convergence of neoliberal and autonomist 
accounts of the KBE, one feature of Formenti’s account which does not go unnoticed is how 
much it shares with both objects of his vis polemica. Indeed, despite his harsh critique of the 
‘theorist of the end and of the refusal of work’, Formenti himself explicitly acknowledges 
sharing much of their analysis and reasoning (Formenti, 2011, pp.145-146), with the only point 
of ‘radical dissent’ being that of the identification of the ‘social subject’ meant to bring about 
the realisation of the political project elaborated by these two perspectives (provision of a 
basic income, ‘radical reduction of working time’, and ‘reconstruction of welfare’) (p.146). 
However, more subtle and unacknowledged is what Formenti shares with the neoliberal 
account of the KBE, i.e. the idea that customers ‘become “prosumers” by cocreating goods and 
services rather than simply consuming the end product’ (Tapscott, Williams, 2008, p.1; 
similarly, see ch. 5), thus becoming the driving force of value production in the (networked) 
KBE. Indeed, while Formenti dismisses the apologetic praise of the amateur underlying 
mainstream discourse on prosumption as the old ‘ideological trick’ of reducing ‘economic 
relations’ and the behaviour of ‘social actors to subjective motivations’ to mask ‘the reality’ of 
exploitation and ‘“unequal exchange” hiding beneath the “reciprocally satisfactory” relations 
between’ firms and prosumers (Formenti, 2011, p.58), this nonetheless implies that 
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 According to Bologna, this would be the main reason having precluded post-operaismo from the 
serious consideration of second generation autonomous work as a political subject (Bologna, 2007, 
p.242). However, for Bologna, if the capacity to generate conflict successfully is to be retained as a 
defining feature of political subjects, only the segment of the working class occupied in the logistic 
sector would qualify today as a ‘last area of manual work able to respond to the classical’ dictates of 
operaismo, as it ‘retains still intact the power of interruption of a productive cycle’ within post-Fordism 
(Bologna, 2007, p.90). 
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prosupmtion, i.e. the free work of consumers, is understood to be at the heart of exploitative 
social relations. Thus, it is worthwhile to analyse the concept of prosumption and its growing 
acceptance within radical and critical scholarship, its validity, and the effects of its uncritical 
acceptance within Formenti’s analysis. Doing so highlights how much Formenti’s discourse is 
itself part and parcel of the convergence he sets himself to denounce, and in stark 
contradiction with his own attempt to defend the validity of Marx’s thought (and, albeit 
implicitly, Marx’s value theory) for the analysis of contemporary capitalist dynamics. 
Coined by the futurologist Alvin Toffler (1980), the categories of prosumer and prosumption – 
portmanteaux combining the words producer/consumer and production/consumption – allude 
to the blurring of the distance and separation between the activities of production and 
consumption and the valorisation of the free work of consumers, processes which are 
understood to be at the heart of contemporary capitalism. Despite having lain dormant since 
Toffler’s coinage, these categories have recently resurfaced across a series of converging 
contemporary debates. Firstly, as surveyed by Formenti (2011), they have been taken up in the 
managerial discourses of business gurus.158 Secondly, they have risen to prominence in critical 
media studies, where they have proven appealing to provide material grounding to the 
theorisation of class, exploitation and value production on the internet.159 Here, they have 
allowed the networked computer (‘a universal machine that is simultaneously a means of 
production, circulation, and consumption’) and the attendant rise of user-generated content 
to be read as enabling ‘the emergence of the figure of the prosumer’ which, on the one hand, 
is seen as promising ‘a new model of cooperative production and socialization of the means of 
production, but, on the other hand, is antagonistically subsumed under the rule of capital’ 
(Fuchs, 2009, p.397). Furthermore, this endeavour has allowed drawing parallels and reviving 
continuity with earlier debates in the discipline (the “blindspot” debate and the debate on the 
“audience commodity”) and the contribution of its forefather, Dallas Smythe.160 The latter saw 
‘the shortcoming of the Western Marxist tradition’ in its construal of ‘the role of the mass 
media primarily in terms of its ability to reproduce’ capitalist ideology, therefore maintaining 
that their ‘actual economic function ... constituted a blind spot for Western Marxists’ 
(Caraway, 2012, p.695). To rectify this perceived negligence, Smythe posited that ‘mass 
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 See also Van Dijck, Nieborg, 2009 for a review of this literature. 
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 See, for example, Fuchs, 2010a. See also Fuchs, Dyer-Witheford, 2013 for an account of how the 
concept of prosumption is thought to be part and parcel of a broader revival of interest in Marxian 
thought and concepts within the burgeoning field of internet studies, not least with respect to the issue 
of the forms assumed by ‘the extraction of surplus value ... in cyberspace’ (p.78). For an account of the 
recent emergence of internet studies as a field in its own right, see Ess, Dutton, 2013. 
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 See Smythe, 1977, 2001. For positive discussions of Smythe’s influence on contemporary critical 
media studies, see: Manzerolle, 2010; Napoli, 2010; and Fuchs, 2012. But see also Lebowitz, 2009, ch. 12 
for critical assessment. 
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communications within monopoly capitalism have a commodity-form and that a materialist 
(i.e., Marxist) analysis required’ recognition ‘that the audience itself was the commodity in 
mass-produced, advertiser-supported communications. The audience, produced by the media-
capitalists and sold as a commodity to the advertisers, worked for the advertising capitalist (by 
learning to buy particular brands) – and, as such, produced surplus value ... Thus, the worker 
was exploited not only in the direct production process but also at home during “free time”, 
while watching’, and, therefore, subject to ‘a double exploitation’ (Lebowitz, 2009, p.218). 
Thirdly, the categories of prosumer and prosumption have been recently taken up in the 
sociology of consumption in the wake of the debates on the experience economy and the rise 
of immaterial production, allowing for the reconceptualisation of capitalism as prosumer 
capitalism. With this concept understood as a significant improvement on previous strands of 
social analysis – perceived as excessively “biased” towards production (as in the theories of 
Weber and Marx) or consumption (as in the theories of Galbraith or Baudrillard) (see Ritzer, 
Jurgenson, 2010 and Ritzer et al., 2012) – the emergence of prosumer capitalism as a historical 
process would, in this account, bring about ‘a new form of capitalism’ characterised by four 
fundamental radically new features: greater difficulty of capitalist control of prosumers (as 
opposed to ‘producers or consumers’) and ‘greater likelihood of resistance on the part of’ the 
latter; a form of exploitation that ‘is less clear-cut’; the potential emergence of ‘a distinct 
economic system ... where services are free and prosumers are not paid for their work’; and 
the rise of ‘abundance’ as central to the system (as opposed to scarcity), leading to ‘a focus on 
effectiveness’ (as opposed to efficiency) (Ritzer, Jurgenson, 2010, p.31).161 Unsurprisingly, 
given the greater autonomy from capital they attribute to the social productive process and 
social practices, both the debates on prosumption within critical media studies and the 
sociology of consumption recognise a kindred perspective in the work of post-workerist 
autonomist Marxists and the debate on immaterial labour and production.162 
However, despite its reception and rising popularity within critical scholarship, the concept of 
prosumption remains highly dubious. Firstly, it is highly ambiguous with respect to 
exploitation, labour and value. On the one hand, prosumption is seen as a form of super-
exploitation, with ‘capitalist systems’ understood as ‘able to extract value from the unpaid 
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 The rise of abundance would depend on the fact that prosumer capitalism, where user-generated 
content on the internet serves as model, ‘is based on a system where content is abundant and created 
by those not on the payroll’ (Ritzer, Jurgenson, 2010, p.30). 
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 For examples drawn from critical media studies, see: Terranova, 2000, 2004 (although she refers to 
“free labour” as opposed to prosumption, for the latter concept had not yet been imported 
systematically within critical media studies literature at that time); Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b; Caraway, 2012; 
and Fuchs, Dyer-Witheford, 2013. For the sociology of consumption, see: Codeluppi, 2012; Ritzer et al., 
2012; and Rey, 2012. 
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material labor of the prosumers on Web 2.0 sites and elsewhere (e.g., in the creation of brand 
meaning)’ and, therefore, ‘able to exploit consumers and in the process earn even greater 
profits than they would from the exploitation of workers’ (since ‘even the lowest paid workers 
are paid something’, while ‘prosumers work without any financial compensation’) (Ritzer et al., 
2012, p.383).163 On the other hand, prosumption is seen as entailing ‘little alienation’ as ‘the 
digital economy’ – which functions as model – ‘feeds off of a multitude of prosumers ... self-
motivated and requiring only a platform through which to express themselves’, with internet 
users ‘willing, even eager, to participate in activities that profit companies’ (through the sale of 
data on users to advertisers), ‘so long as nothing interferes with their ability to do whatever it 
is that they want to be doing’ (Rey, 2012, p.416).164 However, this 2.0 version of the “audience 
commodity” argument is subject to the same flaws plaguing the original version. Indeed, 
‘accepting the conception that audiences’ (or, in the 2.0 version, internet users) ‘work, are 
exploited, and produce surplus-value’ has little to do with the Marxian ‘tenet that surplus-
value in capitalism is generated in the direct process of production’, where workers ‘are 
compelled to work longer than is necessary to produce the equivalent of their wage’. In 
‘essence’, the argument emphasising prosumption as an exploitative mechanism of production 
and extraction of value amounts to ‘stressing surplus-value as the result of the ripping-off of 
consumers – although its form of presentation’ gives a Marxist veneer to the analysis through 
use of (misapplied) Marxian terminology and concepts (Lebowitz, 2009, p.219). Furthermore, 
by emphasising the sale of data on users by social media (such as Google or Facebook, for 
example) to advertisers as surplus-value extraction, the debate on prosumption implicitly 
espouses, as analytical starting point, ‘the self-conception of the media-capitalist in 
competition’. Indeed, from ‘the perspective of the media-capitalist, what it does is to produce 
audiences for the advertiser; what it does is sell audiences and audience-time to the 
advertiser. From the perspective of the individual media-capitalist, its profit is a direct function 
of its size of audience. Rather than as part of the process of selling the commodities of 
industrial capital to consumers, it necessarily appears as if the media-capitalists in competition 
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 There is some parallel, here, with Benkler’s (2006) “commons-based peer production” and 
Söderberg’s (2008) “play struggle”. For Benkler (2006, p.3), the capacity of networked computers to 
allow ‘cooperative and coordinate action’ to be ‘carried out through radically distributed, nonmarket 
mechanisms that do not depend on proprietary strategies’, is to be understood as leading social 
cooperation (i.e. nonmarket and non-proprietary production) to play a greater role within contemporary 
capitalism (as opposed to earlier epochs); following from this, for Benkler, social cooperation can, at 
present, effectively come to supplement, complement or even replace market exchange. Similarly, for 
Söderberg (2008, p.3) networked computers bring to the fore the category and ‘politics of play struggle’, 
whereby the latter concept is meant to emphasise ‘the distance’, in contemporary capitalism, ‘between 
doing and the wage relation’, with play (epitomised by hacking) showcasing ‘how labour self-organises 
its constituent power outside the confines of market exchanges’ (p.3). See also Terranova’s (2000, 2004) 
concept of “free labour”, which represents an antecedent of the use of the concept of prosumption 
within critical media studies, and van den Broek, 2010 for a critique. 
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sell consumers to industrial capital’ (Lebowitz, 2009, p.221). By doing so, though, and positing 
a particular business model as essential for redefining the functioning of capitalism,165 the 
analysis is limited to the level of appearances (as opposed to delving under the surface by 
starting from an abstract model of capital-in-general), thus implicitly rejecting the Marxian 
methodological premise (Lebowitz, 2009, p.222). 
However, the issue is not exclusively one of method, but also (and consequently) one of how 
to interpret correctly the dynamics at hand. For instance, Foley (2013) clarifies these issue and 
dynamics by drawing on the distinction between ‘value creation, surplus value generation, and 
surplus value appropriation’ (p.259). Indeed, while surplus value is generated at the direct 
point of (capitalist) production, ‘[t]he actual exploitation of productive wage workers’ also 
contributes to the constitution of a ‘global pool of surplus value’ for which firms compete and 
from which surplus value can be (and is) appropriated in a variety of ways (for example: 
‘monopolization of sectors of the market; marketing and advertising; establishment of 
intellectual property rights through patents, copyrights, and trademarks; ownership of scarce 
energy or other natural resources’; and ‘superior cleverness in arranging financial transactions 
or structuring financial property rights’) (p.260). Incomes generated from these activities are, 
in effect, part of, and a deduction from, the global pool of surplus value; and, while classical 
examples of this are readily found in financial incomes and rents over land and natural 
resources, the same applies to ‘incomes’ accruing ‘to knowledge- and information-based 
activities’ (p.264). Thus, ‘the existence of business models that generate revenue without any 
direct payments of users at all, such as social networking and web search’, can be readily 
understood in these terms, for ‘[t]he connection to the global pool of surplus value in these 
cases is rather direct, in that the incomes supporting these activities come from advertisers … 
willing to pay to divert spending toward themselves’ as they compete for ‘shares of global 
surplus value’. Therefore, “end users”, who(se data) ‘might just as well be viewed as a free 
input to the production process’, receive ‘a use-value (access to social networking or organized 
information) with no apparent payment at all’ (p.265). 
Two considerations follow from this. These “new” ‘business models’, which ‘seem to defy basic 
laws of economics’ and ‘promise an expansion of welfare without the expenditure of 
resources’ (and are even taken to signal the appearance of new, pervasive and all-embracing 
forms of exploitation), are nothing but ‘applications of old (and sometimes ancient) economic 
ideas to new technological possibilities’ (although they testify to how technical change can 
redefine and renegotiate the modalities of surplus value appropriation – see below for more 
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and the perplexities on its viability expressed by analysts, for example Lanier, 2010. 
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on this point). Further, while these modalities of surplus value appropriation can be viable for 
specific individual capitals, to treat them as valid for (if not as redefining of) the system as a 
whole amounts to ‘a fallacy of composition’, for ‘[a]ny individual creator can expand her or his 
income effectively without limit, but this does nothing to expand social value production or 
surplus value appropriation’ (p.265). The latter is especially true as there has to be a pool of 
value from which to draw on in the first place, and this is only constituted through surplus 
value generated at the direct point of production. 
Secondly, the enthusiasm for prosumption within the sociology of consumption extends the 
model of token examples, such as user-generated content on the internet or self-service in 
supermarkets and fast-food chains, into a reading of increased autonomy of the productive 
process within contemporary capitalism as a whole (see, for instance, Ritzer, Jurgenson, 2010 
and Ritzer et al., 2012). However, this rests on a one-sided reading of characteristically 
capitalist dynamics, mistaken for radically new features redefining capitalism and its workings. 
Indeed, capitalism is ‘a dynamic force’ based on ‘the interrelated processes of 
commodification and accumulation’ (Huws, 2003, p.152), with the former denoting ‘the 
tendency of capitalist economies to generate new and increasingly standardized products for 
sale in the market’, whose ‘sale will generate profits’ increasing ‘in proportion to the scale of 
production’ (with standardized products including mass-produced material products and 
services alike) (p.17). This provides an in-built imperative to pursue ‘greater routinization’ and 
‘increased productivity’ of work, as well as ‘centralization’ of activities and operations, 
resulting in ‘an ever-increasing amount of “consumption work” being foisted onto the 
consumer’ (also in the form of self-service) and the transfer of ‘expenditure of time, energy, 
and transportation costs’ to users (p.27). While this does not necessarily translate into greater 
control for consumers over their living and working lives, it often results in ‘a loss of control 
over the labor process of consumption work’ and reproduction, closely paralleling the ‘loss of 
control over labor processes in the workplace’ (p.54). On the other hand, ‘the substitution of 
the purchase of commodities for the hire of services also has the effect of substituting the 
unpaid labor of the consumer for the paid work of the service worker, and creating a number 
of new tasks connected with the purchase, operation, and upkeep of these domestic 
appliances’ (p.44). Thus, the ‘movement of some activities out of the sphere of unsocialized 
labor and into that of manufacturing’ and services is paralleled by a movement, mediated by 
technological change, of activities out of the service sector into manufacturing (p.65). In turn, 
these ‘new manufactured products’ give rise to ‘new consumption activities in the home or 
new forms of unsocialized labor’ (p.67). Therefore, the boundaries between socialised and 
unsocialised labour are, under capitalism, not only extremely porous, but also continuously 
156 
 
and dynamically renegotiated as a result of surplus-value production and the role of 
technological change within it. Indeed, ‘far from simply or exclusively exhibiting a tendency to 
absorb and (capitalist) commodify non-capitalist production ... capitalism equally has a 
tendency to expand non-capitalist (commodity) production’ through ‘the cheapening and 
availability of the means of production that non-capitalist producers can purchase from 
capitalists’, ‘the creation of the reserve army of labour ... within which non-capitalist forms of 
commercial activity survive on the margins (lumped together within the term “informal 
sector”)’, and ‘the tendency to socialize economic and social life ... through the agency of the 
state’, leading to ‘the displacement of capitalist by non-capitalist production and the expansion 
of a wide variety of non-capitalist forms of provision that are embroiled with capitalist 
production and provide markets for them’ (Fine, 2012b, p.451). Thus, it is the dynamic of 
capitalism itself (as opposed to new technologies or organisation and production methods) 
which constantly generates spaces for social autonomy at the same time as it generates and 
accumulates surplus-value (as opposed to univocally constraining or expanding the space and 
scope of commodity relations). 
Having assessed the resurgence and the shortcomings of the concept of prosumption, the link 
between Formenti’s analysis and the Negrian consensus is easily understood. Indeed, although 
not explicitly and purposefully deployed within Formenti’s analysis, the validity of the concept 
of prosumption is presupposed, functioning as metaphor implicitly grounding Formenti’s 
account of the processes of class recomposition. As evident from his critique of the neoliberal 
apology of the amateur, Formenti conceives of prosumption as super-exploitation. Although 
devoid of the positive effects in terms of increased autonomy from capital attributed to it in 
the debates in critical media studies and the sociology of consumption, this attitude simply 
reverses the portrayal of prosumption provided within contemporary managerial discourse 
without contesting the concept itself. Indeed, as the analysis of the concept, its history and 
trajectory provided above shows, at a theoretical level, prosumption is incoherent relative to 
Marxian value theory and its analysis of capitalism. Therefore, Formenti’s acceptance of this 
concept contradicts and undermines his own professed wish to ‘rediscover Marx’ (Formenti, 
2011, p.146) and his commitment to revive an analysis of contemporary capitalism rooted in 
the purposeful deployment of Marxian categories (which assumes the validity of value theory, 
as evident from the discussion of Formenti’s own account provided in section 3.3 above, 
Formenti, 2011, pp.107-119). Moreover, since Formenti is critical of post-workerism on the 
grounds of the ‘excessively abstract character of’ its ‘idea of work’ coinciding with ‘any 
manifestation of vital energy’ (Formenti, 2011, p.101), the acceptance of the concept of 
prosumption is even more striking, given how the latter portrays activities outside the point of 
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production as productive of value, and distinct activities such as production and consumption 
as one and the same. 
Nonetheless, irrespective of its coherence with Formenti’s own commitment to Marx against 
the excesses of post-workerism, the concept of prosumption also functions paradigmatically in 
Formenti’s account of networked capitalism, allowing him to portray the latter as having 
terminally neutralised class conflict in the West. Indeed, with value production and 
exploitation posited as having moved beyond the direct point of production and overflowed 
into consumption and reproduction activities, the Western working class is portrayed as 
“locked-in” to exploitation just as consumers are “locked-in” to corporate walled gardens 
through use of closed platforms and applications, happy and exploited (as the title of 
Formenti, 2011 has it). Implicit in this portrayal is the (conceptually and historically flawed) 
presupposition of the unproblematic translation of the dynamics that structure the 
technological domain into those that structure the historical domain, if not their homology. 
This is due to the convergence and superimposition of the theoretical and intellectual sources 
mobilised, implicitly and explicitly, by Formenti. Indeed, and firstly, Formenti takes for granted 
the common wisdom of popular writing on technology, unwittingly absorbing from it the 
concept of lock-in of technical standards (see footnote 135). Thus, Formenti’s reasoning, albeit 
inadvertently, echoes the homology established between the technical and the historical 
domains by David, who drew from Georgescu-Roegen (1976) the concept of the irreversibility 
of physical processes as inspiration for his own early work on technical change (David, 1975), 
only to recast it later, in the reformulated form of path dependence, and as a companion law 
governing the (irreversibility of) historical processes and institutions (David, 1985). Secondly, 
Formenti’s reasoning echoes closely the McLuhanite belief that the medium and, therefore, 
technology shape being and consciousness, though not the other way around.166 Lastly, 
Formenti’s reasoning reproduces, albeit in negative terms, the close fit and homology 
established by operaismo between the historical forms of the productive process, 
revolutionary figures (or otherwise identified agents of social change) and the forms of 
struggle and organisation. Thus, while other factors of Formenti’s analysis (such as the 
ideological mutation of the left, the heterogeneity of knowledge workers as a class, and the 
role of the world factory taken on by China) can be seen as having relative purchase, 
ultimately, it is the adoption of the concept of prosumption, together with its interaction with 
Formenti’s other theoretical and intellectual sources, which allows Formenti to displace the 
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processes and structures (re)producing their specific historical character and content. 
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class alliance he identified as revolutionary in his earlier work from networked (Western) 
capitalism to China. Formenti’s uncritical acceptance of the concept of prosumption is 
unsurprising, given his admitted acceptance of the analysis of the Negrian consensus (which, 
however, is itself surprising, given Formenti’s vigorously and acutely manifested awareness of 
its shortcomings), and the convergence of the latter and contemporary debates on 
prosumption within critical scholarship. However, this acceptance of the analytical validity of 
the concept of prosumption and its paradigmatic use allow Formenti’s analysis to dismiss 
Western working class behaviour as irrelevant, displaying a similar strategic disdain to that of 
the Negrian consensus for contemporary working classes (although targeting Western working 
classes as a whole and privileging class alliances in the developing world, as opposed to 
targeting traditional forms of work in favour of the multitude). Thus, what Formenti identifies 
as a ‘frankly “operaista” opinion’ (Formenti, 2011, p.138), rather than providing an alternative 
to the Negrian consensus, is simply a reversal of the latter’s one-sided positive reading of 
cognitive capitalism presented as forswearing of Formenti’s own original enthusiasm for 
knowledge workers as avant-garde. However, it is underpinned by the same substantive 
reasoning. 
3.5) Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an assessment of Negri’s critics of old turned into contemporary 
dissenters with respect to the Negrian consensus guiding the cognitive capitalism debate. 
While both Bologna and Formenti are often praised within Italian critical debates, not least 
because of their pivotal roles in earlier phases of the history of (post-)operaismo, this chapter 
has focused on showing how their analyses share with the object of their critiques much more 
than is usually recognised. Indeed, in pure post-workerist fashion, Bologna conflates different 
levels of abstraction (the historical and the logical), with the effect of reducing social relations 
of production and the (evolution of the) capitalist mode of production itself to, respectively, 
specific modalities of deploying labour and organising the labour process, on the one hand, 
and (the succession of) specific forms of exploitation, on the other. Although analytically 
flawed, and irrespective of the weight of own-account work and the validity of the concept of 
second generation autonomous worker, this allows Bologna to identify a segment of the 
labour force as typical of a specific epoch in the development of capitalism, portrayed as a 
“new” central actor of social change (as opposed to traditional workers, depicted as agents of 
the “old”). Considered that Bologna is himself a second generation autonomous worker (or, 
more prosaically, an independent worker), it is hard for the shrewd reader to resist the 
temptation to interpret this analysis as self-predicament writ large as a cross-section of 
society. Similarly, Formenti’s caustic critical analysis of the history, trajectory and development 
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of (post-)operaismo, together with his attempt to revive a commitment to the use of Marxian 
categories to analyse contemporary capitalism and its dynamics, are significantly undermined 
by his acceptance of the concept of prosumption. Mediated by the latter, much of the analysis 
of Hardt and Negri and of the Negrian consensus which Formenti has kicked out of the door 
comes back in surreptitiously through the window. Irrespective of all of this, though, the 
concept functions as vector for the shift to China of a “revolutionary” class alliance which 
Formenti had previously identified for the West, and for the portrayal (or redefinition) of the 
latter as happy and exploited. Thus, rather than presenting an alternative to the Negrian 
consensus more in line with Marxian political economy and the original operaismo of the 
1960s, the reflections of these post-workerist dissenters highlight further the state of 
suspension in which post-workerism survives. Thus, the battle for the heritage of operaismo 
itself stands reduced to nothing more than the struggle amongst competing spasmodic 
searches for revolutionary actors. However, all of these are animated by the same debased 
understanding of the processes of class recomposition and its disconnection from both 
broader political economic factors and a more complex, valid, even coherent, understanding of 
Marx’s political economy. 
The critiques of post-workerist dissenting voices presented in this chapter may seem harsh, 
and the debate over the heritage of operaismo sterile in times of depressed labour struggles. 
However, the post-workerist attitude towards the “traditional” (or Western) working class 
seems even more paradoxical in light of the powerful resurgence of issues, themes and, 
ultimately, political struggles very similar to those which were at the heart, if not outright 
constitutive, of the original Italian operaismo of the 1960s. These are attested in Italy by the 
recent resumption of conflict at FIAT (a locus classicus of operaismo) through the attempts of 
its Chief Executive Officer (Sergio Marchionne) to redefine the Italian system of industrial 
relations (Garibaldo, 2011; Gruppo Lavoro del Centro per la riforma dello Stato, 2011). 
Similarly, the recent controversies surrounding the ILVA steel plant in Taranto, threatened with 
closure due to its environmental and health hazards (Donadio, 2012), recall the early operaista 
engagement with similar issues in Porto Marghera (another locus classicus of operaismo, see 
Wright, 2002). Indeed, it is precisely because of the weakness of workers’ movements and the 
crisis of representation of their interests (together with the aggravation of both during the 
current crisis) that a resurgence of the classical analysis of operaismo could (and should) be 
called for. However, if post-workerist dissent dissatisfyingly displays similar shortcomings to 
the Negrian consensus, a new generation of writing in the tradition of classical operaismo 
(both in terms of method – conricerca, that is, militant enquiry carried out through direct 
involvement with workers and trade unions – and classical locus of analysis – FIAT and its place 
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and role in the system of Italian industrial relations) has recently appeared on the scene 
(Gruppo Lavoro del Centro per la riforma dello Stato, 2011). Although it is too early to judge its 
role in the context of the fortunes of (post-)operaismo, one cannot but share Mario Tronti’s 
(2011) high hopes for it. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has been largely a work of criticism. However, and significantly, this is not how it 
was originally intended. Indeed, the analytical ambitions and interests leading me to undertake 
this research project, together with the specific path followed during its course, were inspired 
by the aim of providing an answer, albeit a critical one, to questions and concerns similar to 
those animating much of the scholarship assessed throughout this thesis. These relate to the 
appropriate determination and conceptualisation of the socio-economic foundations of the 
KBE, the development of an understanding of what the latter imply in terms of labour process 
analysis, exploitation and class dynamics, as well as the appropriate conceptualisation of the 
place and role of software, networked computers and their attendant processes of 
informatisation in contemporary capitalism (not least with respect to their consequences for 
the capital-labour relation). Yet, genuine engagement with the theories discussed (together 
with their origins, trajectories and implications) and the issues they address has led me to 
develop a critical outlook on the KBE and the debates commonly associated with it. At this 
juncture, it is appropriate to reflect on whether this is a product of the existing scholarship 
(which would then invite the rectification of the latter’s flaws and deficiencies, its extension, or 
the provision of (yet) an(other) alternative version and understanding of the KBE), or whether 
it is a product of the research questions themselves. On the grounds of what has been argued 
and demonstrated throughout this thesis, there is good reason to lean towards the second 
option. This has several implications for my future research and for future scholarship more 
generally, and this conclusion will address them by way of venturing on a more speculative 
exercise than the chapters that have preceded it and rather than offering a mundane summary 
of what has gone before. 
To begin with, as demonstrated at several junctures and in different ways throughout this 
thesis, the concept of KBE immediately brings to the fore the issues of continuity and change 
across socio-economic systems and, ultimately, the issue of historicity. However, as 
demonstrated in the course of this thesis, closer inspection of the claims of historical novelty 
attached to both the KBE and its post-workerist version, cognitive capitalism, fall short of 
rigorous scrutiny. Once recognising the obvious claims for the transhistorical nature of 
knowledge, science and technology as determinants of socio-economic development, rather 
than speaking of a KBE, it is more appropriate and useful to address the historically-
determined character of the use, production, reproduction and accumulation of knowledge 
(together with that of science and technology), of the economy (together with its institutions, 
dynamics, processes and structures), of the mutual relations of co-determination between 
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these domains of social life, and of the social relations embedding them. This, in turn, shifts 
the intellectual tasks at hand to the identification of the specific historical character and 
content of the knowledge, science and technology base of any given society, together with its 
relations with, and embedding in, both its immediate socio-institutional context and the 
broader systemic framework and logic provided by capitalist social relations of production. 
This thesis has demonstrated how, albeit in different ways, this represents a stumbling block 
for the theories discussed and criticised. Indeed, the mainstream version of the KBE (together 
with the grievances of those opposing the privatisation and commercialisation of knowledge) 
is built on the characterisation of knowledge as a public good, that is, on what are understood 
to be intrinsic and timeless properties of knowledge (i.e. non-rivalry and non-excludability), 
which are then (mis)construed as underpinning the current stage of the material organisation 
of economic activity as a whole. However, such an analytical starting point precludes from the 
outset awareness and the appropriate treatment of socio-historical specificity, together with 
its embedding in the dialectic between the contextual and the systemic (in both its concrete 
manifestations and abstract logic). 
To accuse post-workerism of exactly the same neglect of historicity would be both wrong and 
an exaggeration. Yet, albeit in much more complex ways and despite having their own distinct 
conception of historicity – manifest in their (flawed) attempts to periodise the historical 
development of capitalism – Hardt and Negri’s characterisation of contemporary capitalism 
and its recasting as cognitive capitalism are plagued by a similar faith in the intrinsic properties 
and “indomitable” character of knowledge, although this time transported to the domain of 
the labour process. Indeed, Hardt and Negri and the cognitive capitalism debate build an 
understanding of contemporary capitalism around the primacy (or hegemony) of immaterial 
labour (Hardt, Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009) and the cognitive dimension of labour (Vercellone, 
2007a). These are thought to imply the direct mobilisation of the linguistic and cognitive 
abilities of workers within the labour process and, therefore, are understood as inherently 
leading to cooperation, making labour inherently autonomous, and the fruits of labour 
inherently inalienable and inexpropriable. Yet, at the starting point of this analysis are generic 
human qualities which become work only when subsumed within a specific labour process. To 
deduce automatically from these qualities and content of work the spontaneity of 
cooperation, autonomy (from capital) and the inalienability and inexpropriability of the 
products of labour, amounts to a simplistic neglect of the specific content and characteristics 
of the particular labour processes in which these faculties are deployed, and to downplay the 
historically-given social relations of production within which these take place. In other words, 
the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism draws implications for (and 
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generalisations over) the status of the labour process within capitalism as a whole, together 
with the corresponding social relations of production of which it is part, from the content of 
work performed and the human qualities mobilised within it. But this is to misinterpret the 
hierarchical historical set of relations of determination, whereby human qualities are deployed 
(and constrained) in specific activities and labour processes which are, in turn, embedded in 
(i.e. shaped, structured and constrained by) historically-given social relations of production. 
A further and more concrete opportunity for the polemical illustration of the problems raised 
by the appropriate consideration of historicity and specificity is easily provided by the way in 
which the theories discussed in this thesis neglect or address the role of finance within 
contemporary capitalism, whether or not they draw a relation between the latter and the KBE 
and, if they do so, how they conceptualise this relation itself. Indeed, as demonstrated, for 
mainstream economics the KBE and the debates related to it have provided, albeit unwittingly, 
a useful distraction from, and a rhetorical strategy to imprint a positive spin on, otherwise 
troubling phenomena such as the deindustrialisation of the West (Mirowski, 2011) and its 
relation to the rise of finance within and without the latter. If anything, as the first chapter 
demonstrates, in many ways the mainstream version of the KBE epitomises the failure of 
mainstream economics to see the current stage of the material organisation of economic 
activity as one of financialised capitalism, together with what this has entailed for the structure 
of employment and the content of work (Thompson, 2013), productive activity, and the 
economy as a whole. In this, mainstream economics has paralleled and mirrored a more 
general trend pertaining to the rhetoric of the KBE which, despite being more prominent than 
the shareholder value discourse (corresponding to the maximisation of shareholder value as a 
principle of corporate governance, see Lazonick, O’Sullivan, 2000), has been much less 
consequential than the latter in exerting material effects on the economy (Thompson, Harley, 
2012). This, in itself, serves as an invitation to broaden the focus of my research to finance in 
its own right, but also in relation to both the changes that its rise has entailed for the economy 
as a whole and the consequences of this for the use, production, reproduction and 
accumulation of knowledge (within and without finance and the economy). In this respect, and 
on the basis of what has been discussed in this thesis, a useful point of departure for my future 
research is easily found in the burgeoning field of the social studies of finance. This has 
recently emerged from the application of the insights of the sociology of scientific knowledge 
of Callon, Latour and the like to the areas of economics and the economy in general, and 
finance in particular (Barry, Slater, 2002a, 2002b; MacKenzie et al., 2007). This field is 
extremely interesting, for it represents an increasingly prominent interdisciplinary attempt to 
re-embed an understanding of the economic, finance and financial practices, within social 
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praxis and the social as a whole. Thus, it is a welcome departure from the neglect of these very 
same issues characteristic of orthodox economics. Yet, my suspicion (to be confirmed, or not, 
through future research) is that such an approach is also flawed and deficient for the peculiar 
and idiosyncratic understanding of the interaction of the economic, the material, the social, 
the political, the cultural and the ideal characterising the work of its proponents (Fine, 2003a), 
and for its neglect of how each of these and their interaction are embedded within, and 
shaped and constrained by, the logic and functioning of capitalist socio-economic structures, 
dynamics, processes and relations of production (which, indeed, tend to be purposefully set 
aside). 
By contrast with the mainstream version of the KBE, Hardt and Negri’s post-workerist 
conceptualisation of contemporary capitalism and its recasting as cognitive capitalism 
explicitly recognise, understand and theorise the rise of finance as not only coeval, but also 
integral, to the constitution and workings of cognitive capitalism. As discussed in the second 
chapter, the post-workerist reading of contemporary capitalism identifies the causes of the 
rise of finance in the putative breakdown of the Fordist social division of labour (for which it 
credits the cycle of struggles of the mass worker), and the putatively consequent retreat of 
capital into forms of valorisation posited as “autonomous” from the direct process of 
production (following the post-workerist (mis)construal of capital as increasingly unable to 
exert direct control over the production process because of the new biopolitical character of 
labour) (Corsani et al., 2001; Vercellone, 2007a; Moulier Boutang, 2008; Hardt, Negri, 2009). 
Further, post-workerism posits financial mechanisms of accumulation as the central 
mechanism of accumulation within cognitive capitalism, and understands this as causing the 
blurring of the differences between rent and profit (if not the “becoming” rent by profit itself, 
Vercellone, 2007b), and the preponderance of rent as the primary form of value in 
contemporary capitalism (Hardt, Negri, 2009; Formenti, 2011). However, this account of the 
rise of finance is highly problematic. This is not exclusively because of its (at best) 
impressionistic reading of class struggle and its outcomes, nor exclusively because of its 
equally impressionistic mobilisation of the categories of profit and, or as, rent (where the latter 
is used as a general catch-all category, encompassing different specific types of revenues 
originating from activities as diverse as control over landed property and intellectual property, 
Hardt, Negri, 2009, to pretty much anything else, once it is seen through the lenses of 
prosumption, Formenti, 2011, see the third chapter of this thesis). Indeed, what is strikingly 
peculiar of this reading of the rise of finance is how it is predicated with very little (if any) 
reference to the social, political and economic dynamics of, and appropriate analytical 
categories for, finance itself. Consequently, this account ultimately betrays a functionalist, if 
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not teleological, reading of the rise of finance and its workings, where the latter are 
understood and theorised exclusively in relation to the putative exigencies and functioning of 
cognitive capitalism. My suspicion is that this is one further example and outcome of the 
conflation of the historical and the abstract/logical which plagues the post-workerist 
understanding of the historical development of capitalism (which has been demonstrated 
throughout the thesis, not least in the third chapter with respect to contemporary forms of 
post-workerist dissent with both Hardt and Negri’s theories and the hypothesis of cognitive 
capitalism). This, in itself, opens a new avenue for my future research, whereby the 
interpretation of post-workerism developed in this thesis can be expanded to encompass the 
post-workerist writings directly concerned with finance and its role in the current crisis 
(Marazzi, 1998, 1999, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Fumagalli, Mezzadra, 2010). 
Given the deficiencies of both the mainstream version of the KBE and the post-workerist 
account of cognitive capitalism (not least with respect to the issues and concerns raised in the 
previous two paragraphs), it is worthwhile and dutiful to emphasise how a small body of 
scholarship (on which this thesis has drawn in the first chapter, even if sometimes only 
tangentially) has recently begun to develop around the idea that the history of science, 
together with the historical development of the knowledge, science and technology base of 
society, can be understood ‘as a sequence of temporally specific “regimes” of economic and 
social organization, intertwined with changes in the ecology of the sciences themselves’ 
(Mirowski, 2011, p.91) (see: Mirowski, Van Horn, 2005; Mirowski, Sent, 2008; Mirowski, 2008, 
2011; Coriat, 2002a, 2002b; Coriat, Orsi, 2002; Coriat et al., 2003; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012; 
Orsi, 2002; Orsi, Moatti, 2001; Orsi, Coriat, 2005, 2006; the connection along these lines 
between the work of Coriat and his associates and that of Mirowski and his associates is 
established by Mirowski himself, see Mirowski, 2011). This literature is important because, by 
developing the idea of regimes of science organisation, its authors have sketched a portrait of 
the socio-economic institutions, structures, dynamics and processes underpinning the 
production and reproduction of the contemporary knowledge, science and technology base. In 
doing so, and in more (Mirowski, 2011) or less (Coriat, Weinstein, 2012) explicitly rejecting the 
concept of KBE, these authors have focused primarily on tracing the contours and evolution of 
the contemporary knowledge, science and technology base with specific emphasis on the U.S. 
in the twentieth century. Indeed, it is there that we find, at the end of the 1970s, the roots of 
the changes, tendencies and processes which have brought about, and shaped the political 
economy of, what this literature identifies as the current global regime of commercialised 
science (Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). However, this is not meant to cast the 
specific case of the U.S. as a generalising narrative valid for all times and places since, for 
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example, the need for more (non-U.S.) country- and region-specific accounts in the same vein, 
attentive to the dynamic interaction of the contextual and the systemic, is clearly expressed in 
Mirowski, 2011, and the similarities and differences between Europe and the U.S. (together 
with the tendencies of homogenisation to, and harmonisation with, the U.S. experience 
emerging at the European level) are clearly delineated (see: Orsi, 2002; Orsi, Moatti, 2001; 
Coriat, 2002a; Coriat, Orsi, 2002; Orsi, Coriat, 2005, 2006; Mirowski, 2011). 
More to the point, though, the greatest merit of this literature lies in having provided an 
historical account of the institutional socio-economic conditions allowing scientific activity and 
the production of basic knowledge to become fungible and, therefore, incorporable within 
market relations as an object of market transactions (Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). 
Further, this account does not limit itself to highlighting, as the cause of the latter phenomena 
and processes, the legal changes enabling the quantitative and qualitative evolution in the 
domain of patents and IPRs (as is instead typical of the rhetoric and scholarship of those 
decrying the commercialisation of knowledge and science on the grounds of their 
characterisation as public goods). On the contrary, this account highlights how changes (both 
legislative and jurisprudential) in the legal domain in the U.S. have interacted with equally 
important material changes and processes within and across other institutional areas 
underpinning the functioning of the economy. The most relevant ones include: the 
transformations in the internal organisation of, and external links between, firms and 
corporations; the historical evolution of the status of labour within the latter (not least with 
respect to the ownership over the products of on-the-job inventive activity); the historical 
evolution of competition/anti-trust policy; and the emerging complementarities between 
these changes and those (not least regulatory) affecting financial markets in the U.S., 
ultimately coalescing to allow the launch (and quotation on financial markets) of firms whose 
activity is primarily concerned with basic scientific research (Mirowski, Van Horn, 2005; 
Mirowski, Sent, 2008; Mirowski, 2011; Orsi, Coriat, 2006; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). This 
literature convincingly demonstrates that the changes in the legal domain enabling the recent 
quantitative and qualitative evolution of patents and IPRs have been certainly one of the 
intermediate causes of the commercialisation of knowledge but, however influential, not the 
primary cause (Mirowski, 2011). Thus, given its attachment to the historically-grounded 
analysis of specific socio-economic institutions, dynamics and processes, this literature moves 
beyond, and represents a sound prophylactic against, the essentialism of the rhetorical and 
scholarly characterisation of knowledge as a public good. Further, it also moves beyond the 
(ineffectiveness of the often exclusively) moral outcry of those opposing the privatisation and 
commercialisation of knowledge on the basis of the latter’s characterisation as a public good, 
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by demonstrating the worst material consequences of the commercialisation of scientific 
research. These include: the debasement of the quality and character of the contemporary 
knowledge, science and technology base, manifest (for example) in the degradation of the 
quality of patents granted (accurately demonstrated in Mirowski, 2011; see also Coriat, 
Weinstein, 2012); the proliferation of obstacles (legal or otherwise) to the circulation of 
knowledge, not least in the form of blockages to both upstream and downstream research and 
development (Coriat, Orsi, 2006; Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012); and an 
interpenetration of finance and the production of knowledge which, by making the latter 
highly dependent on the vagaries and instability of the former, is highly detrimental for the 
production of knowledge itself (Mirowski, 2011; Coriat, Weinstein, 2012). 
This body of literature represents, in my opinion, the best contemporary writing on the 
interaction between the economy and the issues related to the use, production, reproduction 
and accumulation of knowledge within contemporary capitalism. However, given the 
theoretical concerns animating this thesis, it also opens the way to two future possible areas of 
research. First, the historical and institutional analysis pioneered by this literature with respect 
to the study of the knowledge, science and technology base can be extended, at the empirical 
level, to specific country experiences hitherto not analysed in this frame. In doing so, though, 
the analysis could be significantly strengthened and enriched theoretically by being 
complemented with a perspective rooted in a sound commitment to Marxian value theory; 
this would make it possible to frame and embed the dialectic between the contextual and the 
systemic within a deep theoretical understanding of the interaction of socio-economic 
categories, dynamics, processes and structures, yet maintaining the analysis open to 
accommodating appropriately the institutional, the contingent and the contextual. Second, the 
body of literature addressed in this paragraph clearly emphasises how patents and IPRs, 
contrary to their standard treatment within mainstream economics as an incentive to 
innovative investment and activity (discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, but see also 
Foray, 2006), are best understood as an anti-competitive device. However, from the point of 
view of Marxist economic analysis, this invites the development of an understanding of 
intellectual property in terms of value theory which, at the logical level, draws inspiration from 
Marx’s analysis of ground-rent, while at the same time being mindful of the specific role played 
by intellectual property within contemporary capitalism and, therefore, of its historically-
specific conditions of existence and nature (similarly Jeon, 2010 with respect to the use of the 
category of rent within the cognitive capitalism debate). 
At a deeper level of the sociology of knowledge, two further issues must be emphasised to 
explain the conceptual instability of the KBE. First, at a theoretical level, is the very inability to 
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give strong foundations to the concept itself. Indeed, this acts as a powerful force pushing the 
analysis in the wrong directions and beyond what is justifiable, generalising the particular (by 
magnifying select aspects of reality into descriptions of contemporary capitalism as a whole) 
and undermining sound theoretical conceptualisation. For mainstream economics, this 
inability is due to the absence of a sound understanding of knowledge, the economy, and their 
interaction. Further, this is reinforced by that, instead of engaging with these deficiencies as 
such (as implicitly advocated by Boulding, 1966, for example, in his warning to the discipline of 
the origins and consequences of its neglect of the relation between knowledge and the 
economy), mainstream economics attempts to compensate for them in arbitrary ways, not 
least in accordance with the idiosyncrasies of those who engage in the debate. By contrast, for 
the post-workerist school this inability follows from the abandonment of the method, theories 
and concepts of Marxist economics, which would otherwise allow a proper understanding of 
the shifting but unavoidable presence in the capitalist economy of a relation between 
knowledge and the economy. Indeed, it is by relinquishing these methods, theories and 
concepts that post-workerism is able to (mis)construe the old (i.e. the generic interaction 
between knowledge and the economy) as the new (i.e. cognitive capitalism), and to (mis)read 
the latter as having brought about unprecedented levels of autonomy of labour from capital 
and the promise of “the common” (Hardt, Negri, 2009) as a communism almost at one’s 
fingertips (as opposed to the increasing subsumption of the production, reproduction and 
accumulation of knowledge within capitalist social relations of production, together with the 
consequences of this discussed and highlighted in the previous paragraph). 
The second issue that is worthy of emphasis is how much the specification of the foundations 
for the KBE has not only functioned, for the theories and theorists discussed, as a target in 
itself, but also as a means for the purposes and self-affirmation of those engaging in the 
debate, be it within the confines of their discipline, across the confines of scholarship and 
policymaking, or within and beyond the confines of their own way of thinking and community 
of reference. These tendencies have interacted with, and ultimately reinforced, the conceptual 
instability of the KBE emanating from the inability to provide the concept with strong 
foundations. For the mainstream, a key illustrations of this is readily provided by Foray and 
David’s use of the(ir) mainstream version of the KBE to displace the NSI approach from its 
foothold in the reflections on science and technology at the OECD in the late 1990s (David, 
Foray, 1995). A similar example is provided by Stiglitz’s defence of the World Bank and its 
workings on the grounds of its nature as a Knowledge Bank, fit for filling the gaps in knowledge 
across the developed and developing worlds (Stiglitz, 1999c). For the marxisant (or, perhaps 
more appropriately, post-Marxist) approaches discussed in the course of the thesis, the 
169 
 
primary example of this tendency is provided by the social philosophers (the producers of 
knowledge par excellence?) identifying the immaterial labourer (however evanescing its 
definition and correspondence with an actual constituency) as the central subject of 
contemporary capitalism and, therefore, key contemporary revolutionary subject (Hardt, 
Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009). Similar examples are readily provided by the freelance workers 
identifying freelance work as the typical condition of labour within contemporary capitalism 
and the appropriate basis for the refoundation of society in more equitable terms (Bologna, 
2007; Bologna, Banfi, 2011), if not by the radical critical media theorists (Fuchs, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b, 2012; Formenti, 2011; Caraway, 2012) converging with the sociologists of consumption 
(Ritzer, Jurgenson, 2010; Ritzer et al., 2012; Rey 2012) in identifying the role of new media and 
consumption practices in bringing about the newest, inescapable and ultimate (though 
ambiguous) forms of exploitation. 
Yet, the critiques expressed and elaborated throughout this thesis, together with the forces 
determining the conceptual instability of the KBE, suggest that to understand the relations 
between knowledge and the economy requires a continuing commitment to the appropriate 
categories of analysis for the study of capitalism, the economy, and (the use, production, 
reproduction and accumulation of) knowledge. However, they also show that these categories 
cannot be used deterministically or by reduction to construct a notion of the KBE from which 
the implications usually attributed to the latter (and debunked in this thesis) can be drawn. 
One of the best illustrations of this is provided by the study of the socio-economic dynamics 
attached to software, networked computers and their attendant processes of informatisation. 
Indeed, the tendency is to read these as either more (Benkler, 2006) or less (Gorz, 2003; 
Söderberg, 2008) univocally liberational or as harbingers of more pervasive and all-embracing 
forms of oppression (Formenti, 2011) – if not as simultaneously liberational (for they entail less 
alienation through user active participation and engagement) and oppressive (for they are 
socially ubiquitous), once the category of prosumption is embraced (Fuchs, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b, 2012; Rey, 2012). However, perhaps the point is that a proper understanding of the 
socio-economic dynamics attached to software, networked computers and their attendant 
processes of informatisation cannot be developed by abstracting from the specific socio-
economic relations within which these are embedded (e.g. the labour process as opposed to, 
or at least as well as, the household) (Huws, 2003). This, in itself, opens a further future area 
and prospect for research, whereby the overarching and generalising claims made within the 
literature adhering to the concept of prosumption can be contrasted with, and potentially 
refuted with ideas and evidence drawn from, the treatment of software, networked 
170 
 
computers and their attendant processes of informatisation within the labour process 
literature. 
In conclusion, and however much, if naively taken at face value, the KBE concept seems to 
provide a “materialist” account of the sources of change within and across socio-economic 
systems, the recognition of the historically-determined character of the content and conditions 
of production, reproduction and accumulation of knowledge, together with that of the 
material organisation of economic activity itself, raise the issue of the appropriate 
conceptualisation of the dynamic interaction between knowledge and the capitalist economy. 
This cannot but be an interdisciplinary endeavour since, at a more abstract level, it entails the 
determination of the appropriate conditions and methods for the conceptualisation of the 
dynamic interaction and (co)evolution of the economic, the material, the social, the political, 
the ideal and the cultural. However, such an endeavour cannot but have at its basis a rigorous 
approach to the respectful dialogue between and across disciplines, the use of methods, 
concepts and theories (together with their history, original context of application, trajectory 
and implications), as well as the rigorous treatment of the objects of its analysis. This thesis 
has demonstrated, at various junctures and in various ways, how this has been lacking in the 
debates assessed. The path that I have followed in my investigation of the socio-economic 
foundations of the KBE has been marked by the nature of the discipline and its reception of 
the concept in both its mainstream and marxisant versions, as well as by the nature of the 
tasks that the latter receptions have set for themselves. However, what the thesis has 
demonstrated, ultimately, is how it is these very tasks which have led, in various ways, to 
arbitrary breaches with sound methods, theories and concepts, in order to reach conclusions 
set by the tasks themselves. All of this leads to the provisional conclusion that specifying 
capitalism in terms of KBE is inappropriate. However, it also opens the prospect of developing 
an appropriate understanding of the uses, production, reproduction and accumulation of 
knowledge within a capitalist economy. 
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